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ABSTRACT
From an individual perspective, one important way through which economics affects our daily
lives is the framing of choices we make about our jobs, school, and what we have for dinner. Peo-
ple make thousands of decisions everyday, and economics deals with the optimization of those
decisions in terms of individuals and society as a whole. Classical economic theory deals with the
optimization of individuals’ utility based on the rationality assumption. This dissertation studies
individuals’ decision-making from the perspective of behavioral economics which is primarily con-
cerned with bounded rationality. I specifically focus on three different types of decision-making:
insurance-purchasing, competition entry and employees’ labor effort choice.
In chapter 1, I compare agricultural insurance purchasing decisions under three different in-
surance schemes: purely voluntary, purely compulsory and mixed insurance (i.e. insurance with
a compulsory and a voluntary part). The question of what type of agricultural insurance has the
highest social welfare has received a great deal of attention in theoretical studies. However, a gen-
eral consensus is far from being reached. In addition, there is no empirical study comparing all
three insurance schemes in previous literature. It is very difficult to find a natural experiment or
use empirical data to compare all three insurance types simultaneously. In order to investigate this
question, adverse selection and moral hazard are two main issues that need to be jointly addressed.
In this chapter, I use the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) as the assessment of risk-taking and
insurance context to conduct an online experiment. I find adverse selection in purely voluntary
insurance, but advantageous selection in mixed insurance. Moral hazard exists in all three types of
insurance, but it is smaller in mixed insurance. The ancillary results suggest that under the com-
bined effects of significant moral hazard and “no adverse selection" in purely compulsory insurance
make it the insurance type with the lowest social earnings. Overall there is no crowding-out effect
of the compulsory part on residual voluntary purchases in mixed insurance.
In chapter 2, I study the effects of social roles on willingness to compete, especially for women.
It has been well documented that women often respond less favorably to competition than men even
ii
when they have similar abilities. Economists are increasingly interested in investigating whether
such gender differences in competitiveness may be useful for explaining persistent labor market
differences. Competition aversion may explain why women are less likely to seek job promotions
or to choose more lucrative and competitive fields [1]. Selecting out of certain labor markets is
costly for society, especially when competent women are reluctant to compete for positions for
which they are the best suited candidate. In this chapter, I ask whether social roles play an im-
portant role in individuals’ willingness to compete by running a laboratory experiment. Subjects
compete in two-person teams. In the treatment, one team member is randomly assigned the role of
“breadwinner", and the other person is randomly assigned as the “supporter". There are no differ-
ences between the roles in terms of payment, power, or effort. The only difference is the framing of
the gender roles reminiscent of western society. In the baseline, subjects compete without any role
assignment. We find women’s WTC increases by 36.5% when they are assigned as breadwinners
compared to women in the baseline. The increase in WTC is mainly driven by high-ability women,
and their expected earnings are 44.2% higher compared to high-ability women in the baseline. In
the treatment, breadwinner’s WTC is significantly higher than the supporter’s WTC for both men
and women, and the overall gender gap in WTC is not significant. We examine confidence, risk
preferences, responsibility and social norms for competitiveness as potential mechanisms through
which social roles affect WTC. We further test and replicate our laboratory results in an online
experiment using roles prevalent in the workplace: “manager" and “assistant".
In chapter 3, I focus on the effects of promises on employees’ effort choices. A strong em-
ployment relationship benefits the satisfaction, productivity and welfare of employees, and it is the
key to the success of an organization. We experimentally examine the effects of using non-binding
promises along with a claimed wage from the employee to boost the wage and effort level in a one-
shot gift-exchange game. The “claim and promise" setup allowed us to test reciprocity in the “gift
exchange" between employers and employees and the guilt-aversion theory in promise-keeping.
We find that when the employer trusts the employee and provides at least the claimed wage, the
employee reciprocates by keeping his promise or exerting an even higher level of effort. However,
iii
when the employer offers a wage lower than the claimed wage, the employee retaliates by break-
ing the promise. The main results hold when employees must perform a real-effort task. In the
real-effort paradigm, employers are less trusting, and there is less retaliation from employees due
to the extra information about ability. In both stated and real effort paradigms, the wage, effort
level, and final social payoffs are higher in the trust scenario of the “claim and promise" treatment
compared to the baseline. We used pupil dilation and eye-tracking lookup patterns to help assess
guilt and reciprocity dynamically and test the psychological game theory model.
iv
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1. INTRODUCTION AND COMPARISONS OF INSURANCE TYPES: AN ONLINE
EXPERIMENT1
1.1 Introduction
Agricultural production is inherently a business with risk and uncertainty.2 Farmers face a va-
riety of production and price uncertainty resulting from weather, pests, the market, and many other
factors. Agricultural insurance plays an important role in protecting farmers against these risks and
helping them make better investment decisions. Insurance is not only a topic of interest to farmers,
but also to insurance providers and policy makers.3 Agricultural insurance can be classified into
two broad categories: Compulsory (government/public) and Voluntary (market/private). Producers
can freely choose to purchase voluntary insurance or not, but they are unable to refuse compulsory
insurance. For example, in Japan, crop insurance is compulsory for farmers who grow crops over
three-fourths of an acre. In India and Philippines, farmers who access loans from banks and other
financial institutions are required to buy crop insurance. Compulsory agricultural insurance is
usually provided and required by the government. The other category —voluntary insurance— is
normally provided by private insurance companies. Many kinds of agricultural insurance, such as
flood insurance, livestock and weather insurance in many countries around the world belong to this
category. In practice, the vast majority of compulsory insurance is partially compulsory. In this
case, public insurance provides only partial coverage, and it allows for supplemental voluntary pur-
chases. For example, flood insurance is compulsory to high-risk flood areas in the United States,
but the compulsory requirement can be for partial coverage. Mixed insurance is also relevant in
other domains outside of agriculture. For example, the U.S. Medicare program covers only half of
all health expenditures for Americans aged 65 and older. In these cases, people can freely choose
to buy additional health insurance from the private market to increase their coverage. In our article,
1Reprinted with permission from “Compulsory versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment" by Peilu
Zhang and Marco A. Palma, 2021. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 103.1, 106-125, Copyright [2021]
by Wiley.
2This study was approved by the IRB.
3In the United States, Federal Crop Insurance represents 9% of the latest Farm Bill.
1
we refer to this type of insurance as mixed insurance.
Not surprisingly, the question of what type of agricultural insurance has the highest social
welfare has received a great deal of attention in theoretical studies. However, a general consensus
is far from being reached. In addition, there is no empirical study comparing all three insurance
schemes in previous literature. It is very difficult to find a natural experiment or use empirical data
to compare all three insurance types simultaneously. In order to investigate this question, adverse
selection and moral hazard are two main issues that need to be jointly addressed. The objective
of this paper is to conduct an experiment to compare the three insurance schemes in terms of
both adverse selection and moral hazard. A theoretical model is constructed and tested using the
experimental data.
In our experiment, we use the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) as the assessment of risk-
taking and economic context in which insurance options are set to protect participants from zero
earnings due to explosions of balloons. BART, developed by [4], is a balloon-pumping task used to
measure risk-taking behavior. By setting different balloons with or without insurance options, our
experimental design allows for testing advantageous/adverse selection and moral hazard for each
insurance scheme.
Adverse selection is a well-known phenomenon in the insurance market. It describes a sit-
uation where an individual’s demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual’s
riskiness. Due to asymmetric information, insurers are not able to distinguish high-risk individ-
uals from low-risk individuals.4 More recently, however, a growing empirical literature suggests
a negative relationship between insurance demand and riskiness [10, 11, 12, 13], which conflicts
with the implications of the standard economic model of insurance. One factor potentially caus-
ing this negative relationship is heterogeneity in risk aversion, which is absent in standard adverse
selection models (for a review, see [14]). Higher-risk individuals are less likely to buy insurance
because they are also less risk-averse. [15] first used the term “propitious selection" to describe
4Adverse selection was initiated by formal models in [5] and [6]. It has been found in different insurance markets.
For example, [7], [8], [9] use empirical evidence to show adverse selection in crop insurance.
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this phenomenon.5 In this paper, balloons in BART without an insurance option allow us to mea-
sure risk preferences. We investigate adverse selection by comparing the level of risk aversion
of individuals who purchased insurance to individuals who did not purchase insurance. We find
that mixed insurance leads to advantageous (propitious) selection, as the partial compulsory part
induces the least risk-averse individuals not to buy the additional (voluntary) insurance. We also
find adverse selection still exists in purely voluntary insurance. Since we include risk preferences
in the discussion of selection, adverse selection in our case is endogenous. Note that endogenous
adverse selection is fairly common in agricultural production. For example, [20] show that farm-
ers who are more willing to invest in risky production methods and technologies are more likely
to purchase index insurance. In contrast, compulsory insurance is intended to prevent adverse or
advantageous selection, as it forces all individuals to purchase insurance [21, 5].
Moral hazard is another factor that influences insurance welfare. Moral hazard arises when an
individual engages in riskier behavior after purchasing insurance because the risks are transferred
to the insurance company. Moral hazard has been extensively tested in crop insurance by inves-
tigating input (chemical/pesticide use) or output (yield) [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27].6 In the present
experiment, we compare insured subjects’ performance in balloons with insurance to their perfor-
mance without insurance to study moral hazard. We show moral hazard exists in all three types of
insurance. Our BART set-up also provides a measure of the degree of moral hazard, and we find
mixed insurance has a smaller degree of moral hazard.
Finally, we include adverse selection and the degree of moral hazard into the analysis of social
earnings. Under the combined effects of “no adverse selection" and significant moral hazard,
purely compulsory insurance has the lowest social earnings.7 Based on our social earnings analysis,
mixed insurance is the preferred insurance type.
5[16] provide a theoretical model of advantageous selection. [17] points out that the “propitious selection" argu-
ment is appealing, however it has not gained much interest. [18] and [19] use a theoretical model and simulation
techniques respectively, to suggest propitious selection cannot imply a final negative relationship after insurance at
equilibrium.
6Moral hazard has also been studied outside of the agricultural field. For example, [28] and [29] evaluate moral
hazard in health insurance by studying medical care expenses and health care services utilization.
7Social earnings are used as an indicator of social welfare in our experiment. Social earnings consists of three
parts: the government, the insurer, and the consumer.
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To the best our knowledge, our paper is the first to compare all three insurance types in terms
of both adverse selection and moral hazard theoretically and experimentally. There has been con-
siderable experimental work in insurance topics, including both laboratory and field experiments.
Lab insurance experiments focus more on market design, such as testing prospect theory [30],
and studying insurance purchase decisions and strategy. Most lab experiments use hypothetical
situations. For example, [31] asked participants to imagine a hypothetical scenario where they
own a house worth US $100,000, and then asked them to make insurance purchasing decisions.
[32] studied the effects of microinsurance on farmers’ sow production by conducting a randomized
field experiment in China. [33] studied crop insurance in a pilot experiment in rural Ghana. [34]
simulated a fertilizer purchase situation to study moral hazard in weather-index insurance. [35]
takes advantage of a two-level randomized allocation of insurance to identify asymmetric infor-
mation in crop insurance in the Philippines. Unlike previous field experiments focusing on one
specific agricultural insurance market, our study compares the three broad agricultural insurance
categories.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the theoretical model and hy-
potheses. Section 1.3 introduces the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. In section 3.3, we present the
experimental design and procedures. The analysis and results are presented in section 2.4. Section
1.6 shows robustness checks to test the validity of BART, and section 3.7 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Hypotheses
We first use backward induction to show the two properties implied by advantageous selection,
and test them in voluntary and mixed insurance. We then solve the equilibrium insurance contract
when advantageous selection exists. Finally, we explore the degree of moral hazard under the
equilibrium insurance contract.
1.2.1 Properties of Advantageous Selection
Consider a simple model with two possible states of the world. In S1 there is no accident,
and individual i suffers no loss. In S2, an accident occurs and i suffers a loss of C. We assume
4
individuals only differ in risk aversion, and consider two levels of risk aversion, θ ∈ {L,H},
which is not observable by insurance providers. Type L indicates less risk-averse individuals, and
more risk-averse individuals are indicated by typeH . All individuals have identical levels of initial
wealth W . The probability of loss in S2 for each individual is πi. Individuals can take activities zi
to prevent the accident in S2. The preventive activities zi are assumed to be costly and unobservable
by the insurers. Clearly, πi is decreasing with zi.
Following [18], we study insurance in a three-stage procedure. In the first stage, zero-profit
insurance contracts are offered by the insurance company, which includes the per unit premium p
(i.e., premium-indemnity ratio) and the coverage rate δ ∈ [0, 1]. The total premium is P = p ∗ δ.
In the second stage, individuals decide which contract to purchase. In the final stage, they decide
how much preventive activities zi to exert.
[18] make two properties underlying the propitious selection argument, and they focus on inves-
tigating whether propitious selection can explain a negative correlation between risk and insurance
coverage after purchasing insurance. We focus on studying the existence of advantageous selection
itself in different insurance types, and we examine the two properties of advantageous selection.
We solve the three-stage setup by backward induction, starting with the choice of preventive
activities zi. We use von-Neuman-Morgenstein’s utility function uθ to represent the individual
preferences over lotteries, where uH is obtained by an increasing concave transformation of uL.
The following equation shows the expected utility of a type θ individual who chooses the insurance
contract (P, δ) and exerts preventive activities z.
Uθ(z, P, δ) = π(z)uθ(w − P − (1− δ)C) + (1− π(z))uθ(w − P )− c(z) (1.1)
where c(z) is the cost of z. Thus, the optimal zθ(P, δ) of type θ is given by
zθ(P, δ) = argmax
z>=0
Uθ(z, P, δ) (1.2)
Since for a given level of δ, the premium will not change with z, insurance provides motives
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for individuals to decrease the level of z. The optimal z decreases with the coverage rate. Advan-
tageous selection first assumes:
Property 1 (Regularity): For any insurance contract, a more risk-averse individual (H) exerts
more preventive activities zi compared to a less risk-averse individual (L).
We now look at the second stage to determine which insurance contract (P, δ) the individual
will choose. Plugging the optimal z (2) in the utility function (1), we obtain the indirect utility
function of type θ for an insurance contract. The choice of insurance contract depends on whether
the marginal willingness to pay for insurance is monotone in risk-aversion, (i.e., the single-crossing
property presented next). There are two simultaneous effects going in opposite directions, and we
refer to them as the “preference effect" and the “risk effect". On the one hand, the more risk-
averse individual H has a higher willingness to pay for insurance compared to the less risk-averse
individual L (preference effect). On the other hand, the more risk-averse individual H exerts more
preventive activities and has lower risk, resulting in a lower willingness to pay for insurance (risk
effect). Table 1.1 summarizes these two opposing effects.
Table 1.1: Comparison of the Willingness-to-pay for Insurance (Reprinted from [2])
WTP WTP
Preference effect More Risk-averse > Less Risk-averse
(low-risk) (high-risk)
Risk effect More Risk-averse < Less Risk-averse
(low-risk) (high-risk)
The advantageous selection argument assumes that:
Property 2 (Single crossing): Given the optimal preventive activities z, for any insurance
contract, a more risk-averse individual (H) has a higher marginal willingness to pay for insurance.
Property 2 assumes that the “preference effect" dominates the “risk effect" for any given insur-
ance contract. To summarize, advantageous selection exists only when Property 1 and Property 2
hold. In Property 1, there are no opposite effects at play, and it is straightforward for it to hold for
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all three insurance schemes. In other words, advantageous selection exits when the “preference
effect" dominates the “risk effect". Adverse selection exits when the “risk effect" dominates the
“preference effect".
We now test the dominance of the two effects in purely voluntary and mixed insurance respec-
tively. We follow [36]’s dual theory under which the expected utility is linear in wealth but non
linear in probabilities. Now in equation (1), the utility of purchasing the insurance contract (P, δ)
for an individual is
U(π, P, δ;α) = (1 + α)π(w − P − (1− δ)C) + (1− (1 + α)π)(w − P )
= w − P − (1 + α)(1− δ)πC.
(1.3)
where α >= 0 captures the level of risk-aversion where a higher α represents higher risk-aversion.
In other words, the individual overestimates the expected utility in state S2 by a fraction α. With
this utility function, the optimal preventive activity z is chosen by
max
z
= w − P − (1 + α)(1− δ)π(z)C − c(z) (1.4)




] for z ∈ [0, 1].
Taking the first order condition of equation (4), we obtain the optimal preventive activity:
zα(δ) =
(1 + α)δ − (1 + α)
4
(1.5)
We define θ = 1+α
2
(with θ ∈ [1
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Plugging equation (7) in the utility function (3), we have the induced utility function:
Uθ(P, δ) = w − P − (1 + α)(1− δ)π





Using the envelope theorem to take the derivative of P in equation (8) with respect to δ, we get





= θ − (1− δ)θ2 (1.9)
In mixed insurance, a uniform compulsory insurance contract (P ′ , A) is provided before people
make purchasing decisions. The utility of purchasing the residual voluntary insurance contract
(P
′′





, δ1;α) = (1 + α)π(w − P
′ − P ′′ − (1− A− δ1)C) + (1− (1 + α)π)(w − P )
= w − P ′ − P ′′ − (1 + α)(1− A− δ1)πC.
(1.10)
where A+ δ1 <= δ.
By doing the same process for purely voluntary insurance above, we get the marginal willing-





= θ − (1− A− δ1)θ2 (1.11)
We compare equation (9) and (11) to test the difference in willingness to pay for insurance










= (δ − (A+ δ1))θ2 (1.12)
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Thus, the resulting sign in equation (12) depends on δ − (A+ δ1). Less risk averse individuals
are less likely to buy the additional voluntary part in mixed insurance, and hence we have:
δ > (A+ δ1)for less risk-averse individuals
δ = (A+ δ1)for more risk-averse individuals.
(1.13)
In other words, the partially compulsory insurance in mixed insurance reduces the willingness
to pay for the additional voluntary insurance for less risk-averse individuals (i.e., crowding-out
effect), but it has no effect on more risk-averse individuals. Thus, Property 2 is more likely to hold
in mixed insurance. We then have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Given the same total insurance contract, the “Preference effect" is more likely to
dominate the “Risk effect" in mixed insurance compared to purely voluntary insurance, i.e., mixed
insurance leads to advantageous selection.
1.2.2 Equilibrium Contracts
We solve the pooling equilibrium insurance contracts when advantageous selection exists. Con-
sider the proportion of type L, less risk-averse individuals in the population is λ, and type H , more
risk-averse individuals is 1 − λ. In Figure 1.1, the two curves P (L) and P (H) represents the
premium for each type. Due to moral hazard, the premium is an increasing and convex function
of coverage. Property 1 ensures that for any given coverage, the premium for less risk-averse type
P (L), lies above it for more risk-averse type P (H), except for δ ∈ {0, 1}. When the insurer pro-
vides the same contract to both types L and H , the charged premium is λP (L) + (1 − λP (H))
which is represented by the dotted curve. The single-crossing property is depicted by w(l) and
w(h). It is clear from the graph that a pooling equilibrium does not exist, as it is always possible
for an insurer to propose a contract that attracts only the more risk-averse individual and makes a
positive profit.
[18] show the existence of a separating equilibrium (see Appendix A.1). Under the separating
equilibrium, the more risk-averse individuals are overinsured. The intuition is based on Property 2,
9
λP (L) + (1− λP (H)








Figure 1.1: Non-existence of Pooling Equilibrium of Insurance Contract when Advantageous Se-
lection Exists (Reprinted from [2])
the insurer needs to over-provide insurance to the more risk-averse individuals so that the insurer
can separate them from the less risk-averse individuals. Thus, the final degree of moral hazard
after insurance provision also depends on two opposite forces. On the one hand, more risk-averse
individuals exert more preventive activities z; on the other hand, more risk-averse individuals
purchase more insurance, and preventive activities decrease with insurance coverage. We denote
these two effects as the “preference effect" and the “coverage effect" in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Comparison of the Degree of Preventive Activities (Reprinted from [2])
Preventive Activity Preventive Activity
Preference effect more risk-averse > less risk-averse
(more coverage) (less coverage)
Coverage effect more risk-averse < less risk-averse
(more coverage) (less coverage)
We derived the expected utility function for purely voluntary and mixed insurance separately
(equations 3 & 10). We now derive the expected utility function for purely compulsory insurance:
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Uc(π, P
∗, δ∗;α) = (1 + α)π(w − P ∗ − (1− δ∗)C) + (1− (1 + α)π)(w − P ∗)
= w − P ∗ − (1 + α)(1− δ∗)πC.
(1.14)
Purely compulsory insurance means identical purchase which is indicated by δ∗ in equation
(14). P ∗ is the identical premium. In order to do comparison, we set δ∗ = δ and P ∗ = P . We
denote Zv, Zm and Zc as the optimal preventative activity in purely voluntary, mixed, and purely
compulsory insurance respectively (i.e, Z maximizing equations 3, 10, 14 respectively).
In mixed insurance, we expect people who choose not to buy the additional (voluntary) insur-
ance are less risk-averse, and this means they have less coverage. Since they are less risk-averse,
we can expect the coverage effect to dominate the preference effect. [18] argue this dominance as
well. Thus, the final degree of moral hazard in mixed insurance is lower than in purely voluntary
insurance, i.e, Zm < Zv. In purely compulsory insurance, both types of individuals are in the
consumer pool. Compared to mixed insurance, less risk-averse individuals in purely compulsory
insurance have more coverage, and the degree of moral hazard is higher, i.e., Zc > Zm. Compared
to purely voluntary insurance, more type H (more risk-averse) individuals are in the consumer
pool in purely compulsory insurance, and the degree of moral hazard is lower, i.e., Zc < Zv. We
then have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Given the same total insurance contract, mixed insurance has the lowest degree
of moral hazard, and purely voluntary insurance has the highest degree of moral hazard.
We next describe the experiment to test our theoretical hypotheses.
1.3 The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART)
BART is a computerized measure of risk-taking behavior developed by [4]. In this task, partic-
ipants are presented with a balloon and they receive a monetary reward for each successful pump.
However, if the balloon explodes, they receive nothing. A higher number of pumps yields higher
potential earnings, but it also represents a higher risk of explosion. Therefore, risk-taking is mea-
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sured by the selected number of pumps, with more pumps indicating more risk-taking behavior.
The participants know the balloon may explode at some point and that a higher number of pumps
has a higher risk of explosion, but they do not know the actual probability function. The probability
of explosion of a balloon is arranged by constructing an array of N numbers. In our experiment,
the array of each balloon is 1-128.8 Thus, the probability that a balloon will explode at the first
pump is 1/128. The probability of explosion at the second pump is 1/127 if the balloon did not
explode after the first pump; 1/126 at the third pump, and so on up until the 128th pump, at which
the probability of explosion is 1. According to this arrangement, the expected earnings for each
balloon are a bow-shaped function with a maximum at the 64th pump, which is also the expected
explosion point.
The participants’ decisions can be formalized as the choice of the lotteries:
L =

0 probability : k/128 = 1− (128− k)/128
γk probability : (128− k)/128 = (127/128 ∗ 126/127 ∗ ... ∗ (128− k)/(129− k))
where k is the number of pumps which in our experiment ∈ [0, 128], while γ > 0 is a scale
factor. The expected value of these lotteries is equal to γ(128k − k2)/128. Assuming a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function u(k) = kr, the BART allows for the estimation of
the coefficient of risk aversion. The implied levels of r for every possible choice k are shown
in Appendix Table A.1. The table implies a risk-neutral individual would choose k∗ = 64. A
risk-seeking participant whose utility function is convex would choose more than 64 pumps; a
risk-averse participant with a concave utility function would choose less than 64 pumps. The
insurance premium and coverage in our experiment are designed based on this algorithm of BART
(explained in detail in the experimental design section).
[3] developed the Automatic version of BART, in which participants input their desired number
of pumps into a box and the balloon is pumped automatically. If a balloon explodes before the
8In the original paper, the association of the BART with self-reported risk behavior in the real world occurred only
with data from the balloon with a maximum number of 128 pumps [4]. For this reason, we choose a range of [0,128]
pumps in our experiment.
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indicated number of pumps is reached, participants lose all their earnings for that balloon. [3]
show that this version does not change the validity of BART as an assessment of risk-taking. In
order to observe risk-taking of successful pumps and explosions (i.e., avoid the data truncation),
we use the Automatic Version of BART. In the original version of BART, risk-taking can only be
observed for balloons that did not explode. Thus, risk-taking in our experiment is quantified by the
selected number of pumps.
To prevent potential negative outcomes associated with risk-taking behavior in agricultural
production, agricultural economists started to develop more reliable approaches to study behavior
under risk and uncertainty back in the 20th Century [37, 38]. [39] is the first to conduct an incen-
tivized gamble choice game with India farmers to test their risk preferences. Nowadays, there are
several methods to elicit risk preferences that have been widely used and tested, including [40],
[41], and [42], among others. In this paper, using BART as the assessment of risk-taking and in-
surance context in our experiment has three important advantages. First pumping a balloon is a
simple task and a relatively under-studied context, and this task may incur “accidents" (explosions)
so that we can incorporate insurance options. Second we can use the performance with and without
insurance to test for both adverse selection and moral hazard. Third, BART also provides a good
environment to study endogenous adverse/advantageous selection.9
1.4 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted online using Amazon MTurk.10 We use a between subject
design with three treatments. The treatments are the three types of insurance: purely voluntary,
9The main criticism of BART is that the procedure is ambiguous as it does not provide objective probabilities to
participants. [43] develop a new protocol based on BART to address the methodological issues in BART (BERT). In
our experiment, although subjects do not know the objective probabilities, they know that a higher number of pumps
yields higher earnings and also higher risk of explosions, and more importantly, we inform participants the maximum
number of pumps of each balloon to reduce the ambiguity [44].
10To avoid limiting the subject pool to only students, we conduct our BART insurance experiment online using
Amazon Mturk. We are aware that using Mturk comes at a cost such as no face-to-face instructions. However, our
task, pumping a balloon is a simple task demanding low cognitive efforts. It sets up a context that is familiar and
easy to grasp for participants [45]. In addition, [46] find that the data obtained from Mturk are at least as reliable as
those obtained via traditional methods. [47] show Amazon MTurk workers can provide consistent and economically
meaningful data. Our experiment actually further confirms it by showing the average number of pumps in BART
is very similar to the original results in [4]. The average number of pumps without insurance options is 57 in our
experiment, and the average number of pumps in the original paper is 59.
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purely compulsory, and mixed insurance. Subjects signed a consent form and then proceeded to
the BART task. In the BART section, subjects were informed that they will play with 30 sequential
balloons which have a potential maximum of 128 pumps each; the reward for each successful
pump is ¢1. The explosion points of each balloon were randomly drawn on the spot. Subjects were
asked to indicate the number of pumps they want to select for each balloon. To avoid the effects
of earnings from previous balloons on the performance of subsequent balloon, we randomly select
three balloons at the end of the experiment to determine the participant’s final payments.
Treatment 1: Purely Voluntary Insurance. For the first and last balloon, subjects were
allowed to voluntarily buy insurance at a premium of ¢40 before pumping those two balloons.
Subjects did not know this information until they played with those particular balloons. For the
other 28 balloons, they played BART without the insurance option. The insurance in this treatment
is voluntary. If the insured balloon explodes, participants receive ¢64. If the insured balloon does
not explode, participants receive nothing from the insurance, and the cost is not refunded. In
order to ensure understanding of the procedure and the insurance scheme, subjects had to correctly
answer a quiz before proceeding to pump the balloons.
In our experiment, the maximum number of pumps for a balloon is 128, which implies the
balloon will surely explode at the 128th pump. According to the BART algorithm, the optimal
number of pumps in terms of expected rewards is 64. Thus, we set the insurance coverage equal to
the actual earnings at the optimal pump, which is ¢64. The probability of a balloon exploding at
the 64th pump is 1-(127/128*126/127*...*64/65)=1/2, and hence, the expected insurance benefits
are 64*1/2=32. The actuarially fair insurance premium is ¢32. However, in real life, insurance is
rarely actuarially fair, since insurance companies make profits, and also due to transaction costs,
administration fees, moral hazard, adverse selection and risk premium.11 Therefore, the premium
is usually higher than the expected benefits from insurance. Thus, in our paper, for simplicity, we
set the premium to ¢40.12
11Risk premium is the maximum amount a person will pay above actuarially fair premiums.
12Since in this paper, our objective is to compare different insurance types under the same coverage and premium
instead of the effects of different premiums and coverage, for simplicity, we calculate the premium above based on a
risk-neutral individual.
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In our experiment, we only set the insurance option for the first and last balloon. We view par-
ticipants’ insurance purchasing decisions in the first balloon as a reflection of purchasing behavior
before learning. The performance of the last balloon can be viewed as insurance purchasing be-
havior after learning. All the other balloons serve as within subject comparisons without insurance
allocation, i.e., the measurement of risk-taking by BART.
Treatment 2: Purely Compulsory Insurance. This treatment is identical to the first treatment,
except that insurance is compulsory, which means subjects were required to buy the insurance for
the first and last balloon at a cost of ¢40.
Treatment 3: Mixed Insurance. This treatment is the same as the second treatment, except
that the insurance is partially compulsory. This means the compulsory insurance only pays ¢32 to
the subject if the insured balloon explodes, and the subject is allowed to buy additional voluntary
insurance to obtain full coverage. The premium for the compulsory part is ¢20. The premium
and coverage for the voluntary part are also ¢20 and ¢32 cents, respectively. The calculations of
the premium and coverage are the same as in treatment 1, and we simply split the premium and
coverage into two equal parts.
At the end of the BART task, all participants are asked to respond to the Domain-Specific Risk-
Taking Scale (DOSPERT) questionnaire [48],13 a Sensation Seeking Scale questionnaire [49], a
gamble-choice task [41] and a demographic survey. The DOSPERT and Sensation Seeking Scale
are used to check whether participants in different treatments have different original risk pref-
erences. They are also used as robustness checks to evaluate whether the riskiness in BART is
associated with psychological measures of risk-taking and self-reported risk behavior. The gamble
choice, as one of the most widely used methods of eliciting risk preferences in laboratory experi-
ments, serves the same purpose.
The experiment was computerized in Inquisit [50]. In total there were 305 subjects, with about
100 participants per treatment. Six subjects were excluded due to incomplete information. There
were 13 subjects whose choice of pumps were less than the price of insurance when they chose to
13The DOSPERT scale is designed to elicit the domain-specific nature of risk preferences.
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buy insurance, and we treat them as not understanding the insurance scheme and exclude them from
the analysis. Hence, the final sample consists of 286 subjects. Table 1.3 summarizes the Insurance
features for each treatment. The instructions, screenshots, questionnaires and demographic survey
questions are available in the Appendix A.
Table 1.3: Insurance Features for each Treatment. (Reprinted from [2])
First & Ins coverage Ins 2-29th No.
Treatments Last balloon (if explodes) premium balloon Subjects
Purely Voluntary Vol insurance ¢64 ¢40 Normal BART 93
Purely Compulsory Com insurance ¢64 ¢40 Normal BART 96
Mixed Vol+Com ¢32+¢32 ¢20+¢20 Normal BART 97
Based on the premium and coverage of insurance in our experimental design, we calculate the
expected utility of buying (additional) insurance and not buying (additional) insurance assuming
a CRRA utility function. We show the calculation process in Appendix A3. The intuition is that
we have the coefficient of risk aversion r for each pump in BART, and then for each r, we find its
optimal number of pumps after full/partial insurance. Then we can calculate the expected utility
of buying or not buying (additional) insurance. In general, the results suggest that risk-averse
individuals will choose to buy (additional) insurance, but risk-seeking individuals will choose not
to buy (additional) insurance. This means our experimental design aligns with the economic theory
section about the behavior of individuals with different risk preferences. Next, we show the results
from our experimental data to test our two main Hypotheses.
1.5 Main Results
The main objective of this article is to compare the three insurance schemes. We first show the
analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard corresponding to our hypotheses. We also show
two ancillary results about social earnings and the overall effects of the compulsory part on the
residual voluntary part in mixed insurance. In our experiment, the explosion points of each balloon
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were randomly drawn on the spot instead of fixed points, and this may cause different learning
paths across treatments. Before showing the results, we test the distribution of explosion points
and individuals’ average number of pumps for each balloon (path-dependence) across treatments
(see figures in Appendix A4). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest there is no difference in the
distribution of explosion points or individuals’ path-dependence (p > 0.1 for all comparisons).
Balanced background characteristics across treatments are shown in Appendix A5.14
1.5.1 Analysis of Adverse Selection
Result 1 1a. Mixed insurance leads to advantageous selection, and adverse selection exists in
purely voluntary insurance.
1b. The advantageous selection in mixed insurance is mainly contributed by the least risk-
averse participants.
In purely voluntary insurance, the purchasing rate in the first balloon is 38.71%, and 59.14%
in the last balloon. In mixed insurance, the purchasing rate for the additional insurance in the
first balloon is 43.3%, and 59.79% in the last balloon. To study adverse selection, we explore the
compositions of individuals with different risk-aversion among subjects who purchased and those
who did not purchase insurance.
Figure 2.1 compares the average number of pumps in the middle 28 balloons of participants
who purchased (additional) insurance in the first or last balloon (or both) to participants who did
not purchase insurance at all. The results are consistent regardless of whether we consider the first
and last balloon separately.
In purely voluntary insurance (Figure 1.2a), the line describing participants who purchased
insurance lies above the line of those who did not purchase insurance. Using a two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U-Test with 28 observations for each subgroup, we find the average number of pumps
in the 2-29th balloons for those who “buy insurance" is significantly higher than those who “do
not buy insurance" (p < 0.001). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the two distributions
14The only exception is participants in the purely voluntary insurance treatment are older than participants in the
mixed insurance treatment, but in the following estimations, there are no significant effects of age.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.2: Adverse selection: Average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloons by insurance purchasing decision. (Reprinted from [2]) Note: The
black line represents the 64th pump which theoretically maximizes the expected earnings. In our experiment, except for the first and last balloon,
the average number of pumps per balloon per subject is 57 for purely voluntary and mixed insurance, and 59 for purely compulsory insurance. This
result is similar to [3] who report an average of 59 pumps.
are statistically different (p < 0.001). Thus, the figure indicates the presence of adverse selection
in purely voluntary insurance, as the insurance is more attractive to less risk-averse (higher-risk)
individuals.
The results in mixed insurance are opposite (Figure 1.2b): the average number of pumps in
the 2-29 balloons for those who chose to buy additional insurance is significantly lower than for
those who did not choose to buy additional insurance at all (Mann-Whitney U-Test, p = 0.002.)
In Figure 1.2b, the dash and solid lines swap positions, and the result of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (p=0.012) confirms that the two distributions are statistically different. Table 2.4 summarizes
the average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloon by insurance purchasing decision for both
treatments. In mixed insurance, when participants make decisions on purchasing the additional
voluntary part, less risk-averse (higher-risk) individuals are less likely to buy additional insurance
compared to more risk-averse (lower-risk) individuals, which leads to advantageous selection.
Participants went through 30 sequential balloons, and their performance may be erratic which
could affect identification. We calculate the coefficient of variation (CV) of the number of pumps
in 2-29th balloon for each subject. The CV is 0.297, 0.304, 0.267 for purely voluntary, mixed and
purely compulsory insurance respectively. P-values from Mann-Whitney U-Tests suggest that the
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Table 1.4: Average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloons by insurance decisions. (Reprinted from [2])
Purely Voluntary Mixed
Buy (additional) 59 55
(1.9) (1.9)
Not buy (additional) 52 58
(2.6) (3.2)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
CV did not differ across treatments (p > 0.3 for all comparisons).
We now explore the potential causes of advantageous selection in Mixed Insurance. Table
2.5 shows the average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloons by gender. In purely voluntary
insurance, adverse selection exists for males and females. However, in mixed insurance, there is
no difference in the number of pumps in the 2-29th balloon between women who buy and women
who do not buy additional insurance. In addition, advantageous selection exists for males. Males
who do not buy additional insurance in mixed insurance are the least risk-averse (highest-risk)
participants in these two treatments.
Table 1.5: Gender differences in adverse selection by treatment. (Reprinted from [2])
Purely Voluntary Mixed
Buy Not buy P-value Buy Not buy P-value
Male 61 53 0.001 58 63 0.002
(2.7) (3.2) (2.7) (3.4)
Female 57 51 < 0.001 53 51 0.436
(2.9) (3.9) (2.8) (5.6)
Notes: P-values are from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Tests. Standard errors are in parentheses.
We first use “64 pumps" as the threshold to estimate a linear probability model (LPM) for
subjects with different risk preferences. As shown in columns 1-2 of Table 1.6, mixed insurance
(“Mixed") has no significant effects on insurance purchases of either risk-averse (< 64 pumps)
or risk-seeking (> 64 pumps) participants, but the sign of “Mixed" is opposite for these two
subgroups: positive for risk-averse subjects, and negative for risk-seeking subjects. We further
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estimate the LPM for the top 15% risk-seeking (high-risk) participants whose average numbers of
pumps are higher than 70. The results in column 3 show that the mixed insurance scheme signifi-
cantly decreases the likelihood of the risk-seeking participants to purchase insurance. In column 4,
we control for the average number of pumps in 2-29th balloon (MeanPumps229), gender (Male),
age, education, income and household size (HHsize), and the coefficient of mixed insurance is
marginally significant.15
Table 1.6: The Effects of Mixed Insurance on Purchase Rate (Reprinted from [2])
<= 64 pumps > 64 pumps top 15% pumps top 15% pumps
(1) (2) (3) (>= 70 pumps) (4) (>= 70 pumps)







Constant 0.592∗∗∗(0.057) 0.818∗∗∗(0.096) 0.923∗∗∗(0.118) 0.835(0.973)
Control No No No Yes
Observations 141 49 30 30
R2 0.01 0.04 0.14 0. 28
Notes: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for choosing to buy insurance in the first or last (or both) balloon. Standard errors are
in parentheses. ∗p < 10%, ∗ ∗ p < 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 1%. All results are robust to using probit.
Thus far, we conclude that the elimination of adverse selection in mixed insurance is mainly
contributed by the least risk-averse participants.16 In mixed insurance, the partial compulsory part
has a crowding-out effect on the voluntary part for less risk-averse individuals. This result is
consistent with our theoretical Hypothesis 1.
15Education levels were defined as: EDU = 1 if Some High School or less, EDU = 2 if High School Diploma, EDU
= 3 if Some College, EDU = 4 if 2 year/Associates Degree, EDU = 5 if 4 year/Bachelor’s Degree, EDU = 6 if Some
Graduate School, EDU = 7 if Graduate Degree; income levels were: INC = 1-10 corresponds to Less than $30,000,
$30,000 - $39,999, $40,000 - $49,999, $50,000 - $59,999, $60,000 - $69,999, $70,000 - $79,999, $80,000 - $89,999,
$90,000 - $99,999, $100,000 - $149,999, $150,000 or more respectively.
16As we mentioned in the introduction of BART, subjects are not aware of the accurate explosion probability of
each pump, and hence we treat subjects with more pumps as less risk-averse, and include subjects whose numbers of
pumps are higher than 70 into the group of least risk-averse participants.
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1.5.2 Analysis of Moral Hazard
Result 2 There exists moral hazard in all three insurance types; but comparatively, mixed
insurance has the lowest degree of moral hazard; purely voluntary insurance has the highest degree
of moral hazard.
(a) Voluntary Insurance (b) Mixed Insurance
Figure 1.3: Moral Hazard: Comparison of the average number of pumps on different balloons in purely voluntary and mixed insurance. (Reprinted
from [2])
Figure 1.3a depicts the average number of pumps on different balloons in purely voluntary
insurance for insured and uninsured subjects separately. For insured subjects, we take the average
number of pumps in the first ballon for subjects who purchased insurance in the first balloon (First),
and do the same calculation for the last balloon (Last), and then take the average number of pumps
in the 2-29th balloons for subjects who purchased insurance in the first or last or both balloons
(2-29th).
The result shows that the average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloons is significantly lower
than in the first and last balloon (Mann-Whitney U-tests, p < 0.001; p < 0.001). The number on
the last balloon is higher than the first balloon (p = 0.035). The part of “uninsured subjects"
of Figure 1.3a shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the average number
of pumps between the 2-29th balloons and the first or last balloon for subjects who did not buy
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insurance at all (p > 0.01 for all comparisons). These results suggest moral hazard exists in purely
voluntary insurance.
Figure 1.3b shows the results for mixed insurance. In mixed insurance, all subjects are insured
(fully or partially), however, we find different results between subjects who purchased and those
who did not purchase additional voluntary insurance. Using Mann-Whitney U-Tests we find a
significant higher number of pumps in the first or last balloon compared to the 2-29th balloons
(p < 0.001) for subjects who purchased additional insurance (i.e., fully-insured). There is no
difference (p > 0.1 for each comparison) for subjects who did not buy additional insurance (i.e.,
partially-insured). This result suggests that moral hazard only exists for fully-insured subjects in
mixed insurance.
Figure 1.4: Moral Hazard: Comparison of the average number of pumps on different balloons in purely compulsory insurance. (Reprinted from [2])
Figure 2.6 shows the results for purely compulsory insurance. Every participant in the purely
compulsory insurance treatment is required to buy full insurance. We find moral hazard exists in
purely compulsory insurance. The average number of pumps in the first or last balloon is signif-
icantly higher than the average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloons (Mann-Whitney U-tests,
p=0.001 for the first balloon; p < 0.001 for the last balloon).
BART allows us to further compare the degree of moral hazard for the three insurance schemes.
The degree of moral hazard is quantified as the difference in the average number of pumps for
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insured subjects between the “first/last balloon" and the “2-29th balloons". Table 1.7 shows the
average degree of moral hazard per insured subject for each treatment. We find that in the first
balloon the degree of moral hazard in purely voluntary insurance (32.3) is the highest. We find no
overall difference between mixed (15.2) and purely compulsory insurance (14.9), but individuals
who were partially-insured in mixed insurance (5.1) have the lowest degree of moral hazard. In
the last balloon, the degree of moral hazard in mixed insurance (26.0) is the lowest, which is
mainly contributed by partially-insured individuals. There is no difference in the moral hazard
level between purely voluntary (44.9) and compulsory insurance (43.3) in the last balloon.17
Table 1.7: Average degree of moral hazard per insured subject in the first or last balloon. (Reprinted from
[2])
Voluntary Mixed (Fully-insured) Mixed (Partially-insured) Mixed Compulsory
First 32.3 28.5 5.1 15.2 14.9
(4.97) (4.78) (3.62) (3.13) (3.09)
Last 44.9 36.8 9.9 26.0 43.3
(3.38) (3.27) (5.08) (3.11) (2.76)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
We estimate an OLS regression on the level of moral hazard in the first and last balloon. The in-
dependent variables are “Mixed" and “Compulsory" (Compulsory=0 if purely voluntary or mixed,
Compulsory=1 if purely compulsory). We also control for age, education, gender, income and
household size, but the coefficients for all these covariates are not significant. We show the results
in Table 2.6. We estimate three regressions for the first and last balloons. The three regressions
differ in the inclusion of subjects in mixed insurance: all the subjects in mixed insurance; only
the fully-insured subjects; only the partially-insured subjects. The other insured subjects in the
three regressions are the same: all the subjects in purely compulsory insurance and subjects who
purchased insurance in purely voluntary insurance.
17P-values from Mann-Whitney U-Tests: V vs M(fully-insured): 0.471(F), 0.040(L); V vs M(partially-insured):
< 0.001(F), < 0.001(L); V vs M: 0.002(F), < 0.001(L); V vs C: 0.004(F), 0.509(L); M(fully-insured) vs C: 0.015(F),
0.104(L); M(partially-insured) vs C: 0.086(F), < 0.001(L); M vs C: 0.839(F), < 0.001(L).
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Table 1.8: OSL Regression on the Degree of Moral Hazard (Reprinted from [2])
First Balloon: First Balloon: First Balloon: Last Balloon: Last Balloon: Last Balloon:
all subjects in M M (fully-insured) M(partially-insured) all subjects in M M (fully-insured) M(partially-insured)
Mixed −17.169∗∗∗ −3.491 −27.305∗∗∗ −20.237∗∗∗ −10.001∗∗ −35.905∗∗∗
(6.116) (7.121) (6.392) (4.846) (4.892) (5.940)
Compulsory −17.135∗∗∗ −16.885∗∗∗ −16.338∗∗∗ −2.559 −2.986 −2.254
(6.070) (6.067) (5.803) (4.796) (4.364) (4.759)
Constant 39.383∗∗∗ 45.464∗∗∗ 44.640∗∗∗ 55.097∗∗∗ 57.815∗∗∗ 52.619∗∗∗
(11.927) (12.688) (12.226) (10.208) (9.674) (11.185)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 229 174 187 248 209 190
R2 0.055 0.082 0.126 0.088 0.069 0.158
Notes: The dependent variable is the degree of moral hazard. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 10%, ∗ ∗ p < 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 1%.
Table 2.6 shows that in the first balloon, making insurance compulsory or mixed reduces moral
hazard. The reduction of moral hazard in mixed insurance is mainly contributed by the partially-
insured subjects. In the last balloon, the compulsory part has no effect, and mixed insurance
reduces moral hazard. Both fully-insured and partially-insured subjects reduce the moral hazard in
mixed insurance, but the magnitude of partially-insured subjects is larger, as shown in the last two
columns of Table 2.6. Combining the results from the first and last balloon, we argue that mixed
insurance has the lowest degree of moral hazard, and purely voluntary insurance has the highest
degree of moral hazard. Recall in the analysis of adverse selection, we show subjects in mixed in-
surance who did not buy additional insurance are the least risk-averse subjects in our experiment.
The results of moral hazard show that when the least risk-averse subjects are partially-insured, the
“coverage effect" dominates the “preference effect", which is in line with our theoretical Hypoth-
esis 2.
1.5.3 Ancillary results
Result 3 Purely compulsory insurance has the lowest social earnings.
We tested adverse selection and have the quantified moral hazard level, so we can include them
into the regressions of social earnings. Social earnings in our experiment consists of three parts: the
government, the insurer, and the consumer.18 Table 1.9 shows the overall average social earnings,
18Some compulsory insurance in real life are paid by employers or by the insurer; for simplicity, we assume in our
analysis that compulsory insurance is paid by the government.
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the average net earnings from each subject for the insurer and government (henceforth, earnings of
the insurer, government)19, and also the average net earnings per consumer.
Table 1.9: Average Net Earnings (Dollars). (Reprinted from [2])
First balloon Last balloon
Society Insurer Consumer Government Society Insurer Consumer Government
Purely Voluntary 0.25 -0.03 0.29 0 0.21 -0.07 0.28 0
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (omitted) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (omitted)
Purely Compulsory 0.24 0 0.22 0.03 0.11 0 0.26 -0.15
(0.03) (omitted) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (omitted) (0.01) (0.01)
Mixed 0.21 -0.02 0.22 0.002 0.18 -0.02 0.23 -0.02
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
We first combine the insurer and government into a broader “insurer" category. In the first
balloon, there is no difference in overall social earnings or earnings of the insurer between any
two insurance scheme. The consumer in purely voluntary insurance has higher earnings com-
pared to mixed and compulsory insurance (Mann-Whitney U-tests, p=0.06 for both comparisons).
In the last balloon, purely compulsory insurance has the lowest social earnings ( p=0.003 (C vs
V); p=0.02 (C vs M)), and there is no difference between purely voluntary and mixed insurance
(p=0.447). We further find that the lower social earnings in purely compulsory insurance is due to
the loss of earnings of the insurer/government (p < 0.001 for both comparisons). Earnings of the
consumer in purely compulsory insurance are even higher than in mixed insurance (p=0.001).
The last balloon represents the purchasing behavior of participants after learning and the dif-
ference is in the last balloon, and hence we focus more on social earnings in the last balloon. We
estimate an OLS regression for the overall social earnings in the last balloon. The independent
variables are moral hazard level in the last balloon (MHL), and a dummy variable for adverse se-
lection (AS = 1 if purely voluntary insurance, AS = 0 if mixed or purely compulsory insurance).
We also control for gender, age, education, income and household size. The results shown in col-
umn (1) of Table 1.10 suggest that moral hazard has significantly negative effects on overall social
19For uninsured subjects, the earnings of the insurer and government are zero.
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earnings; however the coefficient of adverse selection is not significant. We estimate regressions
for earnings of the consumer and insurer. The results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.10 show
that moral hazard reduces the earnings of the insurer, but it increases the earnings of consumers
to a smaller degree. Why does purely compulsory and voluntary insurance have different overall
social earnings given that the degree of moral hazard in purely voluntary insurance is higher (Re-
sult 2)? Column (2) shows that adverse selection has a marginal positive effect on earnings of the
consumer. Since purely compulsory insurance has no adverse selection, its overall social earnings
do not have the positive effects from adverse selection on the consumer part.
Table 1.10: OLS Regression on (Social) Earnings in Insurance (Dollars). (Reprinted from [2])
Society Consumer Insurer & Government
(1) (2) (3)
MHL −0.002∗∗∗(0.001) 0.001∗∗∗(0.000) −0.002∗∗∗(0.000)
AS 0.044(0.04) 0.038∗(0.0191) 0.006(0.028)
Male −0.019(0.038) 0.012(0.019) −0.030(0.026)
Age 0.001(0.002) −0.000(0.001) 0.001(0.001)
Education 0.010(0.013) 0.011∗(0.006) −0.001(0.009)
Income −0.008(0.007) −0.004∗(0.004) −0.001(0.069)
HHsize 0.006(0.013) 0.007∗(0.006) −0.004(0.069)
Constant 0.167∗(0.099) 0.171∗∗(0.049) 0.272∗∗∗(0.098)
Observations 286 286 286
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.124
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 10%, ∗ ∗ p < 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 1%.
As mentioned in the introduction, the efficiency of each insurance type has no exact answer
from economists. Our results suggest some implications of the combined effects of moral hazard
and adverse selection on social welfare of different insurance types from the perspective of social
earnings. When consumers in general can benefit from adverse selection which may depend on
the distribution of the riskiness of consumers, the combined effects of significant moral hazard
and “no adverse selection" makes purely compulsory insurance have less net social earnings than
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purely voluntary and mixed insurance.20
Result 4 When compulsory and voluntary insurance coexist, overall there is no crowding-out
effect of the compulsory part on the residual voluntary purchases.
Since the majority of compulsory insurance is partial, investigating the effects of compulsory
insurance on the residual voluntary part is also important to the insurance literature [51, 52, 53].
According to [54], compulsory and voluntary insurance are substitutes when they coexist. This
means that there is a crowding-out effect of compulsory insurance on the residual voluntary mar-
ket. Crowding-out effect indicates that increased government involvement in insurance markets
substantially reduces demand for private insurance. [55] studied the U.S. Medicare program and
found that Medicare does not have substantial effects on the coverage of the residual private in-
surance market. [56] reviewed the U.S. Medicaid program and showed that incomplete public
insurance crowds out private insurance demand.21 [57] find that crowding-out depends on the cov-
erage rate of government insurance. In our “Mixed Insurance" treatment, subjects are first required
to buy partially compulsory insurance, and then they are allowed to voluntarily purchase addi-
tional insurance. By comparing the purchasing rate in “Mixed Insurance" with “Purely Voluntary
Insurance", our design also allows us to study the crowding-out effects of the compulsory part in
“Mixed Insurance".22
Table 2.1 compares the proportion of subjects choosing to buy (additional) insurance in the first
and last balloon by treatment. The last row shows the p-values from Mann-Whitney U-tests, which
suggests there are no significant differences in the number of subjects choosing to buy insurance
between purely voluntary and mixed insurance in either the first or last balloon. This means overall
there is no crowding-out effects of the compulsory part in mixed insurance, which is also shown in
our estimation results (Table 2.3).
In Table 2.3, we analyze a probit model on the purchase rate of the first and last balloon.
20The effect size in Table 1.10 is small, and this is because in many cases, the earnings of consumers are the losses
of insurers. As a result, the final estimates are around zero.
21We did not find related studies in agricultural insurance.
22We assume if there is no partially compulsory part, the purchasing rate of the residual voluntary part in mixed in-
surance is similar to the purchasing rate of full voluntary insurance, since in mixed insurance, we divided the premium
and coverage levels in full voluntary insurance at the same rate.
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Table 1.11: Number of subjects choosing to buy insurance. (Reprinted from [2])
Insurance First balloon Last balloon
Purely Voluntary 38.7% 59.1%
Mixed 43.3% 59.8%
P-value 0.521 0.927
In column (3) and (4), we controlled for the average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloon
(Meanpump2-29), age, gender, education, income and household size. All the coefficients of
demographic covariates are not significant, and hence we do not report them in the table. The
regression results suggest there is no effects of mixed insurance on purchase rate.
Table 1.12: The Crowding-out Effects of Mixed Insurance (Reprinted from [2])
First Last First Last
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mixed 0.118 0.017 0.125 0.042
(0.184) (0.184) (0.191) (0.191)
MeanPumps229 −0.001 −0.008
(0.010) (0.010)
Constant −0.287∗∗ 0.231∗ −1.015 −0.372
(0.132) (0.131) (0.625) (0.629)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 190 190 190 190
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.000 0.017 0.018
Notes: The dependent variable of the probit model is the dummy variable for choosing
to buy insurance. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 10%, ∗∗p < 5%, ∗∗∗p <
1%
Recall in Result 1, we found that the compulsory part has a crowding-out effect on voluntary
part for less risk-averse subjects. Combining these two results, we conclude that the compulsory
part has a differential effect for people with different levels of risk aversion, with these effects
offsetting each other.
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1.6 Testing the Validity of BART as an Assessment of Risk-taking
BART has been previously shown to be correlated with self-reported risky behavior such as
drug use and gambling [4]. We further test the validity of BART as an assessment of risk-taking in
our experiment by comparing it with other measures of risk-taking. In particular, we use the Sen-
sation Seeking Scale (SSS), DOSPERT23 and a gamble-choice task (EG).24 We consider Spearman
rank correlations among risk-taking in BART and the other three risk measures.25 Table 1.13 shows
the Spearman’s ρ in all the treatments. The results suggest that risk-taking behavior in BART is
highly correlated with DOSPERT-investing and SSS-experience measures.26 Risky behavior col-
lected by the SSS-total scores and SSS-bor are positively correlated with BART at the 10% level.
The correlation between risk-taking in BART and the gamble-choice is not statistically signifi-
cant.27 Self-reported risk preferences measures have been shown predictive of related behavior in
the real world [60]. We conclude that risk-taking behavior collected in our experiment has some
predictive power of risk-taking behavior in real life. This further confirms the validity of our anal-
ysis about adverse selection and moral hazard using the average number of pumps in BART for
quantifying risk-taking behavior.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
The World Bank report about government support to agricultural insurance shows that agri-
cultural insurance is voluntary in 78% of the surveyed countries [61]. About 13% of countries
23The SSS yields one total score and primary scales for: Disinhibition (SSS-DIS)-This scale represents the desire
for social and sexual disinhibition as expressed in social drinking, partying, and a variety of sexual partners; Boredom
Susceptibility (SSS-BOR)-This scale represents an aversion to repetition, routine, and dull people, and restlessness
when things are unchanging; Thrill and Adventure Seeking (SSS-THR)-This scale contains items expressing a desire
to engage in sports or other activities involving speed or danger; Experience Seeking (SSS-EXP)-This scale represents
the seeking of experiences through the mind and senses, travel, and a nonconforming life-style. DOSPERT assesses
risk taking in five content domains: financial decisions (separately for investing versus gambling), health/safety, recre-
ational, ethical, and social decisions.
24In the incentivized gamble-choice task, participants were asked to choose one out of six lottery options with option
1 representing extreme risk aversion, and option 6 risk-loving. We code option 1 to 6 as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
25We only use the average number of pumps in the 2-29th balloon as risk-taking in BART when testing for the
correlations with other measures, as the pumps in the first and last balloon were affected by the insurance options.
26In our experiment, BART does not correlate with DOSPERT-all or DOSPERT-gamble, which is in line with the
findings in [58]. However, in [58], they don’t find correlations between BART and DOSPERT-investing.
27Risk preference evaluations have been shown not stable across elicitation techniques and context-dependent (see
[59]).
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Table 1.13: Spearman’s ρ of the correlations among risk-taking in BART and the other three measures
(Reprinted from [2])
SSS-all SSS-bor SSS-dis SSS-exp SSS-thr
Average number
of pumps in 2-29th .099* .093* .023 .156*** .062
Do-all Do-ethics Do-gamble Do-invest Do-health Do-recreational Do-social
Average number
of pumps in 2-29th .073 .033 .026 .139*** .039 .049 .077
EG
Average number
of pumps in 2-29th .033
Notes: ∗p < 10%, ∗ ∗ p < 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 1%.
have compulsory insurance for either crop or livestock, and 11% have conditionally compulsory
insurance for farmers who have investment loans. Most of the compulsory insurance is partially
compulsory. In the literature, the comparisons of compulsory, voluntary and mixed insurance types
are not well studied, making the overall efficiency of agricultural insurance scheme ambiguous. We
use a simple experiment to compare the three insurance types in terms of both adverse selection
and moral hazard.
By setting different balloons with or without insurance options respectively, we use BART as
both the assessment of risk-taking behavior and insurance context. First, by comparing risk-taking
behavior in balloons with no insurance options for people who buy and people who do not buy
insurance, we find adverse selection in purely voluntary insurance but advantageous selection in
mixed insurance. Specifically, the partial compulsory part in mixed insurance induces the less
risk-averse (high-risk) individuals not to buy additional insurance.
Moral hazard exists in all three insurance types, but mixed insurance reduces the degree of
moral hazard. Our results shed light on the combined effects of adverse selection and moral hazard
on insurance schemes. We use social earnings as an indicator of social welfare, and find that purely
compulsory insurance has the lowest social earnings.
The results about mixed insurance provide valuable insights, especially for developing coun-
tries where agricultural insurance is not yet well developed and very few schemes of insurance exist
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that implement different forms of mixed insurance. Further work about the optimal compulsory
coverage rate in mixed insurance is necessary.
Our paper is the first to use BART to compare different insurance schemes. [62] modeled the
Balloon Analog Insurance Task (BAIT) after BART to study protective risk management behavior.
Further work —especially field evidence— is needed validate BART (and other risk instruments)
to study insurance markets. We are also aware that different premium, coverage, subject pool and
specific insurance markets need to be explored within each insurance scheme. We hope this paper
serves as motivation to study the effects of different insurance parameters on insurance take up
using incentivized mechanisms.
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2. SOCIAL ROLES AND COMPETITIVENESS: MY WILLINGNESS TO COMPETE
DEPENDS ON WHO I AM (SUPPOSED TO BE)1
2.1 Introduction
From executive boardrooms to battlegrounds women are making great strides to attain parity
with male counterparts. The 2020 Global Gender Gap Report points out that many countries have
achieved important milestones towards gender equality, but this process is very ponderous [63]. It
is well documented in the economics literature that females are less competitive than males, even
when they have similar ability [64, 65]. Economists have tried to explore whether such gender
differences in competitiveness may be useful for explaining the persistent labor market gender gap
[66].2 If women are reluctant to compete, then they may also be less likely to seek job promotions
or to choose more lucrative and competitive fields [1]. Selecting out of certain labor markets is
costly for society, especially when competent women are reluctant to compete for positions for
which they are the best suited candidate.
A direct way to close the gender gap in competitiveness is to assume that preferences for com-
petition are malleable and induce women to become more competitive.3 The other approach is to
take preferences as given and to implement institutional changes to encourage women to compete,
especially high ability women. In this paper, we use this second approach to evaluate how social
roles affect individual preferences for competition. We do this by exogenously assigning roles/titles
that convey specific social norms for competitiveness to individuals. We set up a laboratory exper-
iment using conventional western society roles for men and women, namely “breadwinner" and
“supporter". To make the roles more salient, we set up a group competition in pairs instead of
individual competitions. We introduce in our design willingness to compete (WTC) scales (0-5)
1This study was approved by the IRB.
2The Global Gender Gap Report, documents a persistent structural gender gap in labor markets, such as in top
managerial or CEO positions, STEM field studies, and in the acquisition of emerging skills.
3[67] find that the gender gap in tournament entry reverses in a matrilineal society compared to patriarchal societies.
[68] find that girls in selective single-sex schools are more likely to enter competitions against boys compared to girls
from mixed-sex schools. Single-sex education has been proposed as an alternative to increase the competitiveness of
women [69].
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instead of a binary choice for entering the competition.4 In the treatment, before subjects pro-
ceed to choose their WTC level for their groups, we exogenously and randomly assign the role of
“breadwinner" or “supporter" to each group member. The two roles were selected based on the
results from surveys within the same study population.5 There are no differences between the two
roles in terms of payment, power, or effort in our experiment. The only difference is the social role
titles. There is no role assignment in the control condition.
In psychology, women and men belong to two separate social categories or roles [70], and
they are associated with different behavioral prescriptions or social norms [71]. For example,
men’s social roles promote competitiveness, while women’s social roles penalize it [72]. The two
selected roles in our treatment also have opposite social norms for competitiveness, analogous to
men and women in western society. Our main hypothesis is that the role of breadwinner (supporter)
will reduce (increase) the social cost of entering the competition, and subsequently, we expect the
WTC of men and women to change depending on their randomly assigned roles.
Consistent with previous literature, our results show a significant gender gap in WTC in the
control group. The WTC for males is 40% higher than females in the baseline. However, there
is no significant gender difference in WTC in the treatment. When women are randomly assigned
as breadwinners, their WTC significantly increases compared to women in the baseline or women
who are randomly assigned as supporters. The gender gap between treated female breadwinners
and untreated males is not statistically significant. More importantly, the increase in women’s WTC
is mainly contributed by high-ability women and they become better off, earning more than high-
ability women in the baseline. Men are also affected by the role assignment; male supporters are
less likely to enter the competition compared to male breadwinners. By examining the underlying
mechanisms behind our results, we demonstrate that social norms for competitiveness of different
social roles (including men and women) and responsibility for making the competition decision
4WTC for group competition carries responsibility, and our WTC scale design allows us to study the responsibility
of each role. We provide more details in the experimental design section.
5Before the experiment, we conducted a survey with over 1800 responses to ask respondents to select corresponding
labels to the primary-earner and the secondary-earner in a household. The details of the procedure are explained in the
following section.
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for the group explain the gender gap in WTC. We also show the role assignment affected only the
responsibility of male supporters, and therefore we argue that the changes in WTC brought by the
role assignment are mainly driven by the social norms for competitiveness associated with differ-
ent roles. A theoretical model is developed to investigate how social norms for competitiveness
affect WTC. We also estimate a difference-in-differences model, and find that women are more
responsive to the social norms for competitiveness.
In order to get implications for the real workplace, we further conduct an online experiment
using Amazon Mturk and randomly assign roles from labor markets: “manager" and “assistant" to
the treatment group. We replicate the main results from our laboratory experiment. When women
are assigned as the “manager", their WTC significantly increases, and the gender gap between
male and female managers is not significant.
In the book “Switch: How to Change Things When Change Is Hard", [73] share an example
of a manufacturing firm, Brasilata, and how their engine of success was fueled by the creation and
adoption of a new worker role called “inventor". New employees were asked to sign an “innovation
contract" when they joined the firm. The “inventor" role was made up, but “the program succeeded
beyond any reasonable expectations". Employees submitted 134,846 ideas, an average of 145.2
ideas per worker. Our paper sheds light on the importance of job roles/titles in the workplace and
provides potential mechanisms to understand how job roles/titles affect competitive behavior. [74]
suggest job titles contribute to change the gender-related perceptions of a job. [75] show that job
titles elicited more sex stereotyping than job descriptions. Another policy implication of our study
relates to gender quotas [76]. Nearly 100 countries around the world use some type of electoral
quota aimed at improving the underrepresentation of women in government [77]. Gender quotas
encourage women to pursue a political or board role which violates traditional stereotypic beliefs
about the sexes [78]. Our paper provides evidence of the potential effects of the role itself on
females’ competitive behavior.
We induce subjects with different roles which may be prone to an experimenter demand effect.
However, the experimenter’s expectations connected with the roles of breadwinner and supporter
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are exactly the social norms we are after. In real life, social norms are a type of social expectation,
and in this regard, the experimenter demand effect belongs to the treatment effect we want to eval-
uate.6 To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the effects of social roles on the
gender gap in competition by exogenously and directly inducing social roles with distinctive social
norms for competitiveness to each gender.7 The most relevant papers to our research are [88], [89],
[90] and [91]. [88] investigate the effects of social norms on gender differences in competitive
choices using different birth cohorts of individuals who were exposed to different socio-economic
institutions in China. They suggest that exposure to different institutions/norms during crucial
developmental-ages significantly molds an individuals’ willingness to compete. [89] studies the
impacts of social identity on WTC, but she focuses on building group identity during the experi-
ment and testing its effects on WTC. [90] suggest preferences for competition can be influenced by
gender, family, and professional identities. [91] prime subjects with power, by asking subjects to
recall and write down a personal situation in which they had control over other individuals. They
find that when subjects are primed with a high-power situation, the gender gap in competitiveness
vanishes. Our paper departs from previous work by directly and exogenously assigning social roles
that grant individuals permission to violate prevalent gender stereotypes for competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we introduce the concept of social
norms, and explain how the two social norm roles were selected. In section 3.3, we present the
experimental design and explain the WTC scale. The analysis and results are presented in section
2.4. Section 2.5 examines the potential mechanisms behind the results. Section 2.6 introduces the
procedure and results of the online sessions, and section 3.7 concludes.
6We also adopt other prevalent practices in the experimental economics profession to mitigate potential experi-
menter demand effects [79]. First, the experiment is incentivized, and it is costly for subjects to deviate from their true
competitive preferences. Second, the design is a between-subject design, and therefore the purpose of the experiment
is not obvious for subjects since they are only exposed to one treatment environment [80, 81]. Third, we implement a
second online experiment using Mturk with a higher degree of anonymity as a robustness check and we replicate the
results.
7Previous studies relevant to other institutional changes include changing the gender composition of competitions
[82, 83, 84], changing the competitors [85, 86], and developing a sponsorship program of competition entry [87],
among others.
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2.2 Relevant Literature and Social Role Label Selection
[92] introduced identity concepts from psychology and sociology into economic behavior.
They pose that identity is a sense of belonging to a social category, and it prescribes how people
within a category should behave. More precisely, the social norms linked to a social identity/role
provide unwritten standards of how to appropriately behave among members of that particular cat-
egory [71]. One important application of the social role model is gender, where man and woman
constitute two separate social categories. Man and woman are associated with different behavioral
prescriptions. For example, in patriarchal cultures, “men should not do domestic work at home and
men should earn more money than their wives."8 Social roles can influence economic outcomes
because deviating from social norms generates a social cost. The social cost includes both internal
(shame, guilt, loss of self-esteem, etc.) and external (disapproval, punishment, etc.) sanctions [71].
In psychology, this social cost is known as the “backlash effect" [94].9 In this paper, we focus on
how social roles affect willingness to compete. As noted in the role incongruity theory, men’s
social roles promote competitiveness, while women’s social roles penalize it [72]. Specifically,
women are expected to conform to the role of a supporting wife and to maternal duties. On the
other hand, men are expected to be competitive in the workplace [95, 96].10
Misaligning with the established gender roles results in social costs. First, we show some ex-
amples of external sanctions. [97] show that marriage satisfaction is lower in households where the
wife’s income exceeds the husband’s income; in fact, if this is the case, couples are more likely to
divorce.11 [99] show that men in the dating market prefer women who are less professionally am-
bitious. Men also tend to avoid highly educated female partners [100, 101, 102]. Job promotions
increase the likelihood of divorce for women, but not for men [103]. [104] argue that social identity
costs make single female students demonstrate less ambition in the presence of single males. Sec-
8[93] suggest these prescriptions exist within many households in the United States.
9[94] defines “backlash effect" as social and economic reprisals for behaving counter-stereotypically.
10Throughout the paper the discussions about social norms for competitiveness are based on patriarchal cultures,
unless otherwise noted.
11[98] use a lab experiment with couples who live together and suggest that there are no differences in preference
for work-division in couples.
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ondly, it is hard to find direct empirical evidence of utility loss from internalized norm deviation as
it is subjective. However, there is evidence that even when the actions are unobservable, women
behave under the guides of gender roles. Using field evidence from voluntary-based requests sent
by university email, [105] document that women are more likely to accept low-promotability tasks
compared to men. They further show that such gender gap is not driven by preferences, but rather
by the belief that women are supposed to be more likely to volunteer than men. Internalized social
norms also affect females’ performance. [106] find that female students perform worse in math
tasks when they are in classrooms in which traditional masculinity norms are present; however, in
the absence of these norms, there is no gender gap in performance.
In order to test for the effects of social roles on WTC, we exogenously change the cost of social
norm compliance for competitiveness socially prescribed to each gender by randomly assigning
subjects in the treatment to two different titles/roles, namely “breadwinner" and “supporter". The
two labels were selected based on two-rounds of surveys with the same study population before the
lab experiment.12 First, a total of 56 undergraduate students were recruited to provide open-ended
social role labels corresponding to primary and secondary earners in a household. Specifically, the
scripts asked:
In one word, how would you call someone who is the primary earner in a household:
In one word, how would you call someone who is the secondary earner in a household:
From these 112 responses, the three most frequently used labels for each role were selected for
the second survey. The second survey consisted of the same two questions using a multiple choice
format using the top three labels for each role in the first survey. In the first survey, for the primary
earner, the top three labels were Breadwinner, Primary, and Provider. For the secondary earner,
the top three labels were Supporter, Secondary, and Assistant. Then we conducted the second
survey. A total of 3,794 responses were collected in the second survey with 1,897 responses to
each question (40% males, 60% females). The second survey was a bulk email sent to all students
on campus. The results show that 42% of respondents chose “breadwinner" for the primary earner
12We randomly selected 2 out of 100 participants to receive a $20 Amazon gift card.
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label, and 55% chose “supporter" for the secondary earner label. Thus, the most popular labels
from the two surveys, “breadwinner" and “supporter" were selected as the labels for our social
roles treatment. Under the social role theory, a man is supposed to be the breadwinner of his
family, while a woman is supposed to be the supporter [107].
2.3 Experimental Design
We implement a between subject design with a baseline control and a treatment group. Our
experiment has two stages. The baseline and treatment group only differ in the second stage. The
experiment was conducted at Texas A&M University. Subjects were students who were native
English speakers recruited by bulk email. A total of 28 full sessions were conducted with eight
subjects per session. Nine subjects experienced technical issues that affected their performance
in the first stage and their subsequent choice in the second stage, and hence they were excluded
from the analysis.13 Ten subjects were not native English speakers and reported having difficulties
understanding their assigned roles, so they were also excluded.14 The final sample consists of 205
subjects. The experiment was computerized using Ztree [108], and had a duration of approximate
30 minutes.
2.3.1 Design
First Stage: In the first stage, subjects arrived to the experiment and they were seated in rows.
Each session had 8 subjects. Following the original design in [64], subjects had five minutes to
individually solve a real effort task under a noncompetitive piece-rate payment scheme. The real
effort task consists of adding-up five two-digit numbers. Participants were not allowed to use a
calculator, but they could use scratch paper. Participants received 10 cents for each correctly solved
problem. Contrary to the original design in [64], we do not reveal the subjects’ performance in this
stage until the end of the experiment. Since our focus is on the effects of social norms on WTC,
13It is possible that the other subjects in the sessions may be potentially affected by these instances. The results
were robust to the exclusion of all the sessions.
14Although in the recruitment process, being a native English Speaker was required, there were still some partici-
pants who were not native English speakers who registered for the experiment. In order to have exactly 8 participants
in each session, we allowed them to participate.
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we try to minimize potential confounding effects of natural ability on competition entry decisions.
The purpose of the first stage is to control for ability without a group or competition context.
Second Stage: After the first stage, each participant was randomly paired with another partici-
pant in the same room. We use team competition instead of individual competition following [109]
and [110] so that we can assign different roles within a group. In order to identify the effects of
different roles, the partner assignment was blind, and no information about partners was disclosed.
Four groups were formed in each session.
In the second stage, each subject had 5 minutes to solve a task similar to the first stage. Before
they proceed to the task, participants can choose between two possible payment schemes for their
group: piece rate or tournament. In the piece rate scheme, each group receives 20 cents (10 cents
per person) for each correctly answered question. In the tournament scheme, each group receives
80 cents for each correct answer only if they win, otherwise they receive nothing.15 If a group
enters the tournament, then they compete with all the other three groups in the session, regardless
of the payment scheme chosen by the other three groups. This design feature removes potential
concerns of participants competing only against those who choose the tournament scheme.
Each group member is asked to select the payment scheme for his group using a six point scale:
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, which is our willingness to compete measure. The probability of entering the
tournament for each WTC scale is 0%, 20%, 40%, 60% 80% and 100% respectively. Individuals
can choose (with certainty) the piece rate payment scheme by selecting 0 or the tournament by
selecting 5. One of the two group members’ WTC was randomly selected as the binding WTC for
the group. The WTC selection is anonymous between the two group members, and participants do
not know the payment scheme for their groups or their performance in this stage until the end of
the experiment.16
15The expected payment under the piece rate payment scheme between the first and second stage is the same. In
related literature, the usual payment for each correct answer is 50 cents. In our case, if we choose 50 cents in the first
stage, then the payment for each correct answer would be $4 under the tournament payment scheme in the second
stage. It has been shown that scaling up payments results in a significant increase in risk aversion [40, 111], and this
impact might be heterogeneous by gender. To reduce the effects of the payment itself on competition entry, we lower
our payment for the piece rate scheme to 10 cents in the first stage and 20 cents in the second stage.
16We want to test the effects of roles on performance, and minimize the confounding effects of the payment scheme
on performance. We do not reveal the implemented payment scheme until the end of the experiment.
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After selecting the payment scheme, each group proceeds to the second round real effort addi-
tion task. Subjects work separately on the task and then the payment for each group is determined
by the combination of the number of correct answers of the two group members. The group
earnings were equally divided between the two members. This design feature keeps subjects per-
formance consistent and excludes the possibility of individuals competing on the basis of team
performance.
Treatment Interventions: The difference between the treatment and the control group is the
randomly assigned role to each group member in the second stage. For the treatment group in the
second stage, each group member received the following information before answering the WTC
scale question:
You were randomly selected to be the Breadwinner (Supporter) of the group, and your partner
is the Supporter (Breadwinner) of the group.
In the control group, there is no such role assignment. As previously mentioned, in order to
eliminate other factors that may affect competition entry, we inform subjects that the roles are
randomly assigned, and subjects know their partner has been assigned the opposite role. Recall
that the group payment is equally divided, and one of the two members’ WTC is randomly selected
as the binding WTC for the group. Given all these design features, the only difference between the
two group members is the framing of the role.
Social Norms Belief Elicitation: We modified the method in [112] which is used to elicit so-
cial appropriateness to elicit social attitudes toward the competitiveness of each role in our experi-
ment. Using a five-point-scale (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), subjects were asked to indicate how competitive they
believe the following individual should be: a female supporter, a female breadwinner, a woman, a
breadwinner, a male supporter, a supporter, a man, and a male breadwinner. For each question, if
the participant’s answer was the same as the most frequent answer in the session, they received a
reward of ¢25. We do not reveal the outcome of each question until the end of the experiment in
order to address possible hedging problems.
Performance Beliefs and Risk Preferences: We elicited participants’ beliefs about their rela-
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tive performance in the first task. We ask participants to guess whether they performed better than
their second-stage partner. We also ask them to state their beliefs about their overall ranking in
the session (1-8). Correct answers were incentivized with a ¢25 reward. The performance beliefs
can be used to examine whether changes in WTC induced by the role assignment are derived from
changes in confidence from the roles.
At the end of the experiment, all participants were asked to complete a incentivized risk
gamble-choice task following [41] and a demographic survey. Participants received payments
from the two tasks and the incentivized norm and belief elicitations, and the gamble choice. The
average payment from the two tasks was $6.17 Table 2.1 summarizes the experimental procedures
and the number of subjects in each experimental condition. The instructions, questionnaires and
surveys are available in the Appendix.
Table 2.1: Summary of Treatments and Number of Subjects.
First stage Second stage Female Male F-Breadwinner M-Breadwinner Total
(individually) (group, WTC)
Baseline Group Piece rate No roles 41 35 — — 76
Treatment Group Piece rate Role assignment 73 56 38 26 129
2.3.2 WTC Scale
In our experimental design, we use a WTC scale instead of the conventional binary choice in
previous literature. A more continuous measure of willingness to compete has been previously
studied in the literature [113, 114, 115]. The results from previous studies suggest that the binary
choice measure to some extent hides the intensity of preferences for competition. In this paper, we
follow this line of work and focus on the responsibility required for making competition decisions
for the group.
17The show-up fee was $5.
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The competition in our experiment is a group competition, and in order to make our treatment
(role assignment) more salient, we follow [110] and ask subjects to make WTC decisions for
their groups instead of for themselves. In this regard, choosing to enter the competition or not is
also a decision which carries responsibility. This is a particularly important feature in our design,
since the role assignment may affect the WTC through changing the responsibility. We use the
preference for randomization as a proxy for responsibility. Preference for randomization in the
economics literature is a puzzle for decision theory as it may violate expected utility maximization
[116]. As indicated in [117] and [118], one possible reason for preference for randomization is
that participants may want to avoid the responsibility of making a choice, even when it results in
suboptimal outcomes.18 Thus, we design the WTC scale to investigate changes in responsibility
for different roles.
Denote the piece-rate payment per correct answer as p1, and the tournament payment as p2.
A WTC value of 1 in our scale, for example, indicates a 20% probability of entering the tourna-
ment, and an 80% probability of obtaining the piece-rate payment. Given the exante probability of
winning the tournament in the design, the expected payment of each part of scale 1 is as follows:
scale1 =

20%tournament expected payment :20% * (25% * p2 + 75% * 0)
80%piece rate expected payment :80% * p1
For simplicity, we denote p1 = 1, and p2 = 4p1 = 4. Each point in our scale represents
a lottery with different probabilities assigned to different payoff levels: low payoff (0), middle
payoff (p1 = 1), and high payoff (p2 = 4). For example, point 1 in the scale described above
indicates 80% chance of earning 1, 5% chance of earning 4, and 20% chance of earning 0. The
expected payoff is the same for each point in the scale, which equals to 1, but the variance varies
18In another bigger literature branch, preference for randomization is studied in relation to ambiguity/uncertainty
aversion, where a lottery with 50%/50% probabilities (randomization) is compared to a lottery with unknown probabil-
ities (ambiguity/uncertainty aversion) [119, 120, 121, 122]. We do not study this type of preference for randomization
in current paper.
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across the scale. Table 2.2 summarizes the lottery for each WTC scale.
Table 2.2: Indicated Lottery of Each WTC Scale
WTC Scale Prob. of competition Low Payoff (0) Middle Payoff (1) High Payoff (4) Expected Payoff Standard Deviation
0 0% 0 1 0 1 0
1 20% 15% 80% 5% 1 0.77
2 40% 30% 60% 10% 1 1.10
3 60% 45% 40% 15% 1 1.34
4 80% 60% 20% 20% 1 1.55
5 100% 75% 0 25% 1 1.73
From point 0 to point 5, the standard deviation increases. By assuming a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility function (x
1−γ
1−γ ) and based on expected utility maximization, risk-
seeking individuals would choose point 5 in the scale, and risk-averse individuals would choose the
piece rate (point 0 in the scale). Risk-neutral individuals would be indifferent.19 Thus, choosing
the middle points in the scale (1-4) reveals a preference for randomization. According to the
corresponding tournament entry probability of each number, points 1 and 2 are the randomization
attached to the decision of receiving a piece-rate payment (point 0 in the scale), and points 3 and
4 are the randomization attached to the decision of entering the competition (point 5 in the scale).
The more the subject is willing to take responsibility for selecting the piece-rate payment, the lower
his WTC; the more the subject is willing to take responsibility for entering the competition, the
higher his WTC.
At the same time, the standard deviation increases with the WTC scale, which is in line with
the risky-behavior nature of the tournament entry. Entering the tournament is a riskier decision
compared to the fixed piece-rate scheme. In this regard, our WTC scale also makes the effects of
risk preferences on tournament entry more salient. Females are more risk-averse than males [123],
and therefore the WTC scale allows us to test whether our treatment effects are explained away by
19If we use the subjective probability of winning the tournament instead of 25%, the expected payments and standard
deviations of the scales are monotone. Thus, we find the choices of individuals with different risk preferences do not
change and are still 0 and 5. The only difference is that risk-neutral individuals would also choose either 0 or 5, since
the expected payment is monotone.
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gender differences in risk preferences. Based on the properties of our WTC scale, we argue that it
is a combination of responsibility (for choosing for the group) and risk preferences.
2.4 Results
In this section, we first examine whether conditional on ability, men and women differ in their
preferences for performing under a piece-rate versus a tournament scheme when competing in
teams. We then examine whether exogenous role assignment changes their preferences for com-
petition.
2.4.1 Willingness to Compete in the Baseline
Result 1. In the baseline without role assignment, the WTC of women is lower than the WTC
of men.
In our experiment, the WTC was elicited during the second stage. Figure 2.1 shows the cu-
mulative distribution of WTC by gender in the baseline. The average WTC of men is 3.11, and
the average WTC of women is 2.22. Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-Test, we find that the
WTC of males is 40% higher than females (p = 0.037). Recall that, in the baseline, there is no
role assignment. Participants have no information about their partners, except that the partner is
another participant in the room.20 We always have eight participants in each session. Our result
suggests that men are more likely to choose a competitive tournament environment compared to
women when competing in two-person teams.21 Throughout the paper the reported test statistics
refers to a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-Test, unless otherwise noted.
Figure 2.2a provides detailed evidence of preference for randomization for both genders in the
baseline. There are 68.29% females and 40.00% males choosing middle scales. There is a mass
20Gender composition of each session is observed by participants, and the percentage of each composition by
session is shown in AppendixB.1. We tried to have the same number of males and females in each session, but we
control for the differences in the following model estimations.
21Previous literature have explored gender differences in tournament entry using team competitions instead of indi-
vidual competitions. [109] finds no gender gap in team competition entry. [110] find competing in two-person teams
reduces the gender gap by two-thirds. In [109], the team was constructed by two subjects who had the same decision
for tournament entry. Our team decision-making process is same to the process in [110], but the gender of the partner
in [110] was revealed. Note that [110] use a binary decision to elicit preferences for competition which does not
involve the responsibility for making the decision for the team in our paper.
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative Distribution of WTC in the Baseline
concentration for men in the 4− 5 points in the scale, and a mass concentration for women in the
1 − 3 range. The distribution of WTC scale between men and women is significantly different
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.031). We further use the degree of randomization to quantify
the level of responsibility for making the choice for the group. Based on the probability of entering
the competition/piece-rate, the degree of randomization of point 4 in the scale is lower than the
degree of randomization of point 3; and the degree of randomization of point 1 is lower than the
degree of randomization of point 2. Points 0 and 5 in the scale have a zero degree of randomization.
Thus, we set the responsibility measures equal to 0 for points 2 and 3; 1 for points 1 and 4; and 2
for points 0 and 5. In general, we find that men have lower preference for randomization and are
more willing to take the competition choice responsibility compared to women (p = 0.008). This
difference is mainly driven by the responsibility of entering the competition (i.e., points 3−5 in the
scale), and there is no significant difference in the responsibility of choosing the piece-rate (i.e.,
points 0−2 in the scale) between man and women (p = 0.021 for points 3−5, p = 0.125 for points
0− 2). Note that in our design the lower responsibility in points 0− 2 and higher responsibility in
points 3− 5 indicate a higher WTC.
We further recoded the WTC scale to an adjusted-binary WTC choice with points 0-2 indicating
choosing the piece-rate payment and corresponding to “0" in the binary choice, and points 3-5
indicating choosing to enter the competition and corresponding to “1" in the binary choice. The
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(a) Proportions of WTC Scale Choice by Gender (b) Adjusted-Binary WTC (with standard error bars)
Figure 2.2: WTC in the Baseline
adjusted-binary WTC choice mutes the responsibility for making the choice for the group. Figure
2.2b shows there is a higher proportion of men choosing the scale 3 − 5 compared to women (χ2
test, p = 0.056). Thus, a higher proportion of choosing points 3− 5 (and also higher responsibility
in points 3− 5) for men results in final higher WTC for men in the baseline.
2.4.1.1 Gender Differences in Performance in the Baseline
In order to rule out individual ability as a driver of WTC, subjects were not informed about their
performance during the first stage until the end of the experiment. However, subjects may still form
beliefs about their performance before choosing to enter the tournament or not. In the second stage,
participants work in teams. Recall that participants do not know the payment scheme applied to
their group until the end of the experiment. However, they can speculate about the payment scheme
based on their own WTC, especially those with high WTC. Performance anticipation under a group
context and a tournament environment may also affect subjects’ decisions. Therefore, we examine
whether gender differences in performance exist under the piece rate and tournament payment
schemes in the baseline.
Table 2.3 summarizes the performance of men and women. In the first stage, the average
number of correctly solved problems was 9.05 for women and 9.83 for men. The p-values in the
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last row show that there are no significant differences in performance between men and women.
In the second stage, we first show the performance of all participants in order to evaluate whether
the group context generates gender differences in performance. The difference in performance
under the group context is not significant, which is consistent with [110]. On average, women
correctly solve 9.34 problems, and men 9.40 (p = 0.896). Next, we compare the performance of
individuals who actually end up being paid with a tournament payment scheme, and the difference
is not significant (p = 0.823).
Previous literature (e.g., [124]) documents that competitions can boost performance; however
using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, we do not find differences in performance between the first and
second stage for men or women (see p-values in the last column). This result is reasonable in our
case, since performance and payment scheme information was not revealed until the end of the
experiment. Given the similarity in performance of men and women, we argue that in the baseline,
men have higher WTC than women of similar ability. Regression estimations and other potential
underlying mechanisms will be explored later.
Table 2.3: Gender Difference in Performance in the Baseline
First Stage Second Stage Second Stage p-value
1 2 3 column 1 vs 2
(all participants) (all participants) (only those with tournament pay)
Men 9.83 (0.49) 9.4(0.43) 9.08(0.55) 0.215
Women 9.05(0.52) 9.34(0.48) 9.12(0.64) 0.176
p-value 0.322 0.896 0.832
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
2.4.2 The Impact of Random Role Assignment on WTC in the Treatment Group
Result 2a. Compared to the baseline, women’s WTC significantly increases when they are
assigned as breadwinners; there is no significant change in females’ WTC when they are assigned
as supporters. Males’ WTC is not changed significantly by each role. Overall, there is no gender
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gap in WTC in the treatment group.
2b. The WTC of “supporters" is lower than the WTC of “breadwinners" for both men and
women.
In this section, we explore how the social role assignment impacts participants’ WTC. Recall
that in the treatment group, before choosing their WTC in the 0-5 scale, subjects were informed that
they were randomly selected as the “breadwinner" or “supporter" of the group. We also informed
participants that their partner was assigned the alternative role. Figure 2.3 shows that the gender
gap in WTC decreases by 56% in the treatment group and it is no longer statistically significant
(p-value = 0.123). We further analyze whether different roles have asymmetric effects by gender.
First, we compare the WTC of each role to the baseline. Figure 2.3 shows that the WTC of
treated female breadwinners significantly increased compared to women in the baseline (p-value =
0.031).22 More interestingly, there is no difference in the WTC between female breadwinners and
males in the baseline (p-value = 0.373). The effect of the “breadwinner" role on males’ WTC is
not significant compared to the baseline (p-value = 0.285). We then compare the WTC of treated
supporters to the baseline. There are no differences for both genders (p-value = 0.933 for women,
p-value = 0.181 for men).23 Although the difference in WTC between male supporters and males
in the baseline is not significant, the gender gap in WTC between male supporters and females in
the baseline is not significant (p-value = 0.436).
We further compare the WTC within the role assignment (breadwinner vs supporter). Figure
2.3 suggests that for both genders, breadwinners’ WTC is significantly higher than the WTC of
supporters (p = 0.049 for women, p = 0.016 for men). When we compare the WTC of each role
across gender, we find that there is no gender gap in WTC between male and female “supporters"
(p = 0.513); however male breadwinners are more willing to enter the competition than female
breadwinners (p = 0.032).
Figure 2.4a shows that preference for randomization exists in the treatment for both genders.
22After we apply the multiple hypothesis testing in [125], the difference is marginal significant (both p-values with
Thm3_1 and Remark3_7 = 0.053).
23Male supporters’ WTC decreases, but due to lack of power, the difference is not significant.
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Figure 2.3: Comparisons of Mean of WTC Level (with standard error bars)
There are 71.23% females and 58.93% males choosing middle points in the scale, but the dis-
tribution of WTC scale between men and women in the treatment is not significantly different
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.187). Similar to the baseline, men in general have lower prefer-
ence for randomization and are more willing to take the choice responsibility compared to women
in the treatment (p = 0.018). We further mute the responsibility and recoded the WTC scale to an
adjusted-binary WTC choice. Figure 2.4b shows that the WTC results using the adjusted-binary
WTC choice are consist with the results using our complete WTC scale, except that there is no
gender gap in WTC between female and male breadwinners (χ2 test, p = 0.457).
Table 2.4 summarizes performance in the treatment and it shows that the results are similar
to the baseline results. The p-values in the last row indicate that there are in general no gender
differences in performance during the first or second stage. However, male supporters perform
better than female supporters. Using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, we evaluate the performance
between the first and second stage for each role and gender. The p-values in columns suggest that
the role assignment does not change the performance for men or women. The changes in WTC
induced by the treatment (role assignment) are not likely due to changes in performance induced
by the roles.
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(a) Proportions of WTC Scale Choice by Gender (b) Adjusted-Binary WTC in the Treatment
Figure 2.4: WTC in the Treatment
Table 2.4: Gender Difference in Performance in the Treatment Group
First Stage Second Stage Breadwinner p-value Supporter p-value
(individual) (group) 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Men 9.80 9.46 8.8 8.5 0.497 10.7 10.3 0.811
(0.54) (0.41) (0.65) (0.65) (0.80) (0.49)
Women 8.86 8.97 8.8 9.3 0.286 8.9 8.6 0.441
(0.39) (0.34) (0.58) (0.46) (0.52) (0.51)
P-value 0.202 0.163 0.763 0.377 0.031 0.010
Notes: “1st" and “2nd" indicate first stage and second stage respectively. p values in columns are from comparisons between the first
and second stage performance for each role and gender. Standard errors are in parentheses.
We estimate ordered probit models for the control and treatment groups. The dependent vari-
able is WTC. The number of correct answers in the first stage is used to control for ability (Ability).
We also control for confidence, risk preferences and the gender composition of each session. Con-
fidence is indicated by converted participants’ beliefs of their relative rank in the session (1-8).
Risk preferences are indicated by the choice of [41] incentivized risk gamble task, which has 6
choices (1-6). A higher number means more risk-tolerant behavior (RiskTolerance). Gender com-
position indicates the number of women in each session (No. Female). In Table 2.5, columns
(1) and (2) show that in the baseline, after controlling for risk preferences, confidence and ability,
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the female coefficient is no longer significant.24 In columns (3) and (4), we pool all data in the
treatment. First, consistent with figure 2.3, there are no significant effects for gender. The positive
and significant breadwinner coefficient shown in column (4) suggests that the “breadwinner" label
makes people more willing to enter the competition compared to the “supporter" label. In column
(5), we estimate a difference-in-differences model to investigate whether men and women respond
differentially to the role assignment. The interaction term shows that there is no differential effect
of assigned roles across gender. However, when we use the adjusted-binary WTC choice in col-
umn (6), we find women are more responsive to the role assignment. We explore the mechanisms
behind these results in the following section. We also estimate a difference-in-differences model
for “breadwinner" and “supporter" separately, and the results are similar (Table B.2).
2.5 Exploring the Mechanisms Behind the Changes in WTC
In this section, we explore the potential mechanisms behind the results presented before. We
first ask whether the role assignment changes the confidence level or change the effects of risk
aversion on WTC. We then test for the effects of social norms for competitiveness and examine
changes in responsibility for making the competition choice for the group. Next, we separate sub-
jects based on their performance in order to explore whether the role assignment has asymmetric
effects on subjects with different ability.
2.5.1 Changes in Confidence and Risk Aversion
Recall that in the belief elicitation stage, we asked subjects to guess whether they believe they
correctly solved more questions than their partner during the first stage. We also asked subjects
to guess their performance rank in their session (1-8) during the first stage. Both questions were
incentivized.
Table 2.6 shows the estimated performance rank in the first stage. The p-values in the last row
24In [64], the coefficient of gender stays significant after adding these controls. One reason for the difference in our
case could be the WTC scale, which makes the effect of risk preferences on WTC more salient, and then such gender
gap in our case is explained by risk preferences and confidence. [126] focus on experimental measurement error, and
suggest that the gender gap in competition is well explained by risk attitudes and overconfidence once measurement
error is taken into account. In this regard, our results align with [126].
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Table 2.5: Regression Analysis of Ordered Probit Model of WTC.
Baseline Baseline Treatment Treatment Treat & Base
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Binary-WTC
Female −0.498∗∗ -0.299 -0.308 -0.277 −0.440∗ −0.463∗







Ability -0.012 -0.027 -0.022 -0.017
(0.041) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022)
Confidence 0.324∗∗∗ 0.089 0.171∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.054) (0.045) 0.054
RiskTolerance 0.149∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.063) (0.047) 0.063
No. Female -0.064 0.107 0.023 -0.001
(0.118) (0.088) (0.068) (0.053)
Observation 76 76 129 129 205 205
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.094 0.006 0.065 0.059 0.122
Notes: Dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the WTC scale, and it is the adjusted-binary WTC choice in column 6. Standard errors
in parentheses. Ability refers to performance in the 1st stage. Confidence refers number 1-8 with higher number indicating more
confident. NO. female refers to the number of female in each session. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
show that females are less confident than males, which is consistent with previous literature (see
[65]). The p-values in the last three columns suggest the roles do not change the confidence level
for neither men nor women. The beliefs for guessing the relative performance to their partners
show similar results (see Appendix B.3), except that both males and females believe they perform
better than their partners, and there is no gender difference. We further investigate whether the
effect of confidence on the WTC change by role assignment using a difference-in-difference ap-
proach. We regress WTC on a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a role assignment
and 0 for the control. The results are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.7. The results suggest
confidence has a significant and positive effect on WTC for both “breadwinners" and “supporters",
but the role assignment mitigates the impacts of confidence on WTC. Males are more confident
than females, and therefore they are more likely to enter the competition. The role assignment then
may reduce the gender gap in WTC by mitigating the effects of confidence on WTC.
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Table 2.6: Estimated Performance Rank
Baseline Treat Breadwinner Supporter p-value p-value p-value
Treat Base vs BW Base vs SP BW vs SP
Men 2.54 2.84 2.81 2.87 0.683 0.431 0.839
Women 3.05 3.29 3.29 3.29 0.772 0.436 0.751
P-Value 0.035 0.087 0.298 0.148
Notes: Subjects are asked to guess their performance ranks in a session (1-8). 1 means the best.
Table 2.7: Ordered Probit Estimates of Confidence and Risk on WTC.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Breadwinner & Base Supporter & Base Breadwinner & Base Supporter & Base
Treatment -0.238 −0.733∗ 0.735 -0.449
(0.374) (0.392) (0.472) (0.457)
Confidence 0.332∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.082)




Treat * RiskTolerance -0.061 0.158
(0.108) (0.121)
Observation 140 141 140 141
R-square 0.079 0.081 0.069 0.074
Notes: Dependent variable is WTC. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions control for gender, risk/confidence, performance in the first stage
and gender composition in each session.
Risk preferences were measured using the [41] gamble choice task. We replicate the robust
findings in the literature that women are more risk averse than men (p-value < 0.01). We further
investigate whether the effects of risk preferences change by the role assignment and the results
are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.7. In contrast to confidence, there are no significant
interaction terms, suggesting that risk aversion has no differential impacts on the WTC of different
groups.
53
2.5.2 Responsibility for Making the Choice for the Group
In our setup, the WTC scale also involves responsibility for making the choice for the group.
The change in responsibility will affect the WTC level. Recall that we use the degree of randomiza-
tion to set the responsibility score for each WTC scale. The responsibility score equals 0 for points
2 and 3; 1 for points 1 and 4; and 2 for points 0 and 5. Table 2.8 summarizes the responsibility
scores for the baseline and treatment groups.
Table 2.8: Responsibility Scores
Baseline Breadwinner Supporter
Total Scale 0− 2 Scale 3− 5 Total Scale 0− 2 Scale 3− 5 Total Scale 0− 2 Scale 3− 5
Men 1.49 1.50 1.48 1.50 1.33 1.55 1.00 0.88 1.14
Women 1.00 1.09 0.89 0.82 0.75 0.85 0.971 1.17 0.76
P-value 0.008 0.125 0.021 0.001 0.135 0.003 0.884 0.306 0.191
Observation (M/F) 35/41 12/23 23/18 26/38 6/12 20/26 30/35 16/18 14/17
P-values are from two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-Tests.
Table 2.8 shows that in the baseline and with the role “breadwinner", men have a lower propen-
sity for randomization, and are more willing to take the responsibility compared to women. The
gender gap in responsibility mainly comes from a larger proportion of points 3− 5 in the scale by
males. There is no gender difference in responsibility for the role of “supporter". Higher responsi-
bility in the piece-rate (points 0− 2 in the scale) indicates a lower WTC, and higher responsibility
in competition entry (points 3− 5 in the scale) indicates a higher WTC. The gender gap in respon-
sibility partially explains the gender gap in WTC in the baseline and with the role “breadwinner",
and no gender gap in WTC with the role of “supporter".
We further compare the responsibility between each role and the baseline within each gender.
We find the role assignment only significantly changes male’s responsibility score when they are
assigned as the “supporter". Male supporters are less willing to take responsibility compared males
in the baseline and male breadwinners (p = 0.011 for baseline, p = 0.015 for breadwinner),
with the difference mainly driven by the responsibility in the 0 − 2 points in the scale. Females’
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responsibility are not likely to be affected by the role assignment. The distributions of each WTC
scale for men and women are shown in Appendix B.6.
2.5.3 The Effects of Social Norms
We modified the method in [112] to elicit social norms for competitiveness of each role and
gender. Participants were asked to:
“Please indicate in a 1-5 scale how competitive you think a should be. If your answer is
the same as the most frequent answer in the experiment, you will receive a payment of 25 cents.”
The social norms were elicited for the following: woman, female supporter, female breadwin-
ner, breadwinner, man, male supporter, supporter, and male breadwinner in a household. Each
subject was asked the whole set. Figure 2.5 shows the mean responses for the social norms of
each role and gender in the treatment group.25 Using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, we find that
most participants believe other participants believe Females should be less competitive than Males
(p-value= 0.052). The social norms for the competitiveness of Supporters are lower than Breadwin-
ners (p-value < 0.01). Adding the two labels to the gender closes the gender gap of social norms
for competitiveness (p-value = 0.470 for Breadwinner, p-value = 0.132 for Supporter). We further
find the social norms for competitiveness of female and male supporters are lower than females
and males without any labels (p-value < 0.01 for both genders). In contrast, the social norms for
competitiveness of female and male breadwinners are higher than women and men without labels
(p-value < 0.01 for both genders). Interestingly, the results are consistent when considering the
social norms reported by men and women separately (see Figure B.3).
Based on our main results shown before, we suggest the results using adjusted-binary WTC
choice match the elicited social norms for competitiveness. We also developed a theoretical model
to investigate how social norms for competitiveness affect WTC (see Appendix B.5). In the model,
we argue the intrinsic self-image cost of entering the competition is higher for a woman compared
25In the control group, subjects had not seen the two labels until this section, and some subjects commented that
they did not understand the label “Supporter" until they saw “Breadwinner" in the following question. Thus, we focus
on the elicitation of social norms in the treatment. Including the social norms elicited in the control does not change
the results (see Figure B.1).
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to a man, and it is also higher for a supporter compared to a breadwinner. Assigning the role
“breadwinner" to a woman reduces her social cost of entering the competition. Thus, we argue
that the social norms for competitiveness can be a major mechanism through which the social roles
affect WTC.
Figure 2.5: Social Norms for Competitiveness (with SE)
To sum up, social norms for competitiveness of different social roles (including men and
women) and the responsibility for making the choice for the group explain the gender gap in
WTC in our experimental set-up (both in the baseline and treatment groups). The changes in WTC
brought by the role assignment mainly come from the social norms associated with the social roles,
and based on results in Table 2.5, women are more responsive to such social norms.
2.5.4 WTC by Performance
In this section, we are interested in whether the role assignment differentially affects the WTC
of subjects with different ability.
Figure 2.6 shows the mean WTC for women (panels a and b) and man (panels c and d) condi-
tional on their performance quartile during the first stage.26 Panel a of Figure 2.6 shows that the
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Figure 2.6: WTC by Performance Quantiles
increase in WTC of female breadwinners is mainly contributed by high-performing women. The
difference in WTC between the baseline and female breadwinners in the first two best quantiles (3
and 4) is significant (p-value = 0.040). In panel b of Figure 2.6, we do not find similar patterns of
changes when comparing women in the baseline and women supporters. We also show the WTC
by performance quantile for males (Figure 6-c and 6-d). We do not find similar results for male
breadwinners, but we find that the WTC of male supporters in the top two performance-quantiles
is lower than males in the baseline within the same quantiles (p-value = 0.048). This means the
decrease in WTC of male supporters is also mainly contributed by high-performing men. Based on
our analysis about social norms for competitiveness, one possible explanation is high-performing
subjects are more likely to obey social norms.
group pairing effect in the first stage.
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We finally compare the expected earnings in the second stage for females in different perfor-
mance quantiles. When we calculated the expected earnings, we hypothesized that subjects com-
pete individually with 8 subjects per session. The piece-rate payment is 0.1 per correct answer, and
the tournament-payment is 0.8 per correct answer. We then use subjects’ performance in the first
stage (ability), their ranks in the first stage and their WTC to calculate the expected earnings in the
second stage. Results in Table 2.9 show the top performing-quantiles women are significantly bet-
ter off when they are assigned as breadwinners in the treatment compared to the baseline. In fact,
they earn 44.2% more by entering the competition. For males, we do not find expected earning
differences between the control and treatment by performance quantiles (see TableB.4). We also
show actual earnings by quantiles for men and women, and the results are robust (see Appendix
B.7). Highest-ability women with the “breadwinner" title earn twice the actual amount of money
than highest-ability women in the control.
Table 2.9: Women’s Expected Earnings in the Second Stage by Performance Quartile ($)
Baseline Treat Breadwinner Supporter p-value p-value p-value
Base vs Treat Base vs BW Base vs S
Worst 1-2 0.94(0.17) 1.10(0.13) 1.03(0.19) 1.16(0.19) 0.516 0.836 0.369
Best 3-4 3.62(0.66) 4.32(0.53) 5.22(0.71) 3.00(0.63) 0.236 0.041 0.710
Notes: 1= the worst performance; 4 = the best performance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
2.6 Online Experiment
By using the roles of “breadwinner" and “supporter", we focus on the traditional family roles of
males and females in western society. We further conducted an online experiment using Amazon
Mturk with a more general population.27 In the online sessions, we implement a between subjects
design with a baseline and a treatment group. However, the treatment roles are “manager" and
27In the online sessions, we ask people not to use a calculator. It is still possible people still used the calculator;
however, the number of correct answers solved in the online experiment is very low. Although the absolute numbers
might be affected, the relative comparisons should not be affected in our experiment.
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“assistant". We use these two roles for two reasons. First, we want to evaluate whether the social
norm effects in the lab still hold with different titles. Second, we focus on roles existing in the
actual workplace. The online experiment was computerized with Otree [127]. The experimental
design for the online experiment is identical to the lab experiment. The only difference is the
treatment roles and related incentivized questions in social norm elicitation and questionnaire parts.
We scaled down the payments on Mturk, and the average payment of the two tasks was $1.5. Table
B.7 summarizes the experimental procedures and the number of subjects in the online sessions.
We conduct the same analysis for the online experiment, and obtain similar results (Figure 2.7).
There is a gender gap in WTC in the baseline (p-value = 0.044), and in aggregate there is no gender
gap in the treatment group (p-value = 0.966). When females are randomly assigned as managers,
their WTC increases significantly compared to females in the baseline (p-value = 0.043) and female
assistants (p-value = 0.035). The gender gap disappears between female managers and untreated
males in the baseline (p-value = 0.882). When males are assigned as assistants, their WTC is
lower than the WTC of males in the baseline (p-value = 0.069). Male assistants also have lower
WTC compared to male managers, but the difference is not significant (p-value = 0.113). When
we compare WTC within the treatment, there is no gender gap for both managers and assistants
(p-value = 0.898 for manager, p-value = 0.748 for assistant).
We further check the performance in the two stages, confidence and risk preferences. We also
elicit the social norms for the new titles. The results are congruent with what we find in the lab
experiment (please see the Appendix for more details). The online experiment provides robustness
of the effects of social role titles on the WTC we found in the laboratory experiment.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) recently surveyed more than 3,600 professional women (aged
28-40) to learn about their career development experiences and aspirations.28 The survey results
show that 82% of women are confident in their ability to fulfill their career aspirations and 73%
28PricewaterhouseCoopers (doing business as PwC) is one of the Big Four auditors in the world.
The report of the survey can be found at www.pwc.com/timetotalk.
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Figure 2.7: Comparisons of Mean of WTC in Online Experiment (with standard error bars)
are actively seeking career advancement opportunities. However, 42% feel nervous about how
starting a family might impact their careers. Affected by traditional social norms, women are
expected to spend more time in child care and household activities than men [128]. As a result,
reducing the limits of social norms for competitiveness on women becomes important. Especially
for high-ability women, since it is costly for them, their families and society if they do not pursue
professional positions for which they are the best suited candidate. PwC’s global chairman Bob
Moritz states “It must go hand in hand with efforts to mitigate any unconscious biases and gender
stereotypes that have traditionally impacted career success and progression in workplaces around
the world".
However, gender norms remain extremely powerful because they are highly visible, biologi-
cally and culturally rooted. Changing norms is almost impossible during a short period of time,
but the results of our experiment show that another social role added to females with different
prescriptive social norms for competitiveness can be promoted to mitigate the effects of traditional
gender norms and change their competitive behavior. We use a simple experiment and provide
evidence that females’ willingness to compete is limited by social norms. We show females’
WTC significantly increases when they are randomly assigned the role of “breadwinner" or “man-
ager". Although the role is randomly assigned, and there are no changes in responsibility or power
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bestowed on this role, it still gives women a permission “nudge" to break the glass ceiling of
traditional gender roles for competition. This result is further reinforced by examinations of the
underlying mechanism behind the results. Becoming the “breadwinner" or “manager" mitigates
the impacts of confidence on competition entry and reduces the social cost of entering the com-
petition for women. According to our social norm elicitation, under the title of “breadwinner" or
“manager", it becomes socially permissible for women to be competitive.
Importantly, the increase in female breadwinners’ WTC is mainly contributed by high-ability
women, and they earn 44.2% more money compared to high-ability women in the baseline. The
effects of the social role nudge in our experiment imply that restructuring institutions, such that
assigning leadership encouraging titles to women, has the potential to reduce gender disparities in
economic and labor market outcomes.
In our experiment, for simplicity and clean identification, we do not disclose any information
about partners. Future work may investigate how subjects change their WTC when the gender of
the other group member is disclosed to them, or when the role is assigned based on performance.
It is also possible that social roles may have heterogeneous effects on women of different ages and
women in different cultures, which can be another avenue for future research.
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3. BARGAINING WITH PROMISES: THE EFFECTS OF PROMISES ON EMPLOYEES’
EFFORT CHOICE1
3.1 Introduction
From politicians running for office to couples swearing eternal love, promises are universal
in human culture. In labor markets, promise-based management plays a crucial role in fostering
employees’ engagement in the workplace, and the positive correlation between employees’ en-
gagement and organizational performance is proven [129, 130]. Well-crafted, thoughtful promises
from employees can build trust and productivity [131]. In the workplace, the procedure of sign-
ing a contract or reaching an agreement where the employee makes a promise to the employer
typically involves negotiation. During negotiation, the employee’s promise usually comes with a
request or claim from the employee for increased salary, a promotion, or flexible working sched-
ules. The employer then chooses whether to trust the employee, and sequentially, the employee
allocates effort. In this paper, we follow these sequential interactions between the employer and
employee that include a “claim and promise" option in the labor contract to test the effectiveness
of promise-based management in a laboratory experiment.
The labor contract between employers and employees is incomplete in that the employee has
the residual ability to adjust her/his performance since performance is not always observable or
easily enforceable after implementing the contract. If the employee is entirely self-interested, s/he
would exert minimal effort. However, numerous scholars have documented a “gift exchange"
between employers and employees where employees respond to generous wage levels (i.e., the
gift) by exerting above minimal effort [132, 133, 134, 135]. [136] first introduced the gift-exchange
game to study labor contract relationships in a laboratory experiment. Since then, several studies
have tested different methods to obtain Pareto improvements in a gift-exchange game to provide
innovation in the workplace to harness motivation and increase employees’ performance [137,
1This study was funded by the IFREE Small Grants Program, and preregistered at AEA RCT Registry: AEARCTR-
0003533. This study was approved by the IRB.
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138, 139].2 In the current paper, we focus on employees’ promises in the workplace. In particular,
we explore the effects of using a non-binding promise along with a claimed wage (“claim and
promise") from the employee on boosting the labor contract efficiency in a one-shot gift-exchange
game using both stated and real effort paradigms.
We implemented a two by two experimental design varying the promise (no “claim and promise"
vs. “claim and promise") and effort paradigm (stated-effort vs. real-effort). We started with the
stated-effort paradigm. In the baseline, subjects play a modified two-stage gift-exchange game.
During the first stage, the employer chooses a wage level and announces a non-binding desired ef-
fort level. In the second stage, the employee chooses the effort level with a fixed cost for each level
of effort. In the treatment group, the employee chooses whether to make a “claim and promise" or
not before the employer selects the wage level. The employee initiated the “claim and promise"
using a brief limited message to the employer: “If the firm gives me the wage w, I will choose
the effort level e". Both the claimed wage and promised effort are non-binding. Adding this step
increases the number of interactions between the employer and the employee and allows us to fol-
low the negotiation process. The difference between the actual wage and the claimed wage and the
difference between the desired effort and the promised effort may affect reciprocity between the
employer and the employee.
Our results suggest that most employees (92.7%) chose to make a “claim and promise" during
the first stage in the stated-effort paradigm. When the employer trusted the employee and pro-
vided a wage greater than or equal to the claimed wage, the employee reciprocated by keeping
his promise or exerting an even higher level of effort. Both the actual wage and effort level in-
creased, in this case, compared to the baseline. The wage level increased by 15.1%, and the effort
level increased by 28.3%, which resulted in 15.3% higher final social payoffs. However, when the
2[137] analyze the consequences of control in a principal-agent game where the principal can control the agent
by implementing a minimum performance constraint before choosing an activity. They find that most agents reduce
their performance in response to the controlling decision. [138] found that delegation can improve effort levels and
firm profits by conducting an experiment in which an employer chooses for each worker whether to assign the wage
or to allow the worker to choose her/his wage (i.e. “delegate" the wage choice). [139] found that social comparisons
concerning wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them
choose their own.
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employer offered a wage lower than the claimed wage, the employee retaliated by breaking his
promise. The employer tried to negotiate with the employee desiring a different effort level than
the promised effort based on the difference between the actual wage he offered and the wage the
employee claimed. However, the employee cared more about the trust of the employer and ignored
the negotiation. The employee retaliated whenever the actual wage was lower than the claimed
wage.
To obtain more implications for a real workplace environment, we also ran the baseline and
“claim and promise" treatment using a real-effort task. In the real-effort task, subjects added up
sets of five two-digit numbers for three minutes. Compared to the stated-effort paradigm, we
added an incentivized practice stage after subjects read the instruction and before they started
the game. The employee was informed about his performance and the median performance of
participants in their sessions (i.e., relative performance) before starting the game. The employer
was only informed about the median performance of the session. We used the performance during
the practice stage as a proxy for ability.
We replicated the main results obtained in the stated-effort paradigm in terms of direction, but
the magnitude of the results was much larger in the real-effort paradigm. When the employer chose
to trust the employee, the wage level increased 55.9%, the effort level increased 35.8%, and the
final social payoffs increased 30.0%. There were differences between the stated and real-effort
conditions. We found lower trust rates of the employer and a lower degree of retaliation of the
employee in the real-effort paradigm. Due to information about ability, the employer could infer
the probability of promise-keeping by comparing the promised effort and the median performance
during the practice stage. Thus, the employer was more likely to choose not to trust the employee
when the promised effort was higher than the median performance during the practice stage. The
employee also knew whether his promised effort was higher than her/his performance during the
practice stage. Consequently, when the employer provided a lower wage with a lower desired
effort, the employee chose not to retaliate as much as in the stated-effort paradigm. Based on these
results, we argue that the negotiation between the employer and the employee in the real-effort
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paradigm is successful.
One of the leading theories in the literature regarding why people keep their promises is the
belief-based “guilt-aversion" model from psychological game theory (PGT)[140, 141, 142].3 In
contrast to traditional game theory, PGT models emotions directly into the utility function [146].
The “guilt-aversion" model assumes that people care about others’ expectations. Promises change
others’ expectations, and subsequently, people feel guilty if they break promises. Scholars from
various disciplines have explored guilt-aversion to explain other prosocial behavior [147, 148, 149,
150]. Most relevant to our work is [151]’s test of guilt-aversion as a mechanism to explain the “gift
exchange". Based on PGT, reciprocity is another potential explanation of the “gift exchange"
[152, 153]. Our theoretical analysis focused on stated-effort, applied PGT, and included both
reciprocity and guilt in the utility function. The “claim and promise" treatment served to change
the reciprocity component through the “claimed wage" and change the guilt component through
the “promised effort". We showed simulated results of the PGT models for both the baseline and
the treatment. Another contribution of this paper is that we used choice-process data (pupil dilation
and eye-tracking lookup patterns) to test subjects’ feeling of guilt and reciprocity dynamically and
then provide direct evidence for PGT models.4
The rest of the paper is presented in the sections to follow. Section 3.2 offers a review of the
literature. Section 3.3 explains the experimental design. Section 3.4 constructs the theoretical
model and reports the simulation results. Section 3.5 presents the main results of our experiment.
Section 3.6 provides a discussion of choice-process data, followed by the conclusions in Section
3.7.
3In noting the “commitment-based theory" which does not belong to PGT, [143] argued people have an innate
preference for promise keeping per se. The discussion on which theory poses stronger data demands related to promise-
keeping has not yet reached a consensus in the literature [144, 145]. In this paper, we focus on PGT and the guilt-
aversion theory.
4Each computer station included a screen-based eye-tracker and a high-resolution camera, which captured facial
expressions (see Figure C.1).
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3.2 Literature Review
Scholars have intensively studied promises theoretically [154] and within different economic
games, such as in the (hidden action) trust game, the dictator game [140, 144, 155, 156, 157,
145, 158], and the mistress game [159]. Limited literature exists on promises in experimental la-
bor economics. To investigate the effects of cheap-talk evaluations on effort choice in a one-shot
gift exchange game, [160] provided an “evaluation" option to the employer after an employee’s
choice of effort. [161] evaluated promises in group decision-making using a gift-exchange game.
The contract used in [162] bears the closest resemblance to the one we used in our study. In
the [162] design, the treatments differed in two factors: (1) who proposes the contract (the firm
or the worker) and (2) whether the proposed contract includes a non-binding specification of the
worker’s effort level. Their key finding was that the worker’s actual effort choice was highest
when the worker proposed the contract, and the contract included the worker’s promised effort
level. Our paper departs from [162] in several ways. Their study focused on whether the tendency
to keep agreements depended on who proposed the agreement; our paper focused on the sequential
negotiation process between employers and employees where employees made promises to em-
ployers with claimed/proposed wages, and then employers paid wages with desired effort levels.
In [162], the worker’s proposal could be either accepted or rejected by the firm. If the firm re-
jected the worker’s proposal, the game ended, making the proposed wage binding. In our design,
the employer could choose any wage level they wanted (not necessarily the claimed wage) after
reviewing the employee’s “claim and promise," which made the wage non-binding. We believe the
employer’s actual wage is a crucial factor reflecting the employer’s trust and affecting reciprocity
in the negotiation process. [162] measured the feeling of guilt using a self-reported conscious
affect-3 (TOSCA-3) score at the end of the experiment [163]. TOSCA-3 tests the intrinsic char-
acteristics of personality, which is likely not affected by the decisions during a laboratory session.
Using biometric equipment permitted tracking changes in feelings of guilt throughout the experi-
ment and permitted its use to test PGT models. In addition, we implemented a real-effort paradigm
to include ability in the promise setup.
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3.3 Experimental Design
A total of 314 undergraduate and graduate students from Texas A&M University participated
in this experiment. Each session involved 6-14 participants. The experiment was computerized
using Ztree [108], and lasted approximately 30 minutes. Each participant earned approximately
$25 (including a $5 show-up fee). The experiment instructions are available in the Appendix.
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to a computer station.
Each computer station was equipped with an eye-tracker and a high-resolution camera to capture
participants’ facial expressions. In each session, participants were randomly assigned as an em-
ployer or an employee, and each employer was randomly paired with an employee. Participants
only knew that they were paired with another participant in the room. Partners received no infor-
mation about each other. To avoid reputation effects, each treatment lasted only one round (see
[164] and [162]). Our two by two design consisted of a baseline and the “Claim & Promise" treat-
ment (hereafter C&P) for stated and real effort paradigms. Each treatment was a modified version
of [136]’s gift-exchange game.
3.3.1 Stated Effort
Stated-Effort Baseline: Subjects played the gift-exchange game in two stages:
Stage 1: a) The employer chose a wage level, w for the employee;
b) The employer announced a non-binding effort level, ê, that he wanted the employee
to do for the chosen wage.
Stage 2: The employee chose the effort level, e, after reviewing the wage level set by the
employer.
The combination of wage and effort level determined the monetary payoffs for the employer
and the employee as follows:
πF = (120− w) ∗ e
πW = w − c(e)− 20
(3.1)
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where c(e) was the cost of effort, a function increasing in e. Wages were integers between 20
and 120.5 We used tokens in the experiment, and each token equaled $0.50. Table 3.1 shows the
feasible effort levels and the cost of effort.
Table 3.1: Effort-Cost Table
Effort Level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Stated-Effort C&P: The only difference between the baseline and the C&P treatment was an
additional stage before the employer chose the wage level. The first stage became:
Stage 1: The employee decided whether to make a “claim and promise" or not:
“If the firm gives me the wage= , I will choose the effort level= ". This claim and
promise were non-binding.
The next two stages were identical to the baseline.
3.3.2 Real Effort
In the real-effort paradigm, subjects performed a real effort task that consisted of adding up
sets of five two-digit numbers for three minutes. Then, the effort level was the number of correct
answers to the additions, s.
Real-Effort Baseline: After subjects read the instructions and before they started the game,
they participated in a practice stage. Each subject was given three minutes to do the task and re-
ceived $0.25 for each correct answer. Employees learned about their performance and the median
number of correct sums for the session after finishing the practice task.6 To avoid the potential
confounding effects of employers’ ability on their wage decisions, employers were only informed
5We used the redemption value of 120. It was possible for the employee to take the employer’s entire profit.
Previous studies suggest that, except for the difference in the level of the firms’ earnings, the results were very similar
using a redemption value of 120 or 240 [165, 138].
6The program assigns the roles initially, but we show the assigned roles to participants after the practice stage.
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about the median number of correct sums for the session. They did not know their performance
until the end of the experiment. Performance in the practice stage served as a proxy for subjects’
ability. Note that providing information about the median performance was to inform the employer
about the employee pool’s performance level and to inform the employee about their relative per-
formance. In real work environments, the employee is usually aware of his ability. After the
practice stage, participants proceeded to the following sequential stages.
Stage 1: The employer chose the wage level, w; and announced a non-binding number of
correct additions ŝ he wanted the employee to solve.
Stage 2: After reviewing the employer’s wage level, the employee proceeded to the addition
task.
The number of correct answers was updated on the computer screen after each question so that
the employees could decide to continue solving more questions or to stop exerting effort at any
point. Note that there was no fixed cost function for each subject in the real-effort paradigm, and
the cost was their real effort. The payoff functions were:
πF = (120− w) ∗ (s/10)
πW = w − 20
(3.2)
Real-Effort C&P: The only difference from the baseline was that there was an additional stage
before the employer chose the wage level after the practice stage. The first stage then became:
Stage 1: The employee decided whether to make a “claim and promise" or not:
“If the firm gives me the wage= , I will solve correct sums". This claim and promise
were non-binding.
After the one-shot gift-exchange game in the stated and real effort paradigm, we elicited the
employer’s beliefs. We asked the employer to guess the effort level the employee provided. A
payment of $1 incentivized correct answers. Finally, subjects proceeded to the TOSCA-3 ques-
tionnaire and a demographic survey. We used the same five scenarios as [162] from TOSCA-3
in our experiment. Each scenario’s answers were on a scale from 0 to 4, with “0" indicating no
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feeling of guilt while “4" indicated strong feelings of guilt. Table 3.2 summarizes the number of
observations in each treatment and also the number of employees who chose to make a “claim and
promise."
Table 3.2: Number of subjects in each treatment group.
Total No. (Pair of Employer & Employee) No. of Promise
Stated-Effort Baseline 76 (38) -
Stated-Effort C&P 82 (41) 38 (92.7%)
Real-Effort Baseline 78 (39) -
Real-Effort C&P 82 (41) 35 (85.4%)
3.3.3 Eye-tracking and Pupil Size
We used eye-tracking to record visual attention and pupil size during the entire experiment.
The eye-tracker recorded where participants were looking at the computer screen. It provided data
including, but not limited to, pupil dilation, gaze location, time spent on a stimulus (fixation), the
time length of fixations, and the number of revisits. The measurement rate was 60 Hz, which means
each metric was measured 60 times per second. Pupil dilation has been previously used in the
economics literature to measure emotional arousal. More relevant to our experiment, researchers
[166, 167, 168] have linked pupil dilation to guilt.7
Each participant was required to read the consent form that included disclosure information
about the biometric tools before agreeing to participate in the experiment. Before starting the
experiment, we performed a nine-point eye-tracking calibration for each subject to ensure high-
quality data. We successfully recorded eye-tracking data for 147 subjects in the stated-effort
paradigm and 143 subjects in the real-effort paradigm.
7We have 11 Tobii X2-60s and 5 Tobii Spectrum devices. All 16 stations also use iMotions AFFDEX for facial
expressions. We evaluated facial expressions for evidence of guilt. However, we find subjects are neutral most of the




Our theoretical model focused on stated-effort, which was the fixed cost function and did not
involve ability. In the baseline, subjects played the two-stage gift-exchange game above. In the
treatment, we added a “claim and promise" before the first stage. The “claim and promise" was
non-binding as cheap-talk, and therefore based on traditional game theory, the sub-game perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is the same in both the baseline and the treatment group, with the em-
ployer choosing the minimum wage and the employee choosing the minimum effort. However, the
literature documents higher wages and effort levels and a “gift exchange" between employers and
employees [132]. Thus, we applied psychological game theory (PGT) to our gift-exchange setting.
In PGT, contrary to traditional game theory, utility is not solely motivated by material payoffs
but also by belief-dependent motivations (see a survey, [146]). Reciprocity and emotions are two
examples of belief-dependent motivations. Reciprocity means people respond to kindness with
kindness and be unkind when treated unkindly. Reciprocity was the intuition to explain the wage-
effort exchange when [132] first documented gift exchange in labor markets.8 [153] later brought
in expectation to gift exchange and present reciprocity as the employee’s response to the distance
between the expected and actual wage.
Emotion is another motivation captured by PGT to study behavior. Among the emotion cat-
egory, guilt is one of the most widely used emotions to explain cooperative behavior in different
economics games, including cooperation in the gift-exchange game [141, 151]. Individuals feel
guilty if they do not meet others’ expectations, and hence, guilt-aversion has also been used ex-
plain promise-keeping [140]. In previous literature, guilt-aversion is tested by eliciting second-
order beliefs [140].9 However, [172] pointed out that second-order belief elicitation may cause
“false consensus," as players might believe others have thoughts similar to their own when asked
8[169] first incorporated reciprocity into game theory, and [152] expanded it to extensive game forms.
9In previous studies, guilt-aversion has also been tested through second-order beliefs elicitation to explain other
prosocial behavior [170, 149, 171]. The results of whether second-order beliefs can explain behavior are mixed. [172]
showed matched recipients’ expectations directly to the donors, and they suggested the correlation between behavior
and expectations was close to zero.
71
to state their second-order beliefs. The “induced belief" is the solution to “false consensus" issues
suggested by [172]. In the current design, we used the “desired effort" ê as a proxy for the induced
belief to study guilt-aversion.
We tested both reciprocity and guilt-aversion to explain the gift exchange in our design. We
set the baseline and the C&P treatment model separately; the C&P treatment changed the reci-
procity component in the model through the “claimed wage" and the guilt component through the
“promised effort."
In the baseline, there was no claimed wage and promised effort, and the worker’s utility de-
pended on actual wage(aw), desired effort(de), and actual effort(ae). The following function con-
sisting of three parts was how we modeled the worker’s utility.
Uw(ae; aw, de) = πw(ae, aw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
material payoff
+λR ∗ (aw − 20) ∗ πf (ae, aw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
reciprocity
−λG ∗ TG ∗max{E[πf ; de]− πf (ae), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
guilt
(3.3)
where πw(ae, aw) is the material payoff of the worker, and πw(ae, aw) = aw − c(ae)− 20 in our
design. λR is the sensitivity parameter of reciprocity, and λR ≥ 0; aw − 20 (the distance between
the actual wage and minimum wage) represents the kindness received from the firm, and πf is the
payoff of the employer (πf = (120 − aw) ∗ ae ). The entire reciprocity part indicates that the
more the worker cares about reciprocity and the more kindness he receives from the firm, the more
weight s/he puts on the firm’s payoff.
The third part of the utility function modeled guilt. λG is the sensitivity parameter of guilt,
and λG ≥ 0. Since the desired effort (de) indicates the firm’s expectation about the effort level
and guilt is from letting down others, we modeled guilt to be generated by the distance between
the firm’s expected payoff by the desired effort and the firm’s actual payoff by the actual effort.
When ae ≥ de (i.e., πf ≥ E(πf )), there is no guilt, and hence we set max{E[πf ; de]−πf (ae), 0}.
TG is the trigger of guilt. [146] argued that the feeling of guilt should be “reasonable". For
example, if the firm paid the minimum wage with the maximum desired effort in our experiment,
72
then there should be no guilt from employees if they did not exert the desired effort. Thus, we
added TG to the model. We further set TG = aw−20de , and this means the higher the wage rate by
the firm based on desired effort, the higher the level of guilt for the worker. Finally, based on
previous literature, people derive utility from reciprocity and disutility from guilt, and therefore in
our model, reciprocity increased utility, and guilt reduced the worker’s utility.
In the C&P treatment, the worker’s utility also depended on promised effort(pe) and claimed
wage(cw):
Uw(ae; aw, cw, de, pe) = πw(ae, aw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
material payoff
+λR ∗ (aw − cw) ∗ πf (ae, aw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
reciprocity
−λG ∗ TG2 ∗max{min(E[πf ; pe], E[πf ; de])− πf (ae), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
guilt
(3.4)
where (aw − cw) captures reciprocity in the treatment. If aw >= cw, then it means the worker
received kindness from the firm; if aw < cw, then it means the worker was treated unkindly by




indicates that the level of guilt also depends on the claimed wage and promised effort. In the
treatment, we assumed the smaller of promised-effort and desired-effort drove the worker’s guilt.
Thus, instead of using the distance between desired effort and actual effort to represent guilt, we
used [min(E[πf ; pe], E[πf ; de])− πf (ae)].
3.4.2 Simulation Results
We first put the material payoffs and the trigger of guilt into the utility functions. Then the
worker’s utility in the baseline becomes:ă




∗max{(120− aw) ∗ de− (120− aw) ∗ ae, 0}
(3.5)
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The work’s utility in the treatment becomes:




∗ cw − 20
pe
) ∗max{min[(120− aw) ∗ pe, (120− aw) ∗ de]
−(120− aw) ∗ ae, 0}
(3.6)
We then ran simulations using backward induction, assuming λR and λG follow uniform distri-
butions: λR ∼ U(0, a), λG ∼ U(0, b). To run simulations, we also assumed the firm knew the
worker’s type λR and λG. To make the magnitude reasonable, we took square roots of the reci-
procity and the trigger of guilt (TG and TG2) when we ran simulations.
Table 3.3 shows the simulated contract outcomes based on different maximum values of λR
and λG. The results suggest that when the model does not include reciprocity and guilt (i.e.,
λR, λG ∼ U(0, 0)), employers would always choose the minimum wage and employees would
always choose minimum effort. The wage and effort levels increase as employees’ sensitivity
for reciprocity and guilt increases. When employees’ sensitivity for reciprocity is sufficiently
large, employees increase effort levels even when the received wage does not change. The ρ
values by Spearman tests show the correlation between wage and effort. Our simulation results
support the “gift exchange," but the positive correlation between wage and effort declines when
employees’ sensitivity for reciprocity and guilt increases as suggested by the ρ values. This is
because employees would always choose high levels of effort with large λR and λG. Finally, when
we compared the C&P treatment with the baseline, we found the wage and effort levels were higher
in the C&P treatment when λR and λG were small. We next used data from our experiment to test
for treatment effects in the following section.
3.5 Results
This section presents and discusses our findings regarding how “claim & promise" affects con-
tract outcomes. We presented stated and real effort paradigms separately and also compared these
two paradigms. We used the choice-process data to explore guilt and reciprocity in the next section.
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Table 3.3: Simulated Contract Outcomes.
λR, λG ∼ U(0, 0) U(0, 0.01) U(0, 0.02) U(0, 0.04) U(0, 0.06)
Wage Effort ρ Wage Effort ρ Wage Effort ρ Wage Effort ρ Wage Effort ρ
Baseline 20 0.1 - 22.40 0.11 0.99 27.86 0.22 0.73 33.02 0.47 0.61 33.25 0.68 0.34
C&P Treatment 20 0.1 - 45.80 0.26 0.61 44.76 0.36 0.63 43.72 0.48 0.43 42.24 0.48 0.33
Notes: ρ in columns are from Spearman tests.
3.5.1 Stated Effort
Result 1a: The employee reciprocated to the employer by keeping his promise when the actual
wage was greater than or equal to the claimed wage; the employee retaliated against the employer
by breaking his promise and choosing a lower effort than the desired effort when the actual wage
was lower than the claimed wage.
Result 1b: Both wage and effort levels increased significantly when the actual wage was greater
than or equal to the claimed wage compared to the baseline.
In the baseline, we first replicated the “gift exchange" between the employer and the employee
from previous studies [132]. The employee’s actual chosen effort was positively correlated with
the employer’s paid wage (Spearman’s test, ρ = 0.431, p = 0.009), which was also in-line with our
simulated results based on the PGT model. However, the actual effort (e) was significantly lower
than the employer’s desired effort (ed) in the baseline (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.004), as
shown in Table 3.4.10
In the C&P treatment, the positive correlation between the effort and wage level still held
(Spearman’s test, ρ = 0.329, p = 0.036). When we compared the C&P treatment to the baseline in
general, we found employers paid a higher wage to employees; however, employees chose the same
level of effort as in the baseline, which was lower than their promised effort (ep) (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p = 0.014) and the desired effort (ed) (p < 0.001). There was no significant change in
10In four sessions, the rate of participation slipped. To keep an even number of participants, we asked one of the
graduate students working in the lab to be the last participant. After we removed these four observations, 38 employers
and 36 employees remained in the baseline study; 39 employers and 41 employees remained in the treatment. Since
only three employees chose not to make a “claim and promise" in the treatment, we did not report the outcome for
them. Including the three pairs of subjects does not change our results regarding the overall comparison between the
baseline and treatment.
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overall social payoffs.11 Based on the overall comparison, we see employees broke their promises.
Employees did not respond to employers’ higher wage by choosing a higher effort level in the C&P
treatment. The experiment’s primary purpose was to understand how the “claim and promise"
affected the employers’ choices of wages, and subsequently, employees’ effort. Employees might
choose to break or keep their promises based on the difference between the actual wage (aw) and
the claimed wage (cw). Panel B of Table 3.4 shows the treatment outcomes by separate cases.
Table 3.4: Summary statistics of contract outcomes in the stated-effort paradigm.
Obs.(f/w) w e ed ep wc πf πw Overall Payoffs
A
Baseline 38/36 62.79 (3.12) 0.53 (0.04) 0.67 (0.03) 28.23 (2.57) 35.86 (3.04) 63.77 (3.12)
C&P Treatment 36/38 72.61 (3.20) 0.54 (0.04) 0.65 (0.03) 0.68 (0.03) 83.42 (3.45) 23.17 (2.19) 45.47 (2.88) 69.37 (2.18)
p-value (Base vs Treat) 0.031 0.922 0.469 0.209 0.033 0.201
B
C&P Treatment (aw >= cw) 15/16 74.00 (5.78) 0.68 (0.07) 0.69 (0.06) 0.63 (0.06) 68.75 (5.25) 28.73 (3.80) 44.13 (5.09) 73.50 (2.82)
C&P Treatment (aw < cw) 21/22 71.62 (3.74) 0.43 (0.05) 0.63 (0.04) 0.72 (0.04) 94.09 (3.01) 19.19 (2.32) 46.45 (3.42) 66.36 (3.03)
p-value (aw >= cw vs aw < cw) 0.686 0.007 0.529 0.209 < 0.001 0.024 0.906 0.047
p-value (aw >= cw vs baseline) 0.045 0.065 0.818 0.533 0.190 0.032
Notes: p-values are from two sided Mann-Whitney U tests. In each cell, the numbers refer to mean, with standard errors in parentheses. We report wage of employer w, actual effort of employee e, desired effort of employer ed,
promised effort of employee ep, claimed wage of employee wc, employer payoffs in tokens πf and employee payoffs in tokens πw . In part B, we report these variables separately based on the difference between actual wage (aw)
and claimed wage (cw) in the treatment. Note that we do not include the three pairs of employers and employees who chose NOT to make a “claim & promise." The exchange rate in our experiment is 1token = $0.5.
Panel B of Table 3.4 suggests that when the employer trusted the employee and provided at least
the claimed wage, the employee reciprocated by keeping the promised effort. Notably, there was
no significant difference between the actual and promised effort (0.68 vs 0.63, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p = 0.103). However, when the employer offered a wage lower than the claimed wage,
the employee responded by breaking his promise, and actual effort was significantly lower than
the promised effort (0.43 vs 0.72, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). Detailed distributions
where the “actual effort - promised effort" was positively correlated with “actual wage - claimed
wage" (Spearman’s test, ρ = 0.621, p < 0.001) comprise Figure 3.1a. This distribution suggests
a conditional reciprocity in our experiment. We also showed the average distance between the
actual and promised effort based on the wage difference in Figure 3.1b. The difference in the
11The changes in the payoffs of employers and employees strongly depend on the specific function forms. Therefore
we focused on comparing the overall social payoffs rather than the payoffs for employers or employees.
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(advantageous/disadvantageous) distance between these two scenarios was statistically significant
(Mann-Whitney U test, p < 0.001).
(a) Distribution (b) Mean with Standard Error Bars
Figure 3.1: Difference Between Actual Effort and Promised Effort (Stated Effort)
The employer’s actual wage and the desired effort were similar in these two scenarios, as shown
by the p-values in the second to last row of Table 3.4. The reason why the actual wage was lower
than the claimed wage was that the claimed wage was too high to be accepted by the employer
(94.09 in aw < cw vs. 68.75 in aw >= cw). The employer tried to negotiate with the employee
desiring a different effort level from the promised effort when he chose to pay a different wage
from the claimed wage. Figure 3.2a suggests that “desired effort - promised effort" positively
correlated with “actual wage - claimed wage" (Spearman’s test, ρ = 0.622, p < 0.001).12 Figure
3.2b suggests the mean distance between the desired and promised effort when aw < cw was
negative. However, it was positive when aw >= cw. The difference in the distance between these
two scenarios was significant (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.016).13
12The correlation between the desired effort and the actual wage is also positive and significant (Spearman’s test,
ρ = 0.481, p = 0.003).
13Using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, we find when the employer chooses to pay an equal or higher wage than the
claimed wage (i.e., aw >= cw), he desires higher effort than the promised effort (0.69 vs 0.63, p = 0.039). When
aw < cw, there is no significant difference between the desired and promised effort (0.72 vs 0.63, p = 0.126).
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(a) Distribution (b) Mean with Standard Error Bars
Figure 3.2: Difference Between Desired Effort and Promised Effort (Stated Effort)
Since the employer desired different effort levels based on different wage levels he paid to the
employee, we compared the actual and desired effort (ae vs. de) based on the wage difference
to further explore the conditional reciprocity in our experiment. In the case of “aw >= cw", we
found the employee tried to reach the desired effort, which was higher than his promised effort,
and there was no significant difference between actual effort and desired effort (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p = 0.928). When aw < cw, 38% of employers desired the same effort to the promised
effort; 42% and 19% of employers desired a lower and higher effort than the promised effort,
respectively. Table 3.4 suggests that, in general, the actual effort was significantly lower than the
desired effort in the case of “aw < cw" (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). We further found
that even for the 42% of employers whose desired effort was lower than the promised effort, the
actual effort was significantly lower than the desired effort (p = 0.012). In the real workplace,
there are negotiations between the employer and the employee for salary, work schedule, working
conditions, etc. For example, in collective bargaining, the negotiation process occurs between the
representative of employees and the employer. Our results provide insights on such negotiations
in labor contract procedures. Once the actual wage is lower than the claimed wage, the employee
retaliates, even though the employer compromises on the desired level of effort.
The overall social payoffs were highest in the case of “aw >= cw" compared to the case of
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“aw < cw" or the baseline. The p-values in the last row of Table 3.4 show that both the wage
level and effort level were significantly higher than in the baseline when the employer chose to
trust the employee (“aw >= cw"). This suggested our promise setup, in the case of “aw >= cw",
enhanced the efficiency of the labor contract design. When “aw < cw", there was no significant
difference in the overall social payoffs between the treatment and the baseline. Finally, we esti-
mated an ordered probit model of actual effort; Table 3.5 shows the results. Columns (1) and (2)
support the results above that our C&P treatment significantly increased the effort level when we
compared the scenario “aw >= cw” to the baseline, and the result held after we controlled for
wages, desired effort, and socio-demographic variables. In columns (3) and (4), we compared the
scenario “aw < cw” to the baseline. After including control variables, we found that employees
significantly reduced their effort levels when employers chose not to trust them. In column (5), we
estimated a regression only for the C&P treatment group, and the results suggested when the em-
ployer paid greater than or equal to the claimed wage, the employee significantly increased her/his
effort.
Table 3.5: Ordered Probit Estimations of Actual Effort (Stated Effort).
Baseline vs Treat (aw >= cw) Baseline vs Treat (aw < cw) Treat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wage 0.020∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
C&P Treat 0.644∗∗ 0.564∗∗ -0.410 −0.683∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.285) (0.264) (0.245)




AW >= CW (vs aw < cw) 1.455∗∗∗
(0.464)
Control No Yes No Yes Yes
Observation 52 52 58 58 38
Pseudo R square 0.018 0.078 0.009 0.050 0.165
Notes: Dependent variable is the actual effort level. We control for age, gender, race and income. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p <
0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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3.5.2 Real effort
Result 2: The employee reciprocated to the employer by correctly solving more questions than
promised when the actual wage was greater than or equal to the claimed wage. When the actual
wage was lower than the claimed wage, there was no significant retaliation from the employee in
the real-effort paradigm.
In the real-effort paradigm, the effort level was the number of correct answers the employee
solved. We conducted the baseline and the “C&P" treatment with a real-effort task. Recall that we
added an incentivized practice stage, and we used subjects’ performance in the practice stage as a
proxy for their ability. Table 3.6 summarizes the outcomes of the contract with real effort.14
Table 3.6: Summary statistics of contract outcome in the real-effort paradigm.
Obs.(f/w) Ability(employee) w e ed ep wc πf πw Overall Payoffs
A
Baseline 38/38 6.66 54.92 5.89 7.05 37.89 34.92 72.81
(0.38) (2.92) (0.34) (0.30) (2.76) (2.92) (2.52)
Treatment 35/33 6.76 65.14 6.88 7.20 7.27 89.39 37.74 45.00 83.08
(0.50) (3.43) (0.49) (0.28) (0.42) (3.67) (3.96) (3.63) (3.26)
p-value (Base vs Treat) 0.968 0.018 0.096 0.669 0.539 0.026 0.046
B
Treatment (aw >= cw) 8/8 7.88 85.63 8.00 7.63 6.75 69.38 29.00 65.63 94.63
(1.46) (8.42) (1.12) (0.82) (0.88) (5.38) (7.03) (8.42) (4.19)
Treatment (aw < cw) 27/25 6.40 59.07 6.52 7.07 7.44 95.80 40.33 38.40 79.38
(0.47) (2.85) (0.53) (0.28) (0.49) (3.75) (4.64) (3.01) (3.84)
p-value (aw >= cw vs aw < cw) 0.213 0.007 0.196 0.748 0.495 0.003 0.312 0.007 0.019
p-value (aw >= cw vs baseline) 0.095 0.002 0.013 0.212 0.002 < 0.001
Notes: p-values are from two sided Mann-Whitney U tests. In each cell, the numbers refer to mean, with standard errors in parentheses. The variables are the same as in the stated-effort paradigm, except
that the effort is the number of correct answers in the real-effort paradigm. We also report the “Ability" which is the number of correct answers in the practice stage of the employee. In part B, we report these
variables separately based on the difference between actual wage (aw) and claimed wage (cw) in the treatment.
In the baseline with the real-effort task, we did not find a significant correlation between the
number of correct answers solved by the employee and the employer’s wage (Spearman’s test,
14In one session, two subjects were talking to each other during the experiment. We figured out they were friends
after the experiment, and hence we removed their data. In two sessions, the participation rate was not full. To keep an
even number of participants, we asked one of the graduate students working in the lab to be the last participant. The
graduate student workers’ data are excluded. The final tests included 38 employers and 38 employees in the baseline
and 41 employers and 39 employees in the treatment. Six employees chose not to make a “claim and promise" in the
treatment; we did not report the outcome for them. Including the six subjects does not change our results regarding
the overall comparison between the baseline and the “C&P" treatment.
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ρ = 0.053, p = 0.753). This indicates there is no significant “gift exchange" in the baseline. The
actual effort was significantly lower than the desired effort in the baseline (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.018). More interestingly, the employee’s actual effort was also lower than his ability
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.075). This means that in the baseline, the employee exerted less
effort when earning money for the employer. In other words, the employee did not try his/her best
to work for the employer.
In panel A of Table 3.6, we first showed no difference in employees’ ability between the base-
line and the C&P treatment.15 Then, we replicated the outcome of the wage level shown in the
stated-effort paradigm. The employer paid a higher wage in the C&P treatment compared to the
baseline. In contrast to stated-effort, the employee responded to the higher wage by solving more
correct treatment answers in the real-effort paradigm. Also, there was no significant difference
between the actual effort and the promised effort (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.602), nor be-
tween the actual effort and the desired effort in the treatment (p = 0.443). The difference between
the actual effort and ability in the C&P treatment was not significant (p = 0.673). This suggests
that the employee exerted his/her full ability to work for the employer. Based on the overall com-
parison in the real-effort paradigm, the overall social payoffs in the C&P treatment significantly
increased compared to the baseline.
In panel B of Table 3.6, we separated the subjects who chose to make a “claim and promise"
in the treatment into two possible scenarios: “aw >= cw" and “aw < cw".16 There were 8 out of
35 employers (22.9%) choosing to trust employees and pay at least the claimed wage. The trust
rate was lower than in the stated-effort paradigm. Recall that, after the practice stage, the employer
knew the median number of correct answers in the session, and hence the employer knew the
15There is no difference in employers’ ability between the treatment and the baseline (Mann-Whitney U tests,
p = 0.375).
16There are six subjects choosing not to make a “claim and promise" in the treatment. The six employees’ per-
formance in the practice stage (4.83) was less than or equal to the median performance. The difference in the abil-
ity between employees who chose not to make a “claim and promise" and other employees in our experiment is
marginally significant (two sided Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.088). When the employee chose not to make a “claim
and promise," the employer paid a lower wage. Consequently, the employee offered a lower effort, and the overall
payoffs were lower than the case with a “claim and promise." Due to the lack of power, only the difference in the
overall payoffs is significant (p = 0.059).
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employee pool’s median ability. Figure 3.3 shows the difference between the actual wage and
the claimed wage based on the distance between the promised effort and median performance. It
suggested the trust decreases as “promised effort - median performance" increased (Spearman test,
ρ = −0.305, p = 0.074). This, in turn, suggested the employer inferred the probability of promise-
keeping/breaking by comparing the median performance and the promised effort. This explained
why the trust rate was lower in the real-effort paradigm.
Figure 3.3: Difference Between Actual Wage & Claimed Wage
We further analyzed the employee’s reaction in a similar way to the stated-effort paradigm. We
compared the distance between the actual and promised effort, the distance between the desired and
promised effort, and the distance between the actual and desired effort in the cases of “aw >= cw"
and “aw < cw" separately. First, we found that, on average, the employee reciprocated to the
employer by solving more questions correctly than s/he promised when “aw >= cw" (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p = 0.072). In contrast to the stated-effort paradigm, in the case of “aw <
cw", there was no difference between the actual and promised effort (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = 0.184). The correlation between (actual effort - promised effort) and (actual wage - claimed
wage) in Figure 3.4a was not statistically significant (Spearman test, ρ = −0.102, p = 0.570), but
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the magnitude of the difference in Figure 3.4b was significant (p = 0.042). We concluded that
the employee’s conditional reciprocity to the employer held in the real-effort paradigm, but the
negative side of reciprocity (i.e., retaliation) was not significant.
(a) Distribution (b) Mean with Standard Error Bars
Figure 3.4: Difference Between Actual Effort and Promised Effort (Real)
In the stated-effort paradigm, we found the employer tried to negotiate with the employee in
desiring different effort levels from the promised effort when he provided different wages from the
claimed wages. We did not find such significant negotiation strategy in the real-effort paradigm.
The correlation between “desired effort - promised effort" and “actual wage - claimed wage" in
real-effort was not significant (Spearman test, ρ = 0.132, p = 0.450). The average “desired effort -
promised effort" was 0.88 in the case of “aw >= cw", and -0.30 in the case of “aw < cw", but the
difference in the distance was not significant (Mann-Whitney U test test, p = 0.127). Instead, we
found employers in real-effort more likely to use ability information to negotiate with employees.
Employers desired effort levels based on the median performance (Spearman test, ρ = 0.485,
p < 0.001), and they also paid wages based on the median performance (ρ = 0.217, p = 0.058).
We further compared the actual effort with the desired effort. First, we replicated the positive
reciprocity in the case of “aw >= cw”. The employee tried to solve the desired number of correct
answers when trusted. There was no significant difference between the actual and desired effort
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(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.309). Unlike what we found in stated-effort, there was no
significant retaliation in the case of “aw < cw” in the real-effort paradigm, and employees tried
to reach the desired effort by employers. There was no significant difference between the actual
and desired effort when “aw < cw” (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.188). The difference in the
distance (“actual effort - desired effort") between these two scenarios was not significant (0.37 vs
-0.55, p = 0.162). These results suggested that the negotiation between employers and employees
based on employees’ real-effort ability was more successful than the stated-effort. We elaborated
on the comparison between the two effort paradigms in the following section.
We estimated an ordered probit regression of actual effort with the real-effort task. Table 3.7
displays the results. Columns (1) and (2) show that in the real-effort paradigm, compared to the
baseline, the “C&P" setup significantly raised the number of correct answers after controlling
for wage, employee’s ability, desired effort, and socio-demographic variables. Columns (3)-(6)
suggest the C&P treatment had a positive effect on effort when “aw >= cw", with no negative
effects on effort when “aw < cw", compared to the baseline. In column (7), we compared the case
“aw >= cw" to “aw < cw" within the treatment group. The effect of “aw >= cw" was marginally
significant, and this was due to the result of no significant retaliation found when “aw < cw".
3.5.3 Summary of the Results of Stated-effort versus Real-effort
Result 3a:: Due to the consideration of ability or not, there were two major differences between
the stated and real-effort paradigms. There was significant “gift-exchange" in stated-effort, but not
in real-effort; the degree of retaliation from the employee in real-effort was smaller compared to
stated effort when “aw < cw". When “aw >= cw", the positive reciprocity from the employee
was similar in these two effort paradigms.
Result 3b: The employer desired higher effort than his stated-effort expectation, but there was
no difference between desired and expected effort in the real-effort paradigm.
The behavior of stated effort versus real effort has been a controversial topic in previous exper-
imental labor market studies. [173] ssummarized and extensively compared these two paradigms.
It is much easier to control the cost function with stated effort. The real-effort paradigm has the
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Table 3.7: Ordered Probit Estimations of Actual Effort (Real Effort).
Baseline vs Treat Baseline vs Treat (aw >= cw) Baseline vs Treat (aw < cw) Treat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 -0.017
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
Ability 0.248∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.065) (0.069) (0.081) (0.074)
C&P Treat 0.388 0.503∗∗ 0.874∗∗ 1.060∗∗ 0.262 0.417
(0.238) (0.261) (0.412) (0.526) (0.257) (0.323)
Desired effort 0.167∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.079
(0.075) (0.096) (0.081) (0.118)
Promised effort -0.024
(0.134)
AW >= CW (vs aw < cw) 0.728∗
(0.428)
Control No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Observation 71 71 46 46 63 63 33
Pseudo R square 0.008 0.093 0.024 0.178 0.004 0.075 0.101
Notes: Dependent variable is the actual number of correct answers solved by the employee. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. “Ability"
is indicated by the performance of the employee in the practice stage.
confounding effects of ability; however, it is ubiquitous behavior in the real world. Few studies
compare these two effort paradigms with parallel experimental treatments [174, 175]. Scholars
have not reached a consensus between the two methodologies in different situations. In our pa-
per, the treatment in the stated and real-effort paradigm was parallel, except that in real-effort,
we added the practice stage, which revealed information about ability in both the baseline and
“C&P" treatment. This made the difference between stated-effort and real-effort more salient in
our experiment.
We first compared the baseline results without “claim and promise" between these two effort
paradigms. As we showed in the main results above, we found significant “gift exchange" in
stated-effort (ρ = 0.431, p = 0.009), but not in real-effort (ρ = 0.053, p = 0.753). The regression
results of real-effort in Table 3.7 also suggested that wage level did not significantly affect effort
level. However, the effort level strongly depended on ability. This potentially explained that the
insignificant “gift exchange" in the real-effort paradigm was due to limitations on ability. Note
that in the regression results (Table3.7 & Table3.5), the coefficients of wage were negative in real-
effort, but there were no unexpected negative coefficients of wages in stated-effort. To some extent,
these results verified the advantage of a clear cost function in the stated-effort paradigm suggested
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by [173].17
We next compared the C&P treatment between stated and real-effort. Based on our main
results above, the positive reciprocity in the case of “aw >= cw" was similar in these two effort
paradigms, but the retaliation in the case of “aw < cw" was different. The retaliation in stated-
effort was significant, but it was not significant in real-effort. We further calculated the degree
of positive reciprocity and retaliation, which were measured by the absolute distance between the
actual effort and promised effort in the case of “aw >= cw", and the absolute distance between
the actual effort and desired effort in the case of “aw < cw", respectively. We found no significant
difference in the degree of positive reciprocity between these two effort paradigms (0.13 vs 0.06,
Mann-Whitney U test, p-value=0.234), but the degree of retaliation in real-effort was significantly
lower than stated-effort (0.06 vs 0.21, p-value=0.046).
In the real-effort paradigm, employees were aware of their ability and the session’s median
performance (relative ability) before they started the game. In the case of “aw < cw", we found
the employee’s promised effort was significantly higher than his ability (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.050), and the employee’s claimed wage was not based on his ability (Spearman test,
ρ = −0.030, p = 0.869) nor based on relative ability ( ρ = 0.034, p = 0.830). The employee might
feel guilty about the inflated promised effort and claimed wage (see more details in the following
section). Thus, when “aw < cw" and the employer paid wage and desired effort based on ability,
the employee might choose not to retaliate. Such could be one potential explanation for the lack of
retaliation in the real-effort paradigm when “aw < cw".
For the employer, recall that we elicited employers’ incentivized beliefs about the actual effort
level at the end of the experiment. In both the stated and real-effort paradigms, the wage level was
significantly correlated with employers’ beliefs (Spearman test, ρ = 0.571, p < 0.001 for baseline
and p = 0.011 for treatment in the stated-effort; ρ = 0.320, p = 0.051 for baseline and p < 0.001
for treatment in the real-effort). The p-values in Table 3.8 show that in stated-effort, the employer
desired higher effort than his belief, but there was no difference between desired effort and beliefs
17Since the effort level with a real-effort task depends on the provided work time duration, we cannot directly
compare the effort level and the wage rate between the two effort paradigms.
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in the real-effort task. In real-effort, the employer knew the median performance, and he used this
information to build beliefs and desired effort. The correlation between the desired effort and the
median performance was positive and significant (Spearman test, ρ = 0.724, p < 0.001). We thus
argue that since there was no involvement about ability in stated-effort, employers tried to desire
higher effort than his expectation.18
Table 3.8: Comparison between Stated-Effort and Real-Effort
Baseline C&P Treatment
Desired Effort Belief (employer) P-value Desired Effort Belief (employer) P-value
Stated Effort 0.67 (0.03) 0.49 (0.03) < 0.001 0.65 (0.03) 0.51 (0.04) < 0.001
Real Effort 7.05 (0.30) 6.62 (0.30) 0.123 7.20 (0.28) 6.73 (0.30) 0.112
Notes: The p-values in the column are from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. In each cell, the numbers refer to mean, with standard errors in parentheses.
Thus far, we concluded that our “C&P" treatment generated a similar direction of behavior
(conditional reciprocity) for stated-effort and real-effort paradigms. However, the quantitative out-
come was quite different. In the real-effort paradigm, due to the involvement of ability, the em-
ployer paid a wage based on the median performance of the employee, and the employee did not
retaliate against the employer. In this regard, the negotiation between the employer and employee
was more successful in the real-effort paradigm. In the real workplace, the employee had private
information about his/her ability and his/her relative ability, and this information could influence
the feeling of guilt and, subsequently, her/his effort choice. However, if the work did not require
high ability, the employee would choose to retaliate when the employer did not trust his promise.
18We further find with a similar average effort level, the wage rate was significantly higher in stated-effort than in
real-effort (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.009). Note that when we compared the effort level, we divided the effort
level in the real-effort by 10. The average effort level in the stated-effort was 0.53, and it was 0.59 in the real-effort.




[140] suggested that promises could drive behavior because people cared about others’ expecta-
tions, and they might feel guilty when their behavior let down others’ expectations. [140] arrived at
this conclusion using a guilt aversion model, and they tested the model using second-order beliefs.
[162] measured the feeling of guilt and tested the correlation between guilt and promise-keeping
using the self-reported TOSCA-3 questionnaire. In our experiment, we used desired effort as the
induced-belief to include guilt in our model. We further used choice-process data from biometric
tools to directly measure guilt, and we focused on pupil dilation responses [176]. We also incor-
porated the TOSCA-3 questionnaire at the end of the experiment. Since we only had the promise
setup in the treatment, we focused on guilt for the C&P treatment. In the C&P treatment, we
successfully recorded 71 subjects in stated-effort (36 employees, 35 employers) and 72 subjects in
real-effort (36 employees, 36 employers).
Researchers have previously used pupil dilation responses to measure guilt [177, 166, 167, 178,
179]; most of them focused on the guilt in deception.19 The deception literature suggests pupils
dilate when people feel guilty. We followed this literature to assume pupils dilate when people feel
guilty in our promise setup.
We first measured the pupil size of each TOSCA-3 question screen. At the end of the experi-
ment, subjects responded to five questions from the TOSCA-3 questionnaire. The answers about
guilt were on a scale from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating no guilt feelings while 4 indicating strong guilt
feelings.20 Overall, we found (combining stated and real effort), the correlation between pupil size
and TOSCA-3 scores were positive but not significant (Spearman test, ρ = 0.026, p = 0.498).21
However, such correlation in the real-effort for employees are positive and marginally significant
19Pupils dilate for various reasons, including emotion, arousal, cognitive difficulty, and pain [180, 181, 168, 182].
20We followed [162] and chose the questions related to guilt as in Question B and randomly picked one of the other
questions as Question A.
21To calculate pupil size, we first took an average between the pupil size of subjects’ left and right eye (in millime-
ters) on each timestamp (60 times per second), and then we calculated the average pupil size per screen (average of all
timestamps spent on that screen).
88
(Spearman test, ρ = 0.142, p = 0.062). One possible explanation is that three of the five TOSCA-3
questions related to scenarios of employees in the workplace, and the role assignment in our exper-
iment could have had a priming effect, especially for the “employee" in the real-effort paradigm.
This result, to some extent, verified our assumption that pupils dilate when people feel guilty.22
We next studied pupil dilation for the main experimental decision screens. In both stated and
real effort, the screen in which the employee chose his actual effort after reviewing the employer’s
wage was the most important screen to study guilt feelings in our promise setup, hereafter, the
“effort choice" screen. In the stated-effort paradigm, the “effort choice" screen included informa-
tion about the actual wage paid by the employer, the desired effort by the employer, a review of
his “claim and promise," and also the employee’s actual effort choice options. In the real-effort
paradigm, the only difference from stated-effort was that subjects proceeded to the real task after
reviewing the information instead of choosing the effort level. In order to obtain accurate choice-
process data on each information, we first defined non-overlapping Areas of Interest (AOIs) in the
“effort choice" screen (see Appendix C.2). AOI is a tool to select regions of a displayed stimulus
and to extract eye-tracking metrics specifically for those regions.23 We then calculated the average
pupil dilation for all the AOIs.
In the C&P treatment, employees’ guilt feeling depended on the wage paid by the employer.
Thus, we explored pupil dilation on the “effort choice" screen when “aw >= cw" and “aw <
cw" separately. In stated-effort, we found that when “aw >= cw", the correlation between the
pupil size and promise-keeping behavior (i.e., “actual effort - promised effort") was negative and
marginally significant (Spearman test, ρ = −0.231, p = 0.082). We did not find such correlation
when “aw < cw". This suggests that when the employer chose to trust the employee, the larger
22[162] found a significant positive correlation between guilt scores and effort chosen by the employee in a one-shot
gift exchange game. [162] also suggested guilt scores positively correlate with promise-keeping behavior by one-tailed
Spearman tests (i.e., negative correlation between TOSCA-3 scores and “promised effort - actual effort"). However, in
our experiment, we did not find such a correlation in either stated or real effort. We argue that during the experiment,
participants’ feelings of guilt were changeable, and especially in our case, the feeling of guilt also depended on the
wage paid by the employer.
23Note that we use fixation AOI instead of gaze AOI. Gaze points show on what the eyes were focusing. For
example, in our experiment, eye tracker collected data with a sampling rate of 60 Hz, and we had 60 individual gaze
points per millisecond. If a series of gaze points were very close -in time and/or space - this gaze cluster constituted a
fixation, denoting lock of the eyes on an object for some time. Fixations were excellent measures of visual attention.
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the distance between the actual and promised effort the lower the employee’s guilt.
In real-effort, employers’ trusting rate was low, and hence we focused on the case when “aw <
cw". Since the employee in the real-effort paradigm proceeded to the real effort task after reviewing
the information instead of choosing the effort level, we could not use the actual effort to study guilt.
Instead, we used promised effort, desired effort, and ability. We found that the correlation between
employees’ pupil dilation on the “effort choice" screen and inflated promises (i.e., “promised effort
- median performance") was positive and significant (ρ = 0.32, p = 0.031), and the correlation
between pupil dilation and “desired effort - ability" was negative (ρ = −0.26, p = 0.055).24 We
argue that when the employee made a promise that was greater than his ability, and the desired
effort was lower than his ability, s/he experienced guilt. This result supports our explanation about
the smaller degree of retaliation in the real-effort paradigm when aw < cw.
3.6.2 Reciprocity
We used eye-tracking lookup patterns to provide evidence for reciprocity.25 Lookup indicates
care and attention, more care generated higher lookup rates. Based on the definition of reciprocity,
where people cared for others who cared about them, we applied lookup patterns as a measurement
of reciprocity. We followed [167] to use the fixation duration to present lookup patterns.
In the state-effort paradigm, we first showed the information employees cared in the “effort
choice" screen. In Table 3.9, the fixation duration and revisits showed that employees cared most
about the employer’s wage. More interestingly, the second information about which employees
cared most was the desired effort by employers, which did not affect their payoffs, and on average,
employees looked up the “desired effort" for 1.09 seconds with four revisits (Appendix C.4 shows
the distribution of lookup by heatmaps).26 Regarding reciprocity, we found that in the case when
24The “effort choice" screen did not list “ability" and “median performance," but subjects may have had memories
about the performance.
25[167] used lookup patterns to infer the feeling of guilt. However, [167] found high lookup generated more decep-
tion, which was inconsistent with their guilt hypothesis that “the more one cares about others’ payoffs and looks at
them, the less one should deceive."
26Following the protocol of [167], we excluded fixations shorter than 50 msec. However, these observations did not
change the results. Note that similar to [167], participants in our experiment made frequent rapid fixations, and the
time per lookup was low.
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“aw >= cw", employees looked up the information from employers (i.e., “actual wage" and
“desired effort") for a longer time when they received a higher wage from employers (Spearman
test, ρ = 0.468, p = 0.021). We did not find a correlation in the case of “aw < cw" (ρ = −0.209,
p = 0.295).
Table 3.9: Average Lookup Patterns (Stated Effort)
Claimed Wage Promised Effort Actual Wage Desired Effort Actual Effort
Time to first fixation (in seconds) 16.09 24.11 16.31 23.99 15.24
Fixation duration (in seconds) 0.73 0.83 1.19 1.09 0.47
Revisits (No.) 2 3 4 4 9
Notes: Since subjects need to make choice on “Actual Effort", subjects have the most revisits on it. The order (from left to right) of the information in the table is the
same as listed in the screen (from up to down).
In the real-effort paradigm, we found similar lookup patterns as in stated-effort, shown in
Table C.1. Employees cared about employers’ actual wage and desired effort based on the time
employees look at them. The only difference is that employees cared more about their promised
effort in real-effort compared to stated-effort. We calculated the “promised effort to desired effort"
fixation duration ratio, and we found employees looked at the “promised effort" for a longer time
in real-effort (0.96) compared to stated-effort (0.76). This result suggests that due to ability in
real-effort, employees cared more about their promises. Since we had low trusting rates in real-
effort, we did not find a significant correlation between lookup time durations and wages when
“aw >= cw" nor the case of “aw < cw" (Spearman test, ρ = 0.185, p = 0.208).
3.7 Concluding Remarks
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of non-binding promises on labor
contracts using a one-shot gift exchange game. Our treatment consisted of a “claim and promise"
before the conventional gift exchange game. The employee could choose whether to make a “claim
and promise" or not before the employer selected the wage level. The non-binding message of
“claim and promise" was designed to provide more sequential interactions between the employer
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and the employee.
We tested the baseline and treatment in both stated-effort and real-effort, and we found similar
qualitative results in these two effort paradigms. Our empirical analyses suggested that when the
employer chose to pay a wage greater than or equal to the claimed wage, the employee recipro-
cated by keeping his promise, and in this case, the wage level, effort level, and final social payoff
were the highest. When the employer chose a lower wage than the claimed wage, the employee
retaliated and broke his promise in stated-effort. However, in real-effort, due to the provision of
ability information, the retaliation was not significant. We found evidence that the C&P treat-
ment generated more interactions between employers and employees. The employer treated the
C&P treatment as a negotiation stage when paying a different wage than the claimed wage and
desired a different effort level than the promised effort. In real-effort, employers were more likely
to negotiate with employees based on the employees’ ability.
We included reciprocity and guilt in PGT models to explain the gift exchange in our design,
and we further provided direct evidence for the PGT model using choice-process data. Pupil
dilation showed evidence for employees’ guilt when employers trusted the employees, and they
broke their promises. Eye-tracking lookup patterns suggested employees cared about the wage
and the desired effort by the employer. The higher the wage received in the stated-effort paradigm,
the more the employee cared about the employer’s wage and desired effort. This result provided
evidence for reciprocity. We also used choice-process data to suggest that one potential reason
why the retaliation in real-effort was not significant was that subjects felt guilty when they over-
promised (i.e., their promised effort was higher than their abilities).
Our set-up closely followed the negotiation process between employers and employees in real
workplace environments. Our findings have important implications for the use of Promised-based
Management to motivate employees in the workplace. For work that does not require high ability
(represented by stated-effort in our experiment), employees care more about employers’ trust when
they make promises. For work that requires high ability (represented by real-effort), negotiation
between employers and employees base on ability information boosts the efficiency in the work-
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place. We did not test for heterogeneous treatment effects on different subgroups. Future work
might profitably focus on the promise-keeping of different groups (e.g., gender, performance) in
the workplace, especially in a field labor experiment.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STUDY
In this dissertation, I focus on three types of economics decision-making: insurance purchasing,
competition entry and employees’ effort choice. Under the framework of behavioral economics, I
run three different economics experiments to study these economics decision-making. The results
provide important applications for the design of insurance schemes, gender equality in the labor
market and employment relationship in the workplace, respectively.
In chapter 1, I compare the three insurance schemes (compulsory, voluntary and mixed insur-
ance) in terms of both adverse selection and moral hazard. The results about mixed insurance
provide valuable insights, especially for developing countries where agricultural insurance is not
yet well developed and very few schemes of insurance exist that implement different forms of
mixed insurance. The test of the validity of BART as an instrument to study insurance, and the
design of compulsory coverage rate in mixed insurance could be interesting future studies.
In chapter 2, I show the costs of gender roles for females to enter competitions. I encourage
more women, especially those with high abilities, to enter the competition by randomly assigning
them a different role/title with different social norms for competitiveness. The randomly assigned
role (breadwinner) gives women a permission “nudge" to break the glass ceiling of traditional gen-
der roles for competition. The results have emphasized the importance of pushing institutional
changes to help women to break the limits of traditional gender norms in the workplace. In poten-
tial future studies, I would be interested to see the effects of gender norms on women’s decision in
the workplace for women with different ages and from different cultures.
In chapter 3, I show the effects of promises from the employee on the employer’s wage
choice and the employee’s effort choice. The findings have important implications for the use
of Promised-based Management to motivate employees in the workplace. I allow the employee
to make a promise before the employer decides the wage level. This step adds more interactions
between employees and employers, and it increases the efficiency in the workplace. More field
evidence of the effects of employees’ promises in the workplace is needed in the future study.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 The Existence of A Separating Equilibrium
Figure A.1: Existence of a separating equilibrium of insurance contract. (Reprinted from [2])
In the separating equilibrium, point A represents the insurance contract for less risk-averse
individuals (L). In order to separate more risk-averse individuals (H) from less risk-averse (L)
individuals, the insurer needs to over-provide insurance to more risk-averse individuals (H), since
all feasible contracts preferred by more risk-averse individuals in the shaded area are also preferred
by less risk-averse individuals.
A.2 Estimates of r for the BART, assuming CRRA u(k) = kr
Assuming a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function u(k) = kr, the BART
allows for the estimation of the coefficient of risk aversion. The implied levels of r for every
113
possible choice k, k ∈ [1, 128] are shown in Appendix Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Estimates of r for the BART, assuming CRRA u(k) = kr (Reprinted from [2])
K r K r K r
1 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.011 44 0.515 ≤ r ≤ 0.532 87 2.085 ≤ r ≤ 2.161
2 0.012 ≤ r ≤ 0.019 45 0.533 ≤ r ≤ 0.551 88 2.162 ≤ r ≤ 2.240
3 0.020 ≤ r ≤ 0.027 46 0.552 ≤ r ≤ 0.570 89 2.241 ≤ r ≤ 2.324
4 0.028 ≤ r ≤ 0.036 47 0.571 ≤ r ≤ 0.590 90 2.325 ≤ r ≤ 2.413
5 0.037 ≤ r ≤ 0.044 48 0.591 ≤ r ≤ 0.610 91 2.414 ≤ r ≤ 2.506
6 0.045 ≤ r ≤ 0.053 49 0.611 ≤ r ≤ 0.630 92 2.507 ≤ r ≤ 2.605
7 0.054 ≤ r ≤ 0.062 50 0.631 ≤ r ≤ 0.651 93 2.606 ≤ r ≤ 2.710
8 0.063 ≤ r ≤ 0.071 51 0.652 ≤ r ≤ 0.673 94 2.711 ≤ r ≤ 2.821
9 0.072 ≤ r ≤ 0.080 52 0.674 ≤ r ≤ 0.695 95 2.822 ≤ r ≤ 2.938
10 0.081 ≤ r ≤ 0.089 53 0.696 ≤ r ≤ 0.718 96 2.939 ≤ r ≤ 3.063
11 0.090 ≤ r ≤ 0.098 54 0.719 ≤ r ≤ 0.741 97 3.064 ≤ r ≤ 3.196
12 0.099 ≤ r ≤ 0.108 55 0.742 ≤ r ≤ 0.765 98 3.197 ≤ r ≤ 3.339
13 0.109 ≤ r ≤ 0.117 56 0.766 ≤ r ≤ 0.790 99 3.340 ≤ r ≤ 3.491
14 0.118 ≤ r ≤ 0.127 57 0.791 ≤ r ≤ 0.815 100 3.492 ≤ r ≤ 3.654
15 0.128 ≤ r ≤ 0.137 58 0.816 ≤ r ≤ 0.841 101 3.655 ≤ r ≤ 3.830
16 0.138 ≤ r ≤ 0.147 59 0.842 ≤ r ≤ 0.868 102 3.831 ≤ r ≤ 4.02
17 0.148 ≤ r ≤ 0.158 60 0.869 ≤ r ≤ 0.896 103 4.021 ≤ r ≤ 4.225
18 0.159 ≤ r ≤ 0.168 61 0.897 ≤ r ≤ 0.924 104 4.226 ≤ r ≤ 4.447
19 0.169 ≤ r ≤ 0.179 62 0.925 ≤ r ≤ 0.954 105 4.448 ≤ r ≤ 4.689
20 0.180 ≤ r ≤ 0.190 63 0.955 ≤ r ≤ 0.984 106 4.690 ≤ r ≤ 4.954
21 0.191 ≤ r ≤ 0.201 64 0.985 ≤ r ≤ 1.015 107 4.955 ≤ r ≤ 5.224
22 0.202 ≤ r ≤ 0.213 65 1.016 ≤ r ≤ 1.048 108 5.225 ≤ r ≤ 5.565
23 0.214 ≤ r ≤ 0.224 66 1.049 ≤ r ≤ 1.081 109 5.566 ≤ r ≤ 5.920
24 0.225 ≤ r ≤ 0.236 67 1.082 ≤ r ≤ 1.115 110 5.921 ≤ r ≤ 6.315
25 0.237 ≤ r ≤ 0.248 68 1.116 ≤ r ≤ 1.151 111 6.316 ≤ r ≤ 6.759
26 0.249 ≤ r ≤ 0.261 69 1.152 ≤ r ≤ 1.188 112 6.760 ≤ r ≤ 7.260
27 0.262 ≤ r ≤ 0.273 70 1.189 ≤ r ≤ 1.226 113 7.261 ≤ r ≤ 7.830
28 0.274 ≤ r ≤ 0.286 71 1.227 ≤ r ≤ 1.265 114 7.831 ≤ r ≤ 8.485
29 0.287 ≤ r ≤ 0.299 72 1.266 ≤ r ≤ 1.306 115 8.486 ≤ r ≤ 9.244
30 0.300 ≤ r ≤ 0.312 73 1.307 ≤ r ≤ 1.348 116 9.245 ≤ r ≤ 10.136
31 0.313 ≤ r ≤ 0.326 74 1.349 ≤ r ≤ 1.392 117 10.137 ≤ r ≤ 11.198
32 0.327 ≤ r ≤ 0.340 75 1.393 ≤ r ≤ 1.438 118 11.199 ≤ r ≤ 12.485
33 0.341 ≤ r ≤ 0.354 76 1.439 ≤ r ≤ 1.485 119 12.486 ≤ r ≤ 14.074
34 0.355 ≤ r ≤ 0.368 77 1.486 ≤ r ≤ 1.534 120 14.075 ≤ r ≤ 16.090
35 0.369 ≤ r ≤ 0.383 78 1.535 ≤ r ≤ 1.585 121 16.091 ≤ r ≤ 18.729
36 0.384 ≤ r ≤ 0.398 79 1.586 ≤ r ≤ 1.639 122 18.730 ≤ r ≤ 22.334
37 0.399 ≤ r ≤ 0.414 80 1.640 ≤ r ≤ 1.694 123 23.335 ≤ r ≤ 27.558
38 0.415 ≤ r ≤ 0.430 81 1.695 ≤ r ≤ 1.752 124 27.559 ≤ r ≤ 35.816
39 0.431 ≤ r ≤ 0.446 82 1.753 ≤ r ≤ 1.813 125 35.817 ≤ r ≤ 50.885
40 0.447 ≤ r ≤ 0.462 83 1.814 ≤ r ≤ 1.876 126 50.886 ≤ r ≤ 87.682
41 0.463 ≤ r ≤ 0.479 84 1.877 ≤ r ≤ 1.942 127 87.683 ≤ r ≤ 146.285
42 0.480 ≤ r ≤ 0.497 85 1.943 ≤ r ≤ 2.011 128 r ≥ 146.286
43 0.498 ≤ r ≤ 0.514 86 2.012 ≤ r ≤ 2.084
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A.3 Empirical Predictions
Based on the insurance premium and coverage in our experiment and the explosion probability
of each pump in BART, the expected utility of buying insurance is:
EU(buying (additional) insurance) = U(24)kf/128+U(kf−40)(128−kf )/128, kf ∈ (40, 128]
(A.1)
and the expected utility function of not buying insurance in purely voluntary insurance normalizing
U(0) = 0 is:
EU(not buying insurance) = U(k)(128− k)/128, k ∈ (0, 128] (A.2)
and the expected utility function of not buying additional insurance in mixed insurance is:
EU(not buying additional insurance) = U(12)kp/128+U(kp−20)(128−kp)/128, kp ∈ (20, 128]
(A.3)
Since insurance has an incentive effect which changes the lotteries, we use k, kf , kp to indicate
the choice of pumps without insurance, with full insurance and with partial insurance respectively.
Recall that by assuming a CRRA utility function, we get the levels of r for every possible choice of
pumps without insurance (Appendix Table A.1). We first calculate the optimal choice of pumps for
each r after insurance, i.e., kf and kp (Appendix). Then we can calculate each part of the following
equations based on a CRRA:
EU [buying insurance (kf ∈ (40, 128])]− EU [not buying insurance (k ∈ (0, 128])] :
[U(24)kf/128 + U(kf − 40)(128− kf )/128]− [U(k)(128− k)/128]
(A.4)
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EU(buying additional insurance)− EU(not buying additional insurance (kp ∈ (20, 128])) :
[U(24)kf/128 + U(kf − 40)(128− kf )/128]− [U(12)kp/128 + U(kp − 20)(128− kp)/128]
(A.5)
Tables A.2 and A.3 show results of equation (A4) and (A5) around the risk-neutral subjects. In
purely voluntary insurance, the difference between the expected utility of buying and not buying
insurance is negative for risk-loving individuals, zero for risk-neutral, and positive for risk-averse
individuals. In mixed insurance, since we simply split the premium and coverage of purely vol-
untary insurance into two equal parts as the premium and coverage of the mixed insurance, the
difference between the expected utility of buying and not buying additional insurance is positive
for a small group of risk-loving individuals. Note that when we calculate equations A1, A2 and
A3 for each pump and the coefficient r, we find that the difference in the magnitude of expected
utility is large across pumps. Thus, we do not use the comparisons of the utility differences across
pumps in A.2 and A.3 to predict adverse/advantageous selection.
Table A.2: EU [buying insurance (kf ∈ (40, 128])]− EU [not buying insurance (k ∈ (0, 128])] (Reprinted from [2])
K EU(Buy)− EU(NotBuy) K EU(Buy)− EU(NotBuy) K EU(Buy)− EU(NotBuy)
55 1.737 64 0 73 -24.397
56 1.733 65 -0.706 74 -32.935
57 1.706 66 -1.643 75 -44.336
58 1.651 67 -2.976 76 -59.617
59 1.558 68 -4.497 77 -80.247
60 1.415 69 -6.627 78 -108.309
61 1.209 70 -9.427 79 -146.755
62 0.922 71 -13.115 80 -199.828
63 0.529 72 -17.972 >= 81 <= −273.871
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Table A.3: EU(buying additional insurance)− EU(not buying additional insurance) (Reprinted from [2])
K EU(Buy)− EU(NotBuy) K EU(Buy)− EU(NotBuy) K EU(Buy)− EU(NotBuy)
55 1.122 64 2 73 -0.242
56 1.207 65 2.080 74 -1.695
57 1.297 66 2.132 75 -3.821
58 1.393 67 2.152 76 -6.889
59 1.492 68 2.114 77 -11.331
60 1.595 69 1.999 78 -17.715
61 1.699 70 1.761 79 -26.954
62 1.804 71 1.362 80 -40.245
63 1.908 72 0.721 >= 81 <= −59.51294892
A.4 Distribution of Explosion Points and Learning Paths
(a) Explosion Points Distribution by Treatment (b) Leaning Paths by Treatment
Figure A.2: Distribution of Explosion Points and Learning Paths (Reprinted from [2])
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A.5 Background characteristics and measures of risk-taking
Table A.4: Background characteristics and measures of risk-taking across treatments. (Reprinted from [2])
Purely Mixed Purely Purely Purely Purely
Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary v. Mixed Voluntary v. Compulsory Compulsory v. Mixed
Gamble Choice(mean) 3.4 3.4 3.4 0.775 0.969 0.708
Pumps in 2-29th(mean) 56.85 56.45 59.02 0.778 0.413 0.476
SSS-all(mean) 15.39 17.23 16.84 0.073 0.183 0.800
DOSPERT-all(mean) 90.94 91.23 94.53 0.556 0.202 0.384
Age (mean) 38 35 37 0.021 0.294 0.242
Gender 50.5% (F) 47.5% (F) 46.7% (F) 0.669 0.616 0.939
49.5% (M) 52.5% (M) 53.3% (M)
Household(mean) 2.6 2.7 2.8 0.544 0.205 0.513
Education(median) 2 year/ 2 year/ 2 year/ 0.025 0.427 0.194
Associates Degree Associates Degree Associates Degree
Income(mean) 40,000-49,999 40,000-49,999 40,000-49,999 0.499 0.215 0.596
Notes: The last three columns show the p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Tests.
A.6 Experimental Instructions
(1). General Instructions
Now you will be presented with 30 balloons in the computer screen.
You have to decide how many times you want to pump each balloon. For every successful pump
you will earn money. However, the explosion point for each balloon is random. The maximum
possible number of pumps for each balloon is 128. The explosion point is random and it can be
anywhere in the range from the first (1st) to the last (128th) pump.
For each balloon, you will be asked to select how many times you want to pump it up. You
get a MONETARY reward of $0.01 for every successful pump. HOWEVER, if a balloon explodes
before it reaches the number of pumps you indicated, you earn $0.00 for that balloon.
After each trial, a new balloon will appear.
For SOME balloons, you have an opportunity to buy an Insurance to protect yourself against
the risk of an explosion for that particular balloon. Please make your decisions carefully. (if Purely
Voluntary or Mixed Treatment)
For SOME balloons, you are required to buy an Insurance to protect yourself against the risk
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of an explosion for that particular balloon. (if Purely Compulsory Treatment)
At the end of the experiment, 3 balloons will be RANDOMLY SELECTED, and you will be
paid the amount of money earned for these three balloons.
(2). Summary
* You write the number of times you want to pump up each balloon in a provided textbox.
* Remember: each balloon can be pumped up to 128 times (it will surely pop at 128th pump).
* Each balloon is then pumped up until a) that number is reached or b) it pops. Whatever occurs
first.
* If it does not explode, you make $0.01 for each pump.
* If it does explode, you will not make any money on that balloon.
* There are a total of 30 balloons.
* Only some balloons have the opportunity to purchase insurance. (if Purely Voluntary or
Mixed Treatment)
For some balloons, you are REQUIRED to buy an Insurance. (if Purely Compulsory Treat-
ment)
* At the end, you will be paid the exact amount you earned on THREE randomly selected
balloons.
Continue when you are ready to start.
(3a).Insurance (Purely Voluntary)
On the following balloon, you have an opportunity to buy an insurance to protect yourself
against the risk of explosion. The price of the insurance is $0.40.
If the balloon does explode, the insurance will pay you $0.64; if the balloon does not explode,
the insurance will pay you nothing, and the cost is not refunded. However, you will keep the
earnings you make in that balloon if it is selected at the end of the experiment.
Remember: each balloon can be pumped up to 128 times;
The insurance is only valid for this balloon.
Before proceeding to make your choices, you have to correctly answer the following three
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questions.
(1). If you choose to buy the insurance, and you pump 128 times, then how much would you
earn for this balloon?
A. $0 B. $64 C. $24 D. $40
(2). If you choose NOT to buy the insurance, and you pump 64 times, and the balloon does not
explode, then how much would you earn for this balloon?
A. $64 B. $24 C. $0 D. $40
(3). If you choose to buy the insurance, and you pump 70 times, and the balloon does not
explode, then how much would you earn for this balloon?
A. $70 B. $30 C. $0 D. $40
(3b).Insurance (Mixed)
On the following balloon, you are REQUIRED to buy an insurance to protect yourself against
the risk of explosion. The price of the insurance is $0.20, and it is compulsory.
If the balloon does explode, the insurance will pay you $0.32; if the balloon does not explode,
the insurance will pay you nothing, and the cost is not refunded. However, you will keep the
earnings you make in that balloon if it is selected at the end of the experiment.
Besides the compulsory insurance, you have an opportunity to buy another insurance VOLUN-
TARILY. The price of this insurance is also $0.20, and it is voluntary.
If the balloon does explode, the insurance will also pay you $0.32; if the balloon does not
explode, the insurance will pay you nothing, and the cost is not refunded. However, you will keep
the earnings you make in that balloon if it is selected at the end of the experiment.
Remember: each balloon can be pumped up to 128 times (it will surely pop at 128th pump);
if the balloon does not explode, you make $0.01 for each pump;
the insurance is only valid for this balloon.
Before proceeding to make your choices, you have to correctly answer the following three
questions.
(1).If you choose NOT to buy the voluntary insurance, and you pump 128 times, then how
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much would you earn for this balloon?
A. $0.0 B. $0.64 C. $0.24 D. $0.12
(2). If you choose NOT to buy the voluntary insurance, and you pump 64 times, and the balloon
does not explode, then how much would you earn for this balloon?
A. $0.64 B. $0.24 C. $0.0 D. $0.44
(3). If you choose to BUY the voluntary insurance, and you pump 70 times, and the balloon
explodes, then how much would you earn for this balloon?
A. $0.12 B. $0.24 C. $0.58 D. $0.30
(3c).Insurance (Purely Compulsory)
On the following balloon, you are REQUIRED to buy an insurance to protect yourself against
the risk of explosion. The price of the insurance is $0.40, and it is compulsory.
If the balloon does explode, the insurance will pay you $0.64; if the balloon does not explode,
the insurance will pay you nothing, and the cost is not refunded. However, you will keep the
earnings you make in that balloon if it is selected at the end of the experiment.
Remember: each balloon can be pumped up to 128 times (it will surely pop at 128th pump);
if the balloon does not explode, you make $0.01 for each pump;
the insurance is only valid for this balloon.
Before proceeding to pump the balloon, you have to correctly answer the following two ques-
tions.
(1).After you buy the insurance, you pump 128 times, and then how much would you earn for
this balloon?
A. $0.0 B. $0.64 C. $0.24 D. $0.40
(2).After you buy the insurance, you pump 70 times, and the balloon does not explode. How
much would you earn for this balloon?
A. $0.70 B. $0.30 C. $0.0 D. $0.40
(4a). Insurance choice (Purely voluntary)
Now please indicate your decision by Clicking the options below.
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Yes, I buy the insurance at a cost of $0.40.
No, I do not buy the insurance.
(4b). Insurance choice (Mixed)
Now please indicate your decision by Clicking the options below.
Yes, I buy the additional insurance at a cost of $0.20.
No, I do not buy the additional insurance.
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(5). BART
Figure A.3: Screenshot of BART. (Reprinted from [2])
(6). Earnings in BART
Congratulations!
Your earnings on 1-30 balloons are(),(),()...respectively, by randomly selecting three of them,
your payment of this part is $().
The balloon task is now complete. Please Click continue to go to the next part.
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(7). DOSPERT (Figure A.4)
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in
the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation. Provide a rating
from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely.
(1). Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend.
(2). Going camping in the wilderness.
(3). Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
(4). Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund.
(5). Drinking heavily at a social function.
(6). Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return.
(7). Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue.
(8). Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game.
(9). Having an affair with a married man/woman.
(10). Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.
(11). Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability.
(12). Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.
(13). Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring.
(14). Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event.
(15). Engaging in unprotected sex.
(16). Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else.
(17). Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.
(18). Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.
(19). Taking a skydiving class.
(20). Riding a motorcycle without a helmet.
(21). Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more prestigious one.
(22). Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work.
(23). Sunbathing without sunscreen.
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(24). Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.
(25). Piloting a small plane.
(26). Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.
(27). Moving to a city far away from your extended family.
(28). Starting a new career in your mid-thirties.
(29). Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand.
(30). Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200.
(8). Sensation Seeking Scale (Figure A.5)
Each of the items below contains two choices, A and B. Please click the letter of the choice
which most describes your likes or the way you feel. In some cases you may find items in which
both choices describe your likes or feelings. Please choose the one which better describes your
likes or feelings. In some cases you may find items in which you do not like either choice. In these
cases mark the choice you dislike least. Do not leave any items blank.
In this part, there are not right or wrong answers. Be frank and give your honest appraisal of
yourself.
(1) A. I like “wild" uninhibited parties
B. I prefer quiet parties with good conversation
(2) A. There are some movies I enjoy seeing a second or even a third time
B. I can’t stand watching a movie that I’ve seen before
(3) A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber
B. I can’t understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains
(4) A. I dislike all body odors
B. I like some for the earthly body smells
(5) A. I get bored seeing the same old faces
B. I like to comfortable familiarity of everyday friends
(6) A. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means getting lost
B. I prefer a guide when I am in a place I don’t know well
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(7) A. I dislike people who do or say things just to shock or upset others
B. When you can predict almost everything a person will do and say he or she must be a bore
(8) A. I usually don’t enjoy a movie or play where I can predict what will happen in advance
B. I don’t mind watching a movie or a play where I can predict what will happen in advance
(9) A. I have tried marijuana or would like to
B. I would never smoke marijuana
(10) A. I would not like to try any drug which might produce strange and dangerous effects on
me
B. I would like to try some of the new drugs that produce hallucinations
(11) A. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous
B. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening
(12) A. I dislike “swingers" (people who are uninhibited and free about sex)
B. I enjoy the company of real “swingers"
(13) A. I find that stimulants make me uncomfortable
B. I often like to get high (drinking liquor or smoking marijuana)
(14) A. I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before
B. I order the dishes with which I am familiar, so as to avoid disappointment and unpleasantness
(15) A. I enjoy looking at home movies or travel slides
B. Looking at someone’s home movies or travel slides bores me tremendously
(16) A. I would like to take up the sport of water skiing
B. I would not like to take up water skiing
(17) A. I would like to try surf boarding
B. I would not like to try surf boarding
(18) A. I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite routes, or timetable
B. When I go on a trip I like to plan my route and timetable fairly carefully
(19) A. I prefer the “down to earth" kinds of people as friends
B. I would like to make friends in some of the “far out" groups like artists or “punks"
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(20) A. I would not like to learn to fly an airplane
B. I would like to learn to fly an airplane
(21) A. I prefer the surface of the water to the depths
B. I would like to go scuba diving
(22) A. I would like to meet some persons who are homosexual (men or women)
B. I stay away from anyone I suspect of being “gay or lesbian"
(23) A. I would like to try parachute jumping
B. I would never want to try jumping out of a plane with or without a parachute
(24) A. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable
B. I prefer friends who are reliable and predictable
(25) A. I am not interested in experience for its own sake
B. I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations even if they are a little frightening,
unconventional, or illegal
(26) A. The essence of good art is in its clarity, symmetry of form and harmony of colors
B. I often find beauty in the “clashing" colors and irregular forms of modern paintings
(27) A. I enjoy spending time in the familiar surroundings of home
B. I get very restless if I have to stay around home for any length of time
(28) A. I like to dive off the high board
B. I don’t like the feeling I get standing on the high board (or I don’t go near it at all)
(29) A. I like to date members of the opposite sex who are physically exciting
B. I like to date members of the opposite sex who share my values
(30) A. Heavy drinking usually ruins a party because some people get loud and boisterous
B. Keeping the drinks full is the key to a good party
(31) A. The worst social sin is to be rude
B. The worst social sin is to be a bore
(32) A. A person should have considerable sexual experience before marriage
B. It’s better if two married persons begin their sexual experience with each other
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(33) A. Even if I had the money I would not care to associate with flight rich persons like those
in the “jet set"
B. I could conceive of myself seeking pleasures around the world with the “jet set"
(34) A. I like people who are sharp and witty even if they do sometimes insult others
B. I dislike people who have their fun at the expense of hurting the feelings of others
(35) A. There is altogether too much portrayal of sex in movies
B. I enjoy watching many of the “sexy" scenes in movies
(36) A. I feel best after taking a couple of drinks
B. Something is wrong with people who need liquor to feel good
(37) A. People should dress according to some standard of taste, neatness, and style
B. People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are sometimes strange
(38) A. Sailing long distances in small sailing crafts is foolhardy
B. I would like to sail a long distance in a small but seaworthy sailing craft
(39) A. I have no patience with dull or boring persons
B. I find something interesting in almost every person I talk to
(40) A. Skiing down a high mountain slope is a good way to end up on crutches
B. I think I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very fast down a high mountain slope
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(9). Gamble Choice
See Figure A.6: screenshot of gamble-choice task.
(10). Demographic survey
Please answer the following survey questions.
(1) Please enter your age in years.
(2) Please indicate the HIGHEST level of education you have completed.







(3) Including yourself, how many people live in your household?
(4) Please indicate your gender.
Male
Female






Other (Please list below)
(6) Please indicate your household yearly income for 2016. (Include all forms of income,



















Figure A.4: Screenshot of DOSPERT (Reprinted from [2])
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Figure A.5: Screenshot of SSS. (Reprinted from [2])
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Figure A.6: Screenshot of gamble-choice task. (Reprinted from [2])
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APPENDIX B
B.1 Gender composition in each session.
Table B.1: No. of Females by Session
Freq. (Treatment) Percent Freq. (Baseline) Percent
2 1 6.3 - -
3 2 12.5 3 25
4 4 25 4 33.3
5 5 31.2 3 25
6 4 25 2 16.7
Total 16 100 12 100
B.2 Men and Women Respond Equally to Role Assignment
In column (1), we exclude the data of “supporter", and the dummy variable treatment takes the
value of 1 if the treatment assignment is breadwinner and 0 for the baseline. In column (2), the
“breadwinner" data is excluded, and treatment is 1 if the role is supporter and 0 for the baseline. In
column (3), we only use the data of treatment group, and treatment is 1 if the role is breadwinner
and it is 0 if the role is supporter. The coefficients of all the interaction terms are not significant,
which means men and women respond equally to each role assignment.
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Table B.2: Ordered Probit Regressions for the Difference-in-Differences Estimates of WTC.
(1) (2) (3)
Breadwinner & Base Supporter & Base Breadwinner & Supporter
Treatment 0.449 -0.121 0.586∗∗
(0.291) (0.273) (0.301)
Female -0.389 -0.414 -0.131
(0.256) (0.257) (0.278)
Treated * Female 0.069 0.400 -0.314
(0.374) (0.364) (0.384)
Confidence 0.197∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.089
(0.054) (0.058) (0.054)
Risk Tolerance 0.130∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.059) (0.063)
Observation 140 141 129
R-square 0.069 0.072 0.067
Notes: Dependent variable is WTC. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions also control for ability and gender
composition, but none of them are significant. All results are robust to using OLS instead of ordered probit.
B.3 Confidence
Table B.3: Proportion of subjects who believe they performed better than their partner (confidence)
Baseline Breadwinner Supporter p-value p-value p-value
Base vs BW Base vs SP BW vs SP
Men 80.0%(0.07) 73.1%(0.09) 83.3%(0.07) 0.528 0.732 0.355
Women 78.1%(0.07) 78.9%(0.07) 71.4%(0.08) 0.923 0.509 0.460
P-Value 0.836 0.589 0.260
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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B.4 Elicited Social Norms
Figure B.1: Elicited Social Norms for Competitiveness (including baseline & treatment group)
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(a) Female in Treatment (b) Male in Treatment
Figure B.2: Elicited Social Norms for Competitiveness by Gender
B.5 Theoretical Model of Social Norms
In this section we develop a simple social norm model based on [92], and apply it to a “com-
petition entry" environment. Consider social categories C, and each person j is mapped into one
of the categories, cj . Each person is aware of his/her own category and others’ categories. In addi-
tion, each person may be mapped into multiple categories under different situations. For example,
a person j can be both a woman and a professional. P indicates the prescribed behavior by social
norms for each category C. We first propose the following additive utility function, which depends
on an individual j’s identity, as well as his/her actions and the actions of others:
Uj = Uj(aj, a−j, Ij) (B.1)
where Ij is j’s role or self-image, and aj is the action taken by j. The action taken by others is
indicated by a−j . We further extend the self-image term by breaking it into two components:
Ij = Iji + Ije (B.2)
where Iji is the internalized self-image, which captures the positive feeling or negative feeling
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a person j experiences from an action. Ije is the external self-image, and it captures the rewards or
punishments from others after they observe j’s action. We present Iji and Ije separately:
Iji = Iji(aj; cj, εj, P )
Ije = Iji(aj, a−j; cj, εj, P )
First, we evaluate Iji. An individual j’s intrinsic role depends on his/her social category cj ,
as well as the extent to which his/her own actions match the prescribed behavior indicated by P .
The other given characteristics of j are captured by εj . Role also depends on the distance between
εj and the ideal characteristics in category cj , indicated by P . A person j’s intrinsic social status
within a category is given by the function Iji(·). When the action is observable to others, the gains
or losses of j’s self-image further depend on how others interpret his/her action, which is revealed
by a−j in Ije. Based on this framework, the gains or losses associated with person j’s self-image
represent the increases or decreases in utility Uj driven by Ij .
We apply the above model to our experimental setting, to derive our hypotheses. Since in our
experiment, the competitive action is unobservable because the WTC is private information, we
normalize Ije ∼ 0, and focus on Iji. We also assume a person’s identity is additive when he/she is
mapped into multiple categories with different “P " which play in opposite directions.
Hypothesis 1: The WTC of women is lower than the WTC of men.
The current experiment studies gender and competitiveness, which can be formalized as fol-
lows. There is a set of categories C, and it consists of {Female, Male}. If a person j is male, then
his social category is cjm; if a person j is female, then her social category is cjw. Let us assume
that an individual j can choose one of two types of actions aj ∈ {0, 1} in terms of “competition
entry". If an individual j enters the competition, then aj = 1, otherwise aj = 0. P describes the
appropriate behavior for “competition entry" for each gender. Based on P , it is socially appropri-
ate for males (cjm) to choose ajm = 1, but inappropriate for females (cjw) to choose ajw = 1.1
1For competitiveness, males have higher social status than females [72].
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A female experiences a loss of Iji when she enters the competition, but a male experiences a gain
of Iji when he enters the competition, which decreases and increases their respective Uj . Thus,
consistent with previous literature, we hypothesize that in the control, the WTC of females will be
lower than the WTC of males.
Hypothesis 2: The WTC of supporters is lower than the WTC of breadwinners.
We now study the social categories of family roles. The C set consists of {Supporter, Bread-
winner}, and action (aj) still represents “competition entry". P describes the appropriate behavior
for “competition entry" for each role. According to P , a breadwinner (cjb) has higher social status
in competitiveness than a supporter (cjs). Therefore, we expect that the WTC of breadwinners will
be higher than the WTC of supporters.
Hypothesis 3: The “breadwinner" role for women increases their WTC, while the role of “sup-
porter" for men decreases WTC.
When a person j is assigned a role, he/she is mapped into two categories, gender and role. If a
woman is assigned as the breadwinner, her dual category is denoted as cjwb = cjw + cjb. If a man
is assigned as the supporter, his dual category is denoted as cjms = cjm+ cjs. Category gender and
category role have separate P for “competition entry", which is the same as stated above. A female
breadwinner’s (cjwb) intrinsic self-image experienced from entering competition comes from two
parts: woman (Ijiw) and breadwinner (Ijib). We present her self-image as follows:
I
′
ji = Ijiw + Ijib. (B.3)
Since the role of “breadwinner" rewards competitiveness according to its P , then I ′ji > Iji for
a woman. This means the role of “breadwinner" increases Iji when a woman enters the compe-
tition. Therefore, a female breadwinner’s WTC is higher than the WTC of a woman without this
role. Applying the same analysis to a male supporter (cjms), we expect the role of “supporter" to
decrease the WTC of a man.
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B.6 Distributions of each WTC scale
(a) Male (b) Female
Figure B.3: Distributions of each WTC scale
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B.7 Earnings in the Second Stage by Performance Quartile ($)
Table B.4: Men’s Expected Earnings in the Second Stage by Performance Quartile ($)
Baseline Treat Breadwinner Supporter p-value p-value p-value
Base vs Treat Base vs BW Base vs S
Worst 1-2 1.68(0.31) 1.73(0.24) 1.12(0.28) 1.58(0.32) 0.556 0.234 0.951
Best 3-4 6.74(0.99) 6.05(0.85) 5.46(0.98) 5.50(1.02) 0.852 0.396 0.334
Notes: 1= the worst performance; 4 = the best performance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table B.5: Women’s Actual Earnings in the Second Stage by Performance Quartile ($)
Baseline Treat Breadwinner Supporter p-value p-value p-value
Base vs Treat Base vs BW Base vs S
Worst 1 1.09(0.69) 1.22(0.57) 1.11(0.83) 1.36(0.91) 0.845 0.821 0.714
2 1.72(0.85) 1.35(0.52) 1.55(0.85) 1.2(0.62) 0.439 0.684 0.416
3 1.93(0.94) 1.71(0.81) 1.51(1.09) 2.2(0.12) 0.794 0.227 0.298
Best 4 4.1(1.37) 5.35(1.04) 8.4(0.28) 2.73(1.36) 0.741 0.079 0.301
Notes: 1= the worst performance; 4 = the best performance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table B.6: Men’s Actual Earnings in the Second Stage by Performance Quartile ($)
Baseline Treat Breadwinner Supporter p-value p-value p-value
Base vs Treat Base vs BW Base vs S
Worst 1 0.38(0.26) 1.42(0.63) 0.56(0.22) 2.8(1.2) 0.171 0.345 0.101
2 1.63(0.81) 2.45(0.92) 2.1(.) 2.82(1.77) 0.573 0.243 0.332
3 1.85(1.50) 1.11(0.36) 1.86(1.08) 2.01(1.06) 0.522 0.595 0.443
Best 4 2.95(1.25) 3.68(1.14) 1.68(0.56) 5.04(2.07) 0.8441 0.665 0.651
Notes: 1= the worst performance; 4 = the best performance. Standard errors are in parentheses.
B.8 The Online Experiment
Table B.7: Summary of Treatments and Number of Subjects (online experiment).
First stage Second stage Female Male F-Manager M-Manager Total
(individually) (group, WTC)
Baseline Group Piece rate No roles 30 22 — — 52
Treatment Group Piece rate Role assignment 63 52 36 25 115
Table B.8: Gender Difference in Performance in the Baseline
First Stage Second Stage p-value
1 2(all participants) column 1 vs 2
Men 6.82 7.6 0.502
Women 4.87 5.4 0.597
p-value 0.18 0.094
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Table B.9: Gender Difference in Performance in the Treatment Group
First Stage Second Stage Manager Assistant P-value P-value
1(individual) 2(group) 3 4 column 1 vs 3 column 1 vs 4
Men 4.60 5.88 6.72 5.11 0.009 0.144
Women 4.84 5.68 5.61 5.77 0.569 0.042
P-value 0.505 0.611
Table B.10: Proportion of subjects who believe they performed better than their partner (confidence)
Baseline Manager Assistant p-value p-value p-value
Base vs MA Base vs AS MA vs SP
Men 86.4% 64% 66.7% 0.083 0.115 0.842
Women 40% 52.8% 51.9% 0.304 0.374 0.942
P-Value 0.001 0.387 0.272




In the experiment today, you will be asked to complete two different tasks. None of these will
take more than 5 minutes. At the end of the experiment we will pay you based on your performance
in these two tasks. The method we use to determine your earnings varies across tasks. Before each
task we will describe in detail how your payment is determined.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment from the two tasks.
New page:
Task 1
For Task 1 you will be asked to solve a set of problems independently. You will be given 5
minutes to answer these problems. For calculation questions, you cannot use a calculator, however
you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper. Your
answers to the problems are anonymous.
You get 10 cents per problem you solve correctly. Your payment does not decrease if you
provide an incorrect answer to a problem. We refer to this payment as the piece rate payment. You
will not be informed of how many questions you correctly solve and your corresponding payment
in this task until the end of the experiment.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand.
New page:
Task 2
For task 2 you will be randomly paired with a partner (one of the participants in this room, but
you will not be told who she/he is), and you two will work as a group anonymously. Four groups
in total will be formed in this session. As in Task 1 each group will be given 5 minutes to solve
a similar set of problems. The sum of answers that the two members correctly solve will be the
final number of correct answers of the group. The final payment of each group in this task will be
equally split between the two group members.
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New page:
Your payment in this task will also depend on your choice of a payment scheme: piece rate or
tournament. If you choose piece rate, your group will be paid in the same way as Task 1, but with
20 cents per problem you solve correctly.
If you choose tournament, your group will be paid based on the performance of your group
relative to that of the other three groups, regardless of the payment scheme chosen by the other
groups. For instance, if the number of problems solved correctly in your group is the largest
among all the four groups, your group will receive 80 cents per correct answer, four times the
payment from the piece rate; otherwise your group will receive no payment for this task. If there
are ties, all these winner groups will receive 80 cents per correct answer.
The choices and answers from you and your partner will be kept anonymous. You will not be
informed of the corresponding payment of your group in this task until the end of the experiment.
New page:
Now, you were randomly selected to be the BreadWinner of your group, and your partner is
the Supporter. (only for treatment)
Please indicate in 5-scale how much you want to choose the tournament payment scheme for
your group. Your partner will also be asked this same question.
Either your selection or your partner’s selection will be selected to be the final selection of your
group by equal chance.
You (your partner) will not know the choice made by your partner (you) in this task. You will
be informed of the final payment scheme of your group and your corresponding payment in this
task at the end of the experiment.
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New page:
Please indicate in 5-scale how much you want to choose the tournament payment scheme for
your group. If you choose scale 1, and your choice is selected as your group’s choice, then the
probability of entering the tournament will be 20% (i.e., 80% of probability to use piece rate); if




1 Entering the Tournament with probability 20%.
2 Entering the Tournament with probability 40%.
3 Entering the Tournament with probability 60%.
4 Entering the Tournament with probability 80%.
5 Entering the Tournament for sure.
Your choice is: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a woman should be if she is
the supporter in her household? If your answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this
question in today’s experiment, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a woman should be if she is the
breadwinner in her household? If your answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this
question in today’s experiment, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a woman should be? If your
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answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this question in today’s experiment, then you
will get extra 25 cents.
1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a breadwinner of a household
should be? If your answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this question in today’s
experiment, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a supporter of a household
should be? If your answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this question in today’s
experiment, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a man should be if he is the
supporter in his household? If your answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this
question in today’s experiment, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a man should be if he is the
breadwinner in his household? If your answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this
question in today’s experiment, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a man should be? If your answer
is the same as the most frequent answer for this question in today’s experiment, then you will get
extra 25 cents.
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1 (Not competitive at all), 2, 3, 4, 5 (Very competitive)
New page:
Do you think that your performance in Task 1 is better than your partner’s performance? If




Please estimate the rank of your performance relative to the rest of the participants in Task 1?
For example, if you check 1, you consider yourself as better than all other seven participants. If
your guess is the same as your rank, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
New page:




Please make a choice among the following six gamble choices. Each choice has two events A
and B, and each event’s chance of occurring is 50%. After you make your choice, the system will
randomly choose an event for that choice, you will get the corresponding payoff for that event.
Please select the gamble that you choose.
New page:
Do you think men or women generally do better in the "math problem" task that you just did?
149
Demographic survey
Please answer the following survey questions.
(1) Please enter your age in years.
(2) Please indicate the HIGHEST level of education you have completed.







(3) Including yourself, how many people live in your household?
(4) Please indicate your gender.
Male
Female






Other (Please list below)
(6) Please indicate your household yearly income for 2016. (Include all forms of income,















B.10 Word Selection Survey
Survey1
In one word, how would you call someone who is the primary earner in a household:
In one word, how would you call someone who is the secondary earner in a household:
Survey 2












C.1 The set-up of each station.
Figure C.1: The set-up of each station.
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C.2 AOIs in screen.
Figure C.2: AOIs in the “Effort Choice" Screen (stated)
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Figure C.3: AOIs in the “Effort Choice" Screen (real)
C.3 Heatmaps.
The Heatmaps is generated within iMotion, and it is an aggregated visualization and analysis
of eye tracking data. The heatmaps helps identify what areas of the stimuli was focused on for the
longest amount of time by all the participants, and what areas or elements may go missed entirely.
Red indicates relatively more attention and green is relatively less attention.
(a) Stated Effort (b) Real Effort
Figure C.4: Heatmap
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C.4 Lookup patterns in the real-effort paradigm.
Table C.1: Average Lookup Patterns (Real Effort)
Claimed Wage Promised Effort Actual Wage Desired Effort
Time to first fixation (in seconds) 3.74 6.91 5.73 12.96
Fixation duration (in seconds) 0.45 0.73 0.91 0.76
Revisits (No.) 2 3 3 2




Welcome! Thank you for participating in this study.
You will be making REAL decisions involving REAL money. So, please read the instructions
carefully. Feel free to ask any questions by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other
participants during the experiment. You can use the draft paper we provide, but you are NOT
allowed to use the calculator.
The payoffs in the experiment are represented by Experimental Points. Your payment in the
experiment will be converted to Dollars at a rate of 1 point = $0.5. To ensure anonymity and
confidentiality you were given a random number decal at the beginning of the experiment. You
will need this number to collect your payment.
There are two types of participants: employer and employee.
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly choose with equal chance
whether you will be an employer or an employee. Each person selected to be an employer will be
randomly paired with another person in the room who has been selected as an employee.
The identity of the participants will remain anonymous. You will never know the identity of
the person you were paired with and the other person will never know your identity.
The experiment consists of two stages. The employer pays a wage w to the employee. After
receiving the wage w, the employee will choose an effort level e for the employer. The details are
as follows.
Stage 1 (employer): a) The employer chooses the wage level, w for his employee;
b) The employer also announces a non-binding effort level, ê, that he wants the employee to
do.
Stage 2 (employee): The employee has to choose his actual effort level, e, after he reviews the
wage level set by the employer.
Note: The final payment of both parties will be decided by the employee’s actual decision on
effort e, and will NOT be decided by the proposed effort ê.
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The combination of wage and actual effort level determine monetary payoffs for the employer
and the employee:
The cost of each real e:
Table C.2: Effort-Cost Table
Effort Level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Calculation of payoffs:
Payoff of the employer = (120− w) ∗ e
The payoff of the employer equals: (120 - the wage he paid to his employee) * the actual effort
level selected by the employee.
Payoff of the employee = w − c(e)− 20
The payoff of the employee equals: the wage received from the employer - the cost of the
actual effort level he selected - 20.
Thus, the higher the effort level provided by the employee and the lower the wage, the larger
the employer’s payoffs. The lower the effort level provided by the employee and the higher the
wage, the larger the employee’s payoffs.
Example:
If the salary is 50 and the actual effort level is 0.5, then the payoffs would be:
Employer’s payoffs = (120− 50) ∗ 0.5 = 35 points = $17.5
Employee’s payoffs = 50− 6− 20 = 24 points = $12
Questionnaire: Just to be sure that you understand the instructions you have to solve a simple
questionnaire. When everyone in the room has answered the questionnaire correctly we will start
the experiment.
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The wage for an employee is 100, and the employee’s actual effort level is 0.3, then the payoffs
would be:
Employer’s payoff (experimental points):
Employee’s payoff (experimental points):
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Stated-effort “C&P" Treatment
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this study.
You will be making REAL decisions involving REAL money. So, please read the instructions
carefully. Feel free to ask any questions by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other
participants during the experiment. You can use the draft paper we provide, but you are NOT
allowed to use the calculator.
The payoffs in the experiment are represented by Experimental Points. Your payment in the
experiment will be converted to Dollars at a rate of 1 point = $0.5. To ensure anonymity and
confidentiality you were given a random number decal at the beginning of the experiment. You
will need this number to collect your payment.
There are two types of participants: employer and employee.
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly choose with equal chance
whether you will be an employer or an employee. Each person selected to be an employer will be
randomly paired with another person in the room who has been selected as an employee.
The identity of the participants will remain anonymous. You will never know the identity of
the person you were paired with and the other person will never know your identity.
The experiment consists of three stages. The employee chooses to make a “claim and promise"
or not. The employer pays a wage w to the employee. After receiving the wage w, the employee
will choose an effort level e for the employer. The details are as follows.
Stage 1 (employee): The employee decides whether to make a “claim and promise" or not:
“If the firm gives me the wage= , I will choose the effort level= ". This claim and
promise is non-binding.
Stage 2 (employer): a)The employer chooses the wage level, w for his employee;
b) The employer also announces a non-binding effort level, ê, that he wants the employee to
do.
Stage 3 (employee): The employee has to choose his effort level, e, after he reviews the wage
level set by the employer.
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Note: The final payment of both parties will be decided by the employee’s actual decision on
effort e, and will NOT be decided by the promised or proposed effort.
The combination of wage and actual effort level determine monetary payoffs for the employer
and the employee:
The cost of each real e:
Table C.3: Effort-Cost Table
Effort Level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Calculation of payoffs:
Payoff of the employer = (120− w) ∗ e
The payoff of the employer equals: (120 - the wage he paid to his employee) * the actual effort
level selected by the employee.
Payoff of the employee = w − c(e)− 20
The payoff of the employee equals: the wage received from the employer - the cost of the
actual effort level he selected - 20.
Thus, the higher the effort level provided by the employee and the lower the wage, the larger
the employer’s payoffs. The lower the effort level provided by the employee and the higher the
wage, the larger the employee’s payoffs.
Example:
If the actual wage is 50 and the actual effort level is 0.5, then the payoffs would be:
Employer’s payoffs = (120− 50) ∗ 0.5 = 35 points = $17.5
Employee’s payoffs = 50− 6− 20 = 24 points = $12
Questionnaire: Just to be sure that you understand the instructions you have to solve a simple
questionnaire. When everyone in the room has answered the questionnaire correctly we will start
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the experiment.
The employee promised that if the wage is 60, he will select the effort level of 6. The actual
wage for an employee is 100 and the proposed effort level from the employer is 0.8, and actual
effort level selected by the employee is 0.3, then the payoffs would be:
Employer’s payoff (experimental points):
Employee’s payoff (experimental points):
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Real-effort Baseline
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this study.
You will be making REAL decisions involving REAL money. So, please read the instructions
carefully. Feel free to ask any questions by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other
participants during the experiment. You can use the draft paper we provide, but you are NOT
allowed to use the calculator.
The payoffs in the experiment are represented by Experimental Points. Your payment in the
experiment will be converted to Dollars at a rate of 1 point = $0.5. To ensure anonymity and
confidentiality you were given a random number decal at the beginning of the experiment. You
will need this number to collect your payment.
There are two types of participants: employer and employee.
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly choose with equal chance
whether you will be an employer or an employee. Each person selected to be an employer will be
randomly paired with another person in the room who has been selected as an employee.
The identity of the participants will remain anonymous. You will never know the identity of
the person you were paired with and the other person will never know your identity.
The experiment consists of two stages. The employer pays a wage w to his/her employee, and
the employee needs to do an addition task (e.g., 23+34+72+47+97) for the employer. The number
of correct sums solved by the employee determines the payoffs of the employer. The details are as
follows.
Stage 1 (employer): a) The employer chooses a wage level using an integer number between
20 and 120 (w) for the employee.
b) The employer also proposes a number of correct sums (s∗), that he/she wants the employee
to solve.
Stage 2 (employer): After reviewing the wage level set by the employer, the employee has 3
minutes to do the task.
Note: The final payment of the employer will be decided by the employee’s actual number of
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correct sums (s), and will NOT be decided by the proposed number of correct sums (s∗).
Calculation of payoffs:
Payoff of the employer = (120− w) ∗ s/10
The payoff of the employer equals: (120 - the wage he paid to his employee) * the actual
number of correct sums solved by the employee/10.
Payoff of the employee = w − 20
The payoff of the employee equals: the wage received from the employer - 20.
Thus, the more the questions solved correctly by the employee and the lower the wage, the
larger the employer’s payoffs. The the higher the wage, the larger the employee’s payoffs.
Example:
If the salary is 50 and actual number of correct sums is 5, then the payoffs would be:
Employer’s payoffs = (120− 50) ∗ (5/10) = 35 points = $17.5
Employee’s payoffs = 50− 20 = 30 points = $15
Questionnaire:
Just to be sure that you understand the instructions you have to solve a simple questionnaire.
When everyone in the room has answered the questionnaire correctly we will start the experiment.
The wage for an employee is 100 and the employer wants the employee to solve 8 number of
correct sums. The actual number of correct sums solved by the employee is 3, then the payoffs
would be:
Employer’s payoff (experimental points):
Employee’s payoff (experimental points):
Practice Stage:
Before the start of experiment, you will have the opportunity to perform the addition task so
you get familiar with it.
You have 3 minutes to complete the task. You need to correctly solve adding-up sets of five
two-digit numbers (e.g., 12+23+35+45+54). You will earn $0.50 for each correct answer, and $0
for each incorrect answer.
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Real-effort “C&P" Treatment
Welcome! Thank you for participating in this study.
You will be making REAL decisions involving REAL money. So, please read the instructions
carefully. Feel free to ask any questions by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other
participants during the experiment. You can use the draft paper we provide, but you are NOT
allowed to use the calculator.
The payoffs in the experiment are represented by Experimental Points. Your payment in the
experiment will be converted to Dollars at a rate of 1 point = $0.5. To ensure anonymity and
confidentiality you were given a random number decal at the beginning of the experiment. You
will need this number to collect your payment.
There are two types of participants: employer and employee.
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly choose with equal chance
whether you will be an employer or an employee. Each person selected to be an employer will be
randomly paired with another person in the room who has been selected as an employee.
The identity of the participants will remain anonymous. You will never know the identity of
the person you were paired with and the other person will never know your identity.
The experiment consists of three stages. The employee chooses whether to make a “claim and
promise" or not. The employer pays a wage w to his/her employee, and the employee needs to do
an addition task (e.g., 23+34+72+47+97) for the employer. The number of correct sums solved by
the employee determines the payoffs of the employer. The details are as follows.
Stage 1 (employee): The employee chooses whether to make the following “claim and promise"
or not:
”If the employer offers me the wage , I will solve this number of correct sums: ."
Stage 2 (employer): a) The employer chooses a wage level using an integer number between
20 and 120 (w) for the employee.
b) The employer also proposes a number of correct sums (s∗), that he/she wants the employee
to solve.
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Stage 3 (employer): After reviewing the wage level set by the employer, the employee has 3
minutes to do the task.
Note: The final payment of the employer will be decided by the employee’s actual number of
correct sums (s), and will NOT be decided by promised or proposed number of correct sums.
Calculation of payoffs:
Payoff of the employer = (120− w) ∗ s/10
The payoff of the employer equals: (120 - the wage he paid to his employee) * the actual
number of correct sums solved by the employee/10.
Payoff of the employee = w − 20
The payoff of the employee equals: the wage received from the employer - 20.
Thus, the more the questions solved correctly by the employee and the lower the wage, the
larger the employer’s payoffs. The the higher the wage, the larger the employee’s payoffs.
Example:
If the actual wage is 50 and actual number of correct sums is 5, then the payoffs would be:
Employer’s payoffs = (120− 50) ∗ (5/10) = 35 points = $17.5
Employee’s payoffs = 50− 20 = 30 points = $15
Questionnaire:
Just to be sure that you understand the instructions you have to solve a simple questionnaire.
When everyone in the room has answered the questionnaire correctly we will start the experiment.
The employee promised that if the wage is 60, he will provide 6 correct sums. The actual wage
for the employee is 100 and the employer wants the employee to solve 8 number of correct sums.
The actual number of correct sums solved by the employee is 3, then the payoffs would be:
Employer’s payoff (experimental points):
Employee’s payoff (experimental points):
Practice Stage
Before the start of experiment, you will have the opportunity to perform the addition task so
you get familiar with it.
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You have 3 minutes to complete the task. You need to correctly solve adding-up sets of five
two-digit numbers (e.g., 12+23+35+45+54). You will earn $0.50 for each correct answer, and $0
for each incorrect answer.
End of the Practice Stage (employee)
You have completed the practice task. The number of correct answer you solved is:
The median number of correct sums in this session is:
Please click the button below to proceed to the main part of the experiment.
End of the Practice Stage (employer)
You have completed the practice task.
The median number of correct sums in this session is:
Please click the button below to proceed to the main part of the experiment.
Role Assignment
The computer has selected you to be an employee.
The computer has selected you to be an employer.
TOSCA-3 (subjects need to make choice in the scale No(0)—Yes(4) for each A & B)
1. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error.
A. You would think: “life is not fair."
B. You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation.
2. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very helpful. A
few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as you could.
A. You would be proud that you repaid your debts.
B. You would return the favors as quickly as you could.
3. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
A. You would feel: “well, it was an accident."
B. You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving down the road.
4. You and a group of coworkers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles you out for
a bonus because the project was such a success.
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A. You would feel your hard work had paid off.
B. You would feel you should not accept it.
5. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you,
and your boss criticized you.
A. You would think: “Well, nobody’s perfect."
B. You would think: “I should have recognized the problem and done a better job."
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